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Introduction
The  London  Olympics  of  2012  was  watched  by  a  vast  television  audience  worldwide.
According to the International Olympic Committee, the opening ceremony attracted over 900
million people who saw an elaborate pageant celebrating British history and national culture
(Olympic News, 2012). Images of the opening and closing ceremonies, the sunlit stadium,
the medallists and happy crowds were part of a visual script for the Games that planners had
long  intended  to  project.  For  British  politicians  they  expressed  national  pride  and  civic
achievement, reflecting their approach to London 2012 as a project with distinct aims that
complemented their own agendas. They were quick to assert its successes and benefits.
Britain had “delivered” said Prime Minister David Cameron; the Games were “a spectacular
success” said Tony Blair:  they had portrayed a modern,  multicultural  Britain,  proud of  its
traditions and diverse culture (Topping, 2012). 
London mayor Boris Johnson declared that London had shown it  was the “capital  of  the
world”. He called for “triumphalism” and “pointless displays of irritating flag-waving jingo”. All
had been happiness and harmony: “Across London there has been a happy maelstrom of
parties and celebration ... it has been everywhere.” Johnson continued, “These Games have
not changed us. They have revealed us as we are: people who can pull off great feats...
London has put on a dazzling face to the global audience. For the first time since the end of
the empire, it truly feels like the capital of the world.” (Topping, 2012)
Following the Games all was feel-good. According to Sebastian Coe, chair of the  London
Organising Committee for the Olympic Games, “London 2012 was a once-in-a-generation
opportunity  to  showcase  everything  that  makes  Britain  great...  The  winning,  planning,
delivery and legacy of the Olympic Games called upon all the qualities that make the UK
stand  out  in  the  global  economy.”  (Olympic  News,  2012)  Official  reports  recorded  that
590,000 people had visited London for the event, delivering an economic bonanza for the city
and the wider national economy: by 2020 Games-related benefits were expected to total £41
billion. The Olympics had created jobs and attracted investment: they had also succeeded in
stimulating what London’s mayor called Team London – an engagement of the city’s people
in efforts to help their most disadvantaged fellow Londoners, producing “a sense of unity”
and common purpose (Prashar, 2011).
Others were less certain.  The  Financial  Times observed that  government  figures on the
economic benefits of the Olympics had been called into question by many economists and
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academics  (Blitz,  2013).  Business  Secretary  Vince Cable admitted that  official  estimates
were open to challenge: “It is the best we can do – it is not necessarily something that would
pass muster in the best academic journals”, he said. There were also unresolved questions
about  “legacy”,  about  the  value  of  infrastructural  change  and  of  costly  securitisation
programmes, and the cost of displacing industrial enterprises and housing that “obstructed”
planning for the Games. What were the long-term benefits? Who profited – and how?
These concerns echoed independent assessments of earlier Olympics. In 2008 Canadian
academic Christopher Shaw had published  Five Ring Circus:  Myths and Realities of  the
Olympic Games, an account of how the city of Vancouver won the bid for the 2010 Winter
Olympics.  He examined who was involved and what  motivated their  engagement  in  the
process.  Analysing  the  role  of  corporate  media  in  promoting  the  Games,  and  the
machinations of government and business, he concluded that the Vancouver experience was
“a cautionary tale for  future Olympic bid cities”  (2008,  p.4).  All  such bids,  he suggested,
produced  “crops  of  lies,  broken  promises,  debt,  social  displacement  and  environmental
destruction”. Vancouver’s bid history was “utterly predictive” of what was likely to happen in
London and in Sochi (venue for the 2014 Winter Olympics). He observed:
The same real estate developers organize and drive the Olympic bid, a litany of promises 
– all later broken – are made about people and the environment to garner public support,
and once the bid is won, costs escalate wildly out of control. The names of people and 
places may differ, but the pattern is clearly recognizable across time and space (2008, 
p.4).
The  experience  of  Vancouver  and  of  the  Beijing  Olympics  in  2008  also  demonstrated,
suggested Shaw, the importance of “imagineering” the Games: of constructing a spectacle
that would present specific images of the host city, complementing official narratives of its
history and of national traditions and values (2008, p. xiv). These, he argued, were largely
false accounts of social harmony and political integration, used to endorse the agendas of
those who profited, financially and ideologically, from the Games and its outcomes.
In London, radical critic Mike Marqusee saw the same processes at work. There was an
excess of “Olympic hype” and “boosterism”, he argued, evident in efforts of the mass media
to cajole audiences into “appropriate displays of Olympic enthusiasm... telling us again and
again how unique, how special, how extraordinary these Olympics are (2012).” He observed:
The issues raised by the Olympics are not trivial: security in the context of the war on 
terror and the erosion of civil liberties; outsourcing and privatisation; the global ethics 
of giant corporations; the colonisation of the public realm through the super-enforcement
of intellectual property rights; the subordination of local needs to the imperatives of 
global capital.
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Whatever  genuine  engagement  and  entertainment  the  Games  provided  for  sports
enthusiasts, said Marqusee, the Games was not “a vacation from critical thought”.
City of paradox
Many of  these issues were also examined by academics,  researchers and activists at  a
conference in London in April 2012. London – City of Paradox, held at the University of East
London, set out a framework for critical examination of the Olympics as a political project and
as a spectacle, and for analysis of the city itself as a focus of attention in Olympic year.
Organisers of the conference noted in particular an official emphasis on London as a global
city, one with a long history of cultural diversity which now offered a welcome to people from
across  the  world.  They  observed  that  such  diversity  was  indeed  an  important  part  of
London’s stories past and present, but only a part. Among its many histories were those of
tension and conflict, of exclusion as well as inclusion, and new border controls meant that
many people who wished to visit the city could never do so. The Olympics focused attention
on London and its contradictions past and present.
“Imagineering”  of  London  as  a  Games venue  depicted  the  city  as  uniquely  qualified  to
welcome athletes from 205 nation-states. East London, where an Olympic Park was to be
constructed, was celebrated in bid literature and later in advertising materials as a site of
ethnic diversity, economic transformation and profound social change. On this account, the
‘other’ East London(s), noted conference organisers, had largely disappeared: the East End
as a site of mass poverty, of uneven development, and of repeated struggles over racism
and exclusion was absent from official accounts. The city’s complexities and contradictions,
its contended histories, remained – like its many marginalised communities – ‘invisible’ and
‘silent’. 
As  pre-Olympic  hype  gripped  the  British  media  the  conference  asked  how  to  evaluate
accounts of the city past and present, how to understand the complexities of London 2012 as
civic/national projects, and how to address representations of the city that largely excluded
the mass of  its people and their  experiences. It  drew on insights from across the Social
Sciences  and  Humanities,  including  research  in  Urban  Studies,  History,  Sociology,
Anthropology,  Geography,  Development Studies, Cultural  Studies,  Film Studies, Migration
Studies  and  Refugee  Studies.  The  conference  also  addressed  key  issues  in  cultural
production, especially in relation to public representation of cultural  diversity,  by involving
Third  Sector  organisations  undertaking  community  initiatives,  especially  in  the  arts,  and
practitioners including film-makers, photographers and performers in the theatre and in other
public spaces.
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Participants came from across Europe and North America, presenting some 70 papers and
engaging in a series of plenary sessions on key issues of debate. These were clustered
around a number of complementary themes:
• contending histories: London as an object of historical study; London in the national
narrative; “peoples’ ” histories; London, gender and history; history and community
today; “official” history and the Olympic project;
• London  and  the  world:  colonialism,  neo-colonialism  and  the  metropolitan  city;
commerce, slavery and empire; London and the neoliberal networks; global city –
London and the cities of the South;
• race,  racism  and  the  city:  “hidden”  and  “invisible”  populations;  inclusion  and
exclusion; geographies of community; immigration, work and settlement; refuge and
asylum; citizenship, multiculturalism, “cohesion” and integration today;
• East London: the East End in narratives of London and nation; East London and the
maritime  networks;  the  East  End  as  refuge;  East  End,  gender  and  sexuality;
resistance and radicalism; regeneration and the “new” East End;
• imaging  and  performing  London:  visual  cultures  yesterday  and  today  –  film,
photography, multimedia, performance;
• city and spectacle: London and the Olympic cities – global spectacle and local reality.
Documenting the Olympics then and now.
The conference 
London – City of Paradox was organised by the Centre for Research on Migration, Refugees
and Belonging (CMRB) at the University of East London, in co-operation with Runnymede
Trust, Iniva – International Institute of Visual Arts, London East Research Institute, Raphael
Samuel History Centre, the Centre for Cultural Studies Research, Matrix East Research Lab,
and the Centre for Performance Studies of UEL.
We would like to thank both these organisations for  their  support and hard work and all
conference  participants  in  plenary  sessions,  in  parallel  seminars  and  in  the  informal
workshops. We also thank Mica Nava for her support, as she joined the organising team
when both of us were ill and it seemed that the conference might not take place. We would
also like to thank the tireless Mastoureh Fathi, CMRB and conference administrator, and all
the students and other volunteers who helped to make this event as extraordinary as it was. 
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Finally our thanks to Paolo Cardullo, who worked on transcriptions and on layout of this e-
book, to Rahila Gupta, who edited it,  and to Jamie Hakim, CMRB’s current administrator,
who  organised  the  publication  project.  We hope  this  publication  will  retain  some of  the
flavour, excitement and the energy that characterised the conference and we look forward to
receiving comments from readers.
Contents
This e-book contains a selection of the presentations and discussions at the conference.
They  confirm  the  importance  of  independent  analysis  of  events  that  are  weighted  with
national  and  global  significance,  projected  by  mass  media,  and  in  which  the  lives  and
experiences  of  the  mass of  people  are  marginalised  or  even  excised  in  order  to  serve
interests which may be far from their own. The papers published in this report are those that
were presented in April 2012 and have not been updated to take into account any changes in
legislation or developments since then.
Phil Marfleet and Nira Yuval-Davis (UEL)
CMRB, Conference organizers
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Section 1:
London and
the World
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Glocal London: the Double Crisis of 
Governability and Governmentality    
— Nira Yuval–Davis (UEL)
In a conference called ‘London: City of Paradox’ we need to examine the different ways in
which London is a ‘glocal city’, as so many of the issues discussed in this conference are
specific to London and/or the UK but, at the same time, are also a reflection of much wider
global phenomena. As Saskia Sassen (2012) writes in her paper, global cities are the frontier
battle  zone in the contemporary world and London probably more so than many others,
especially in the year of the Olympics spectacle.
Recent election results across Europe have seen growing disenchantment with incumbent
governments  which  have  been  perceived  as  being  unable  or  unwilling  to  deal  with  the
financial crisis while also maintaining the living standards of ordinary people. Meanwhile in
many countries a series of scandals in the banking sector has led to increasing but as yet
unavailing calls for a major overhaul of the industry which I take to be symptomatic of a crisis
of faith in financial institutions. 
This paper reflects on the overall context in which these events are taking place, and the
ways in which they are related to each other. My argument is that these phenomena are
signs of neoliberalism’s systemic, multi-faceted, global political and economic crisis, a crisis
that  is  central  to  relationships  between  states  and  societies  and  to  constructions  of
subjectivity; and that we are seeing a related crisis of both governability and governmentality.
In the limited space available here I can only outline this crisis in general terms before going
on to focus briefly on some of its implications for political action. But I hope that analysing
events within this context will be suggestive, and point others towards undertaking similar
investigations. My focus here will be on the implications of this double crisis for the growth of
the  global  phenomenon  of  autochthonic  political  projects  of  belonging,  both  locally  and
globally; and also for the simultaneous growth of libertarian activist citizenship movements of
resistance. 
The crisis of governability
Some commentators, like Mike Rustin, have looked at the crisis of governability that occurred
London: City of Paradox — 13
when the British government in the 1970s was not able to control the unions. The current
crisis of governability is a different one: as the recent economic crisis has shown, with the
growing entanglement and dependency not only of local and global markets but also of local
private and public institutions, various states have been forced to bail out banks and large
corporations for fear of total economic collapse. However, the governability of state agencies
vis à vis the private sector – the ability to reinforce regulations – is highly limited. As Robert
Imrie & Mike Raco (2000), Richard Murphy (2011) and others have pointed out, in many
ways there can no longer be a clear differentiation between the public and the private: whole
locations and domains which used to be part of the public space – from schools to shopping
centres – are public no more. In some ways the situation today has parallels with the period
of the enclosures in the 18th century when what was considered to be public land began to
be fenced in; this is a new stage of the same phenomenon but it  is much more radical.
Interestingly – and this is highly significant for contemporary relations between states – these
privately owned assets are now less likely to be held by national corporations. 
Between 1990 and 2006 (and today the figures are even higher), the proportion of global
assets in foreign ownership rose from 9% to 26%, and foreign ownership of government
bonds rose from 11% to 31%. In 1987, when the Kuwait Investment Office took advantage of
the  privatisation  of  British  Petroleum  to  buy  22% of  the  company’s  outstanding  shares,
Thatcher’s government was so horrified by this attack on its ‘crown jewels’ that it  forced
Kuwait Investment to reduce its share to 9.9%. However, when in 2008 Sheikh Mansoor of
Abu Dhabi bought 16% of Barclays Bank and then sold it less than a year later at 70% profit,
“nobody even blinked”. (Independent,  2011). Furthermore, the sphere that is regarded as
part of ‘national security’, and thus as off-limits for foreign ownership, is also continuously
shrinking. A French company now owns a British energy company, and British airports are
owned by a Spanish company. It is not that government cannot bring in regulations; indeed,
some regulations such as the separation between retail and investment banking might well
be introduced as well as further bank levies although the effect of all this might be marginal.
Much of it has to do with the basic legal relationships between corporations and states in
which companies have a status of fictional citizenship which enables the people who run
these companies to escape responsibility  for  the results of  their  corporations’ action:  the
famous ‘LTD’ affix. At a time of globalisation, the ability of companies – and the people who
run them – to change locations, base themselves in tax havens and thus escape having to
bear  the  social,  economic,  environmental  and  other  consequences  of  their  actions  is
becoming clear not just in the South but also in the North.
Moreover,  while states were forced to bail  out banks to avoid major economic collapses,
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states –  such as Ireland, Greece and others and, of course, also the UK – found themselves
forced to cut their budgets severely, against the interests of their citizens, because they have
become dependent on their credit assessment by the global financial market. The City of
London occupies a central place in this global system. David Cameron’s fight to keep the
exceptional position of the City free from regulation and taxation stems out of his attempt to
prevent the desertion of corporations once the extra privileges offered here lose their edge
over those offered to them elsewhere. This, like the tax cuts in the last budget, needs to be
seen as part of the close relationship between the Government and the City; they cannot be
seen as the City being governed by the state. In Italy, these days, corporation technocrats
are even running the state. 
One of the issues that needs further study is the ways in which neoliberal capital interacts
with  authoritarian  states  where  such  a  crisis  of  governability  has  not  taken  place.  The
growing power of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) states highlights the apparent
paradox that global neoliberalism operates most successfully in non-liberal states (Bichler &
Nitzan, 2012).
It is an open question as to what extent authoritarian states can limit internal crises within the
financial sector and not just between it and the state. Neoliberalism, unlike liberalism during
earlier phases of capitalism is not inspired by what Max Weber (1905) called ‘the protestant
ethics’ or long-term investments policy and reliance on production. It can be symbolised by
the hedge fund which is  aimed at  maximising short-term profits  by  stripping assets  and
hunting for new markets to exploit. Asset stripping of what used to be the public sector in
Northern states has been its latest big endeavour.
As Bichler and Nitzan (2010) point out, one can detect major systemic fear among the most
successful  contemporary,  global,  neoliberal  corporations.  Part  of  the explanation  for  this,
probably, is that the two largest commodities traded globally – ie oil and arms – have an
inherent instability and complex relationships with states in both the North and the South and
might prove to be unsustainable in the long term under the present globalised political and
economic system. The situation in Libya is a good but not unique example of this. It is, even
more  than  Syria,  an  example  of  the  growing  imbalance  between  the  global  economic,
political and military powers of states and super-states such as the EU.
All of this, of course, has also had a direct effect on the relationships between state and
society; hence the crisis of governmentality which I am going to address now.
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The crisis of governmentality
In one of her earlier works (2007), Saskia Sassen argued that the liberal state, rather than
weakening as a result of neoliberal globalisation, changed internally so that the executive
powers have strengthened at the expense of the legislative branches of the state. This is a
direct  result  of  the  privatisation  of  the  state  where  a  lot  of  the  regulatory  tasks  of  the
legislative have been lost and, at the same time, it is almost exclusively the executive branch
which negotiates with other national and supranational governance executives (such as the
EU,  the UN, the World Bank,  the WTO) as well  as with private,  national  and especially
transnational corporations.
This is an important observation which offers some explanation of the governmentality crisis:
because of  the increasing power  of  the executive,  there  is  growing disenchantment  and
alienation  from the  state  on  the  part  of  citizens,  who  accordingly  begin  to  refrain  from
internalising  and  complying  with  the  neoliberal  state’s  technologies  of  governance.  This
disenchantment is particularly  important  in countries where voting in national elections is
solely  for  the  election  of  members  of  parliament,  rather  than  also  for  the  head  of  the
executive. At the same time, in parliamentary democracies the right to rule is dependent on
formal  endorsement  of  particular  parties  by  the  electorate;  this  is  what  gives  the  state
legitimacy.  Hence  the  growing  worry  of  governments  at  the  lack  of  involvement  of  the
electorate in both national and local elections. 
The growing securitisation and militarisation of the liberal state need to be related directly to
the  growing  fear  of  ruling  elites  which  stems  from  this  crisis  of  governmentality.  The
resistance of people to this crisis, however, can take widely different forms, depending on
their intersected positionings, identifications and normative values: more or less violent; more
or less radical; more or less guided by primordial versus cosmopolitan value systems. In the
short time I have I can briefly discuss a couple of different modes of resistance. 
The rise of autochthonic political projects of belonging
This can be seen as a direct response to the insecurity engendered by the processes of
neoliberal globalisation. Part of the repertoire of neoliberal governmentality is the removal
from most people of any expectation – let alone guarantee – of long-term employment in the
same place, or even in the same kind of work, or of having regular holidays and sufficient
funds  in  their  pension  for  their  retirement.  This  is  part  of  a  wider  trend  towards  the
displacement of risk from the state and corporations to individuals. Other elements of the
‘risk society’ include housing and place of living, networks of friends, and even membership
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in  a  family  unit  (Beck,  1992).  All  these  new areas  of  uncertainty  push  people  towards
membership in  what  Castells  (1997)  has called “defensive  identity  movements”,  whether
ethnic  or  religious.  Policy-makers  often  respond  to  such  defensive  movements  among
majoritarian  members  of  society  by  attempting  to  take  away  rights  from  migrants  and
refugees as an easy way to appease these anxieties; such initiatives are seen as serving to
reinforce what is perceived of as a weakening sense of national ‘cohesion’.
Since the 1980s there has been a lot of discussion on the rise of what Barker (1981) called
‘the new racism’ and Balibar (1990) ‘racisme differentialiste’ (see also Modood’s notion of
‘cultural  racism’,  2003).  Unlike  the  ‘old’  racism,  these  kinds  of  racialisation  discourses
focused not on notions of ‘races’ or different ethnic origins, but on different cultures, religions
and traditions which were seen as threatening to ‘contaminate’ or ‘overwhelm’ the cultural
‘essence’ of ‘the nation’. 
Peter Geschiere (2009) points out, however, that often the crucial element in the construction
of the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and thus the focus of such political projects of
belonging, is of a somewhat different kind that has gained a new impetus under globalisation
and  mass  immigration,  and  which  he  sees  as  the  global  return  to  the  local.  The  term
Geschiere uses for this phenomenon is the Greek word ‘autochthony’ (to be of the soil) which
is  used  in  the  Netherlands  and  in  the  Francophone  world,  to  differentiate  between  the
‘autochthones’ who belong and the ‘allochthones’ who do not.
Autochthony can be seen as a new phase of  ethnicity although in some senses it  even
surpasses ethnicity (see also Yuval-Davis, 2011a&b). While ethnicity is highly constructed,
relationally and situationally circumscribed, autochthony is a much more ‘empty’ and thus
elastic notion. It states no more than ‘I was here before you’ and, as such, can be applied in
any situation and can be constantly redefined and applied to different groupings in different
ways.  It  combines  elements  of  naturalisation  of  belonging  with  vagueness  as  to  what
constitutes the essence of belonging, and thus can be pursued by groups who would not
necessarily be thought to be autochthone by others. 
The notion  of  an  autochthonic  politics  of  belonging  is  very  important  when  we come to
understand contemporary extreme right politics in Europe and elsewhere. The people who
follow these  politics  always argue that  they  are  not  racist  although  they  are  very  much
against all those who ‘do not belong’. In some cases, such as in the case of the English
Defence  League  (EDL),  organisations  include  a  much  more  diverse  range  of  potential
members than anything imaginable in the older kind of extreme right organisation. The EDL,
at  least  formally,  has  both  Jewish  and  gay  sections,  as  well  as  Hindu,  Sikh  and  Afro-
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Caribbean supporters. In France, Front National leader Marine Le Pen goes to great lengths
to deny that her party is racist, anti-semitic or homophobic. She claims (Guardian, 2012) that
“the right-left divide makes no sense any more. Now the real division is between nationalism
and globalisation”. In the latter context, she warns of the “dilution” and “wiping out” of the
French nation and civilisation, under threat from “never-ending queues of foreigners”. In this
way people’s feelings of helplessness in the face of neoliberalism and the risk-society are
channelled into an anxiety about immigration. With this rhetoric she managed to get around
20% of votes in the first round of the French presidential elections in April 2012. The Greek
anti-immigration extreme right Golden Dawn Party is also on the rise.
Even the BNP, a more ‘old fashioned’ extreme right party, put forward as their candidate for
the London Mayoral elections of 2012 a ‘visible foreigner’, Carlos Cortiglia, (BBC, 2012) who
migrated to the UK from Uruguay and is of Spanish and Italian parentage (although he is
indisputably ‘white’). This was at a time when the BNP’s election campaign was calling for a
search for “the indigene Londoner” whatever this may mean. No wonder that their ‘hybrid’
approach failed them, and that the rising extreme right formation in the UK is the British
Freedom Party, which is working closely with the EDL.
It is important to recognise that this invocation of territorial belonging as a naturalised mode
of exclusion can also characterise the politics of non-majoritarian groupings and can be seen
as the basis of much gang warfare in metropolitan cities as well as in remote mountains in
Africa.
The activist citizen
A very different mode of resistance is what Engin Isin (2009) describes as the emergence of
‘the activist citizens’ who are involved in new acts of citizenship, organised and spontaneous,
which can be situationist, carnivalesque or focused around international courts, the social
media and other forms of social  networking. These ‘active citizens’ campaign for various
citizenship  rights  which  often  transform the  boundaries  between  human  and  civil  rights,
political  and social  rights;  they campaign also for  new additional kinds of  rights such as
ecological, indigenous and sexual. Importantly, activist citizens campaign for rights not only
for themselves and their grouping, collectivity or local neighbourhood, but their focus can be
national,  regional  or  global, putting  citizenship  ‘in  flux’  and  blurring  the  boundaries  and
articulations  of  rights  –  and  responsibilities  –  within  the  state  and  beyond  it.  A similar
construction of citizenship, applied mostly to Latino migrants in the USA, has been called
‘cultural citizenship’ (eg Rosaldo, 1997). However, as Isin notes, the range of issues covered
by activist  citizenship campaigns has been much wider than that  of  the cultural  or  even
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identity  politics  arena.  The  recent  series  of  popular  uprisings  in  various  Middle  Eastern
countries is a good example of such activist citizenship which has been focusing on generic
issues of freedom and democracy. Their heavy reliance on new communication technologies
such  as  mobile  phones,  the  web  and  social  networks  has  also  been  typical.  However,
protesting and fighting against a system of governance can loosen it in the margins, deepen
the crisis  of  governmentality  and maybe  even its  governability  but  does not  necessarily
provide  a  viable  alternative.  It  can  also  supply  legitimacy  to  further  securitisation  and
militarisation of the state and/or create a vacuum for autochthonic identity politics.
At the same time, being co-opted into the apolitical professionalisation and judicialisation of
NGOs  and  community  organisations  which  involves  the  transformation  of  grassroots
movements  into  being  dependent  on a  fund-raising professional  elite  is  not  the  solution
either. Being absorbed by the demands of the system may not leave space or a lever for
alternative structures (Yuval-Davis, 2006).
Whenever I become too depressed I tend to remind myself of Gramsci’s call for ‘pessimism
of the mind, optimism of the will’. We have been trying in this conference to contribute to the
development of a counter-narrative which might lead us to some sustainable insights for the
way forward. So let’s try and stick with good old Gramsci.
But when anomic ‘hopelessness’ dominates the social domain, it is only too easy for anger,
injustice and hopelessness to be converted to an autochthonic ‘politics of blame’ which, at its
most extreme, involves a figure like Breivik (Anders Breivik who carried out mass murder in
Norway in 2011) trying to physically annihilate ‘multiculturalism’. The loss of hope is a major
threat to democracy and not just an emotional malaise. So, let us take some comfort and
hope from recent victories for the left in Latin America, Europe and elsewhere, and the small
but detectable cracks opening up in the overwhelming consensus on austerity. But let us also
continue to search for alternative transformative structures which will not repeat the flaws of
the ‘old’ – or the ‘new’ – left.
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Understanding the Crisis 
— Michael Rustin (UEL)
I should remind you that we are in the middle of a social and economic crisis which is both
national  and  international.  Furthermore  it  has  one  of  its  main  centres  here  in  London
because of the importance of its financial sector.  I  shall  draw a comparison between the
crisis of the 1970s, which gave rise to Thatcherism, and the crisis of the ‘credit crunch’ of
2007-8 which, in light of the present Coalition Government, gave rise to Thatcherism mark II. 
What I am going to say derives from an online symposium on the ‘present conjuncture’ to
which Doreen Massey, Stuart Hall and I have contributed (Rutherford and Davison, 2012).
This has been followed by the launch of  After Neoliberalism? The Kilburn Manifesto which
can also be found on-line (Hall,  Massey and Rustin,  2013).  Although this  session of  the
conference is titled 'London and the Empire',  I  am not  going to talk  directly  about  those
topics, as previous speakers have done, linking them to the Olympic Games.1 However, the
present  economic  crisis  is  also  connected  to  the  history  of  Empire,  insofar  as  the
predominance of the financial sector in Britain’s economic life is a carry-over from its imperial
past. Britain’s continual addiction to military intervention in, for example, Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Libya (usually as junior partners of the USA) follows from this conception of its role.
Many  public  rituals  reinforce  this  national  self-conception:  for  example,  there  are  the
commemorations of servicemen who have lost their lives, and the military initiations of the
royal princes. Down the road from the Docklands University campus, Britain’s arms industry
holds a large bi-annual trade fair at the Excel Exhibition Centre. 
The crisis of the 1970s was the beginning of the end of the post-war welfare settlement. Its
origins lay in the unresolved class tensions of that settlement. Governments had been unable
to find a  viable  compromise between the claims of  labour,  or  develop a  viable  plan for
productive economic development. The 1970s saw severe political instability culminating in
1 The  Olympics,  like  other  such  spectacles,  are  a  significant  new  mode  of  production  of  global
capitalism.  Themselves  managed,  like  FIFA or  like  an  international  corporation,  they  assemble
corporate partners, negotiate an invariably favourable deal with a national government, and descend as
a caravan on the host city, which provides the necessary spatial location for what is essentially a global
media event.  (Rustin, 2009).  
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the  calling-in  of  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  in  1976  to  restore  ‘economic
discipline’. The climax of this crisis was the ‘Winter of Discontent’ of 1978-9, public sector
workers’ strikes which caused serious disruption and discredited the Labour Government of
James Callaghan, leading to its defeat by Mrs Thatcher in the General Election of 1979. 
Some will remember the petering out of the ‘white heat of the technological revolution’ which
had been proclaimed by Harold Wilson in 1964, and the failure of the ‘consensus model’ of
economic regulation which had been attempted under different governments by Macmillan,
Heath,  Wilson  and  Callaghan  in  the  1960s  and  70s.  That  was  the  era  of  the  National
Economic Development Council (NEDC), the National Incomes Commission (NIC), and the
National Plan instigated and then abandoned by the Wilson government of 1964. Those were
also  the  days  of  that  strange  character,  Solomon  Binding:  the  ‘solemn  and  binding’
agreement between government and trade unions which in reality signified the failure of the
Labour Government to establish a statutory basis for its industrial relations policy. Thus the
crisis  became  defined  as  the  ‘ungovernability’  of  Britain.  It  was  indeed  the  case  that
successive governments in 1969, 1974 and 1979 were defeated directly or indirectly by the
resistance of trade unions to the control of wage rises or to legislation intended to constrain
the  trade  unions’  power.  In  essence  this  was  a  crisis  rooted  in  class  conflict  and
contradiction. 
The title of this Conference is London: City of Paradox. However I am more interested in the
contradictions than I am in the paradoxes: that is to say less in the surprising diversity of the
urban scene and its juxtapositions and more in its underlying conflicts and tensions. 
Now, as a consequence of this major crisis of the late 1970s, Margaret Thatcher came to
power with a plan to bring about a major change in the balance of power in society. This was
seen in terms of the fundamental balance of forces between labour and capital, but also as a
broader reassertion of  authority and hierarchy against the wave of  dissidence which had
been unleashed during the late 1960s and 1970s.  Among her first  steps were anti-trade
union legislation and the sell-off of council housing under the ‘right to buy’ legislation. The
purpose  of  the  latter  was  to  inculcate  individualist  attitudes  and  aspirations  which  were
thought to accompany home ownership and to undermine the ‘collectivist’ basis of the Labour
vote in working-class neighbourhoods. The government instigated a massive deflation whose
effect was to weaken the bargaining power of workers. A consequence of this was further
large-scale de-industrialisation from which much of Britain still suffers. The opportunity which
existed during the 1980s to use North Sea oil revenues as an investment fund with which to
build a new economy was not taken, as it was in Norway.
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This programme was at first extremely unpopular, and but for the  ‘good luck’ of the Falklands
War in 1982 it  seems likely that  the Tory government would have lost  the 1983 General
Election. This of course takes us back to the theme of Empire and its continuing role in
British society. (Barnett, 2012). However, once that election was won, the way was clear for
Thatcherism to develop its (counter-) revolutionary programme in a more uncompromising
spirit  than in  its  first  years of  office  when it  had been held  back  by caution  and by the
presence in the Cabinet of several survivors of the era of ‘consensus politics’ and of a politics
of negotiation with the working-class, which included a continuing commitment to the welfare
state. 
Then came the Miners’ Strike of 1984-5, more carefully prepared for by the government than
by the National Union of Mineworkers. The defeat of the miners was followed by the ‘Big
Bang’ of 1985 (that is to say the end of capital controls and the deregulation of financial
institutions), the privatisation of formerly publicly owned industry and utilities, like water, gas
and electricity (the era of ‘Sid’), and then the beginning of ‘modernisation’ of the public sector,
to make it conform to corporate sector and market norms. This modernisation was continued
by John Major’s government and later by that of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. Privatisation
is of course going even further and faster under the present Coalition government. 
The growing hegemony of neoliberalism followed the election not only of Margaret Thatcher
in  Britain  but  also  of  Ronald  Reagan  in  the  USA in  1980.  The  defeat  of  European
Communism in 1989 further cleared the way for this radical remaking of the post-war world
and for the unravelling of the post-war social compromise.  For whatever one might have
thought  about  state socialism in the Soviet  Union and in  Eastern Europe (there was no
reason to think much of it),  it  had nevertheless functioned as a competitor to capitalism,
causing market societies in the West to remember that their populations had an alternative
they might  turn to if  they failed to deliver satisfaction to their  peoples.  As we know, this
financialised and globalised neoliberal system encountered its own crisis in 2007-8. 
This was however a different kind of crisis to that  of  the 1970s, and the similarities and
differences  between them need  to  be explored.  Whereas  the first  crisis  was caused  by
conflicts  between  classes,  both  overt  and  covert,  the  second  did  not  come about  as  a
consequence of working-class militancy or resistance to what capital was doing. The credit
crunch occurred because the failure  of  ‘sub-prime’ mortgages led  to  the collapse of  the
banking system through various cascade effects over the western world. Householders were
not refusing to meet their payments; they were not staging a mortgage strike; they were just
unable to pay.  The banks foreclosed on many of  them, and then found themselves with
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unrealisable assets, or bad debts. 
There was nevertheless a ‘class dimension’ to this crisis, even if it was brought about by the
weakness rather than the strength of the working-class in relation to the institutions of capital.
The sub-prime mortgage crisis was a reflection of increasing inequality and impoverishment
in the United States. Populations whose living standards needed to rise to sustain, through
their consuming power, investment and production in the USA were in fact becoming poorer.
This was in part a ‘Keynesian’ crisis of under-consumption, although this itself  had as its
cause the competitive failure of the productive economy of the USA in the face of overseas
and especially Chinese competition. In David Lockwood’s terms (Lockwood, 1964; Rustin,
2008) one could describe this as a ‘system’ but not a ‘social’ contradiction of capitalism, a
social  contradiction  being  defined  as  one  which  has  become manifest  in  social  conflict.
Lockwood’s definition has some parallels with Marx’s distinction between a ‘class in itself’
and a ‘class for itself.’ This was a different kind of contradiction from the overt class conflicts
which were seen in the 1970s, which were reflected in excess demand leading to high rates
of inflation and in a ‘fiscal crisis of  the state’ (O’Connor,  2001) which was attributable to
increased social expenditures whose collectivist purpose was to mitigate and compensate for
the effects of market forces. 
Thus  banks  and  other  institutions  which  had  been  gambling  on  real  estate  and  on
speculative  financial  trading,  in  the  absence  of  more  productive  kinds  of  investment,
essentially went bust, and the whole financial system began to unravel. What has happened
since then is that governments and  de facto taxpayers have been bailing out these banks
and the rest of the financial sector,  ‘socialising’ their  losses, without so far being able to
persuade them to re-invest  on a  sufficient  scale  in  the  productive  economies to restore
previous levels of economic growth.
I  did not  anticipate the system’s intransigent resistance to what seemed like the obvious
adjustments needed to restore it to health. Given that there was little pressure from below to
redistribute income and wealth, and so little effective pressure for a turn to collectivism, what
risk to it would there be in a measure of Keynesian reflation and in some restoration of the
real purchasing power of citizens? Gordon Brown’s initial success in 2008 in organising an
international response to the crisis rescued the banking system and suggested that such
more  long-term  reforms  might  be  the  way  things  would  go.  But  this  is  not  what  has
happened.  The  absence  of  organised  opposition  or  ideas  contrary  to  neoliberalism  has
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merely empowered the establishments to brush aside criticism of their system.2 They have
instead argued that an even more radical pursuit of the ideology of the market is the only way
to resolve the crisis: hence the obsession with deficit reductions similar, in its ideology and
effects, to the deflation that was caused by the return to the Gold Standard that happened
after the First World War.  The neoliberal response to the crisis has taken the form of a
renewal  of  hard-line  Thatcherism,  under  the  protection  of  the  Coalition  with  the  Liberal
Democrats, who have been effectively trapped by the Conservatives.3  
A similar neoliberal approach has prevailed in the European Union. It has been decided that
the  Euro  zone  will  be  maintained  in  the  economic  interests  of  Germany  and  its  north
European  allies,  with  an  even  more  radical  constraint  of  budgets  than  was  previously
imposed by the European Central Bank. Capital holders have been protected, at the cost of
the  immiseration  of  the  people  and  severe  damage  to  the  economies  of  the  European
periphery, such as Greece, Spain and Portugal. Their economies cannot succeed in a single
currency zone which lacks systems of economic redistributions of both capital and income,
such as might enable them eventually to become competitive economies. 
In Britain, the Coalition government has seized the opportunity provided by the financial crisis
to engineer  a major  rebalancing of  the economy away from the public  and towards the
private  sector.  The  idea  was  supposed  to  be  that  enhanced  efficiency  and  new private
investment  would  restore  growth  and  prosperity.  This  has  not  happened;  at  the  time of
writing, Gross National Product was still lower than it was when the crisis struck. Much of the
supposed rebalancing of the economy that has taken place (for example, reduced public and
increased private sector employment) results not from new economic activity, but from the
outsourcing to the private sector of existing activities that are in fact still funded from taxation.
The British private sector has increasingly become parasitic on government and the ‘licenses
to print money’ (franchises and contracts of many kinds) that it affords them rather than the
largely separate and independent sector it used to be. 
2 One area where governments do at length seemed inclined to act is in regard to the evasion of taxes by
globalised corporations. It seemed to me at an earlier stage that governments would be unlikely to put
up with this direct challenge to the power and capacity to function. 
3 A minority Tory government would have been much weaker than the Coalition has been, but for the Lib
Dems this would have carried the risk of an early dissolution of Parliament and their annihilation in an
early  election.  The  course they adopted  has  (probably) given  them five  years  in  government.  The
problem has been that  no one has been willing to argue forcefully  against  the false ‘public sector
deficit’ account of the economic crisis. TINA (‘there is no alternative’) has reappeared on the scene,
largely without challenge. 
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The marketisation or quasi-marketisation of health, education, and virtually all other public
services is another aspect of the implementation of this neoliberal ideology. Colin Crouch
(2012) has valuably pointed out that although such reforms are invariably carried out in the
name of  the  superiority  of  markets  over  other  forms  of  organisation,  what  has  actually
happened is that large corporations have become able to manipulate both markets, through
their quasi-monopoly powers, and governments, through lobbying, their control of media, and
the financing of political parties. ‘The market’ exists as much as an ideology which conceals
the truth, as it does as the main economic reality. 
The dominant neoliberal response to the financial crisis has another explanation beyond the
sheer greed of the propertied and their reluctance to surrender any of their wealth and power.
Faced with intense competition from the ’emerging economies’ of Asia, Latin America and
elsewhere, those in charge of the ‘advanced economies’ now see no means of competing
with them other than by driving down wage levels, welfare expenditures and social protection
within their own systems. The idea seems to be that rising wages in the emerging economies
might  meet  falling  wages  in  the  ‘advanced’  at  some  mid-point.  The  earlier  hope  has
diminished  that  the  West  could  simply  move  its  economies  higher  up  the  value-chain,
concentrating on activities which require higher educational and cultural inputs than routine
manufacturing,  and  compete  with  them on  that  basis.  (This  was  the  economic  strategy
implied by Tony Blair’s  slogan ‘education,  education,  education’.)  Some of  the ‘emerging
economies’ just seem to be more dynamic and nimble than anyone imagined they would be.
They are by no means prepared to settle for the role of implementers of designs and the
assemblers of parts ‘made in the West.’ 
What these severe difficulties in competing successfully expose is that a quasi-laisser faire
model of economic development is wholly inadequate to the modern economic environment.
Just  as  large  corporations  plan  their  investments  and  activities  over  the  long-term,  so
governments need to do the same for their entire economies. Neoliberalism is a disastrous
ideology because it denies this now surely obvious fact of economic life. (Mazzucato, 2013)
New Labour has a significant responsibility for the programmes of public sector marketisation
that have been pushed forward so aggressively by the Coalition. Private Finance Initiatives
(PFI) were a means by which Gordon Brown sought to ‘disguise’ public investment, loading
public  institutions such as hospitals  with unsustainable debt  in  the  process.  The PFI  for
London Underground was a major failure of this kind. However, Labour was divided on these
issues and marketisation was also restrained while it was in office by party and trade union
resistance to it.  It  is highly unlikely that the NHS, the school system, or local authorities,
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would have been treated by Labour as they are now being by the Coalition. The fact that
Blair  was  removed  as  Prime  Minister  signified  some  backtracking  from  New  Labour’s
‘modernising’ (i.e. marketising) agenda, even though it was provoked by the Iraq War.  
The Coalition’s programme now seems to proceed as far and as fast with its ‘rebalancing’
reforms as it can. Remaining in office is a means to an end for this ideologically-motivated
government,  not  an  end  in  itself.  It  calculates  that  it  can  make  many  changes  almost
irrevocable, if it acts with sufficient resolution even if it has only five years, for the time being,
to make them. 
What is so far lacking is any sign of a coherent counter-strategy from the Labour Party. The
needs seem obvious  enough.  There  must  be  a  rebalancing  of  the  economy away  from
London and the south-east. New areas for productive investment need to be identified with
the much improved system of intelligence and planning necessary to make this possible.
There needs to be a reform of the banking system, to make it socially accountable, and to
increase its capacity and willingness to invest  in  economically useful  ways.  The military-
imperial  traditions which have dominated British foreign policy almost  without interruption
need to be challenged, as has previously happened during the campaign against the Iraq
War,  and  by  CND  in  its  two  large  campaigns.  There  needs  to  be  a  regeneration  of
government, especially at local and regional levels, so that the democratic ‘voice’ in decision
making can be enhanced. There needs to be more vigorous action to ‘green’ the economy
and to reduce carbon consumption. There needs to be a reform of corporate governance,
according to the ‘stakeholder model’ which has been advocated for nearly 30 years by Will
Hutton (1996).  There needs to be a reinvention of  the European Union,  to  enhance the
redistributive  and  investment  functions  of  government  within  it,  since  it  is  plain  that  the
existing model of a ‘single market’ ensures neither prosperity nor justice.
Yet  so  far,  Labour  remains  largely  silent.  It  seems unwilling  to  defend its  by  no  means
discreditable record in government. Why should it be so difficult to say the obvious, that the
last Labour government brought 13  years of relative prosperity from 1997-2010, as well as
considerable improvements in public services, when its Coalition successor has brought only
three years of stagnation, or worse, and a savaging of public goods? It has been suggested
that Labour is playing a subtle waiting game, unwilling to disclose its policy hand until close
to the date of the next election. But the wait, if that is what it is, is getting to be a dangerously
long one, and in the meantime the Coalition’s false analysis of the economic crisis, and its
projection of sacrifice and blame on the most vulnerable, holds the field largely unchallenged.
The underlying social  and economic  facts  –  worsening living  standards,  declining public
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goods – still seem to tell in Labour’s favour. But the interpretation of such ‘facts’ to voting
publics  has  a  decisive  role  in  determining political  outcomes too.  At  this  point,  it  is  the
Coalition politicians who seem to have most confidence in themselves and their prospects.
Need it really take two terms in opposition for a Party to recover from a fairly narrow defeat,
and resume the capacity to think and talk confidently about what it intends to do when it
returns to power? 
One must hope not, since the consequences of another five years of the Conservatives, with
or without their Liberal Democratic allies, hardly bears contemplating.
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When Cities become Extreme 
Sites for our Major Challenges   
— Saskia Sassen (Columbia)
Urban capabilities have often been crafted out of collective efforts to go beyond the conflicts
and racisms that mark an epoch. It is out of this type of dialectic that emerged the open
urbanity  that  made  European  cities  historically  spaces  for  the  making  of  expanded
citizenship. One factor feeding these positives was that cities became strategic spaces also
for the powerful and their need for self-representation and projection onto a larger stage. The
modest middle classes and the powerful both found in the city a space for their diverse “life
projects.” 
It is impossible to do full justice to all the aspects of this process in such a short essay. I use
two types of acute challenges facing cities to explore how urban capabilities can alter what
originates as hatred and as war: one is asymmetric war and the urbanising of war it entails;
the other is the hard work of making open cities and repositioning the immigrant and the
citizen as, above all, urban subjects rather than essentially different subjects as much of the
anti-immigrant and racist commentary does (Sassen, 2011).4
Cities as frontier zones
The large, complex, especially global, city is a new frontier zone. Actors from different worlds
meet there, but there are no clear rules of engagement. Whereas the historic frontier was to
be found in the far stretches of colonial empires, today’s frontier zone is in our large cities. It
is  a  strategic  frontier  zone  for  global  corporate  capital.  Much  of  the  work  of  forcing
deregulation, privatisation, and new fiscal and monetary policies on the host governments
had to do with creating the formal instruments to construct their equivalent of the old military
“fort” of the historic frontier: the regulatory environment they need in city after city worldwide
to ensure a global space of operations.
But  it  is  also  a  strategic  frontier  zone  for  those  who  lack  power,  those  who  are
4 I have explored the notion of urban capabilities in a range of other histories, including most recently the
‘occupy’ movements in Globalizations (2011) and Art Forum (2012).
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disadvantaged,  outsiders,  and discriminated minorities.  The disadvantaged and excluded
can gain presence in  such cities,  presence vis-à-vis  power  and presence vis-à-vis  each
other. This signals the possibility of a new type of politics, centred in new types of political
actors. This is one instance of what I seek to capture with the concept of urban capabilities. It
is not simply a matter of having or not having power. There are new hybrid bases from which
to act. One outcome we are seeing in city after city is the making of informal politics.
Both the work of making the public and making the political in urban space  become critical
at  a  time of  growing  velocities,  the  ascendance  of  process  and  flow over  artefacts  and
permanence, massive structures that are not on a human scale, and branding as the basic
mediation between individuals and markets. The work of design since the 1980s has tended
to produce narratives that add to the value of existing contexts, and at its narrowest, to the
utility logics of the economic corporate world. But the city can “talk back”; for instance, there
is also a kind of public-making work that can produce disruptive narratives, and make legible
the local and the silenced. Here we can detect yet another instance of what I think of as
urban capabilities.
These urban capabilities also signal the possibility of making new subjects and identities in
the city.  Often it  is  not  so much the ethnic,  religious phenotype that  dominates in  urban
settings, but the urbanity of the subject and of the setting, even when national politics is
deeply  anti-immigrant.  For  instance,  one  cannot  avoid  noticing  that  when  former  pro-
immigration mayors of large US cities become presidential candidates, they shift to an anti-
immigration stance.  A city’s sociality can bring out and underline the urbanity of subject and
setting, and dilute more essentialist signifiers. It is often the need for new solidarities when
cities confront major challenges that can bring this shift about. This might force us into joint
responses and from there on to the emphasis of an urban, rather than individual or group
subject and identity – such as an ethnic or religious subject and identity. 
Against  the background of  a partial  disassembling of  empires and nation-states,  the city
emerges as a strategic site for making elements of new, perhaps even for making novel,
partial orders.5 Where in the past national law might have been the law, today subsidiarity but
also the new strategic role of cities, makes it possible for us to imagine a return to urban law.
We see a resurgence of urban law-making, a subject I discuss in depth elsewhere (Sassen,
2008, ch 2 and ch 6).6 For instance, in the US, a growing number of cities have passed local
laws (ordinances)  that  make their  cities sanctuaries for  undocumented immigrants;  other
5 One synthesising image we might use to capture these dynamics is the movement from centripetal
nation state articulation to a centrifugal multiplication of specialised assemblages.
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cities have passed environmental laws that only hold for the particular cities. 
In my larger project I identified a vast proliferation of such partial assemblages that remix bits
of territory, authority, and rights, once ensconced in national institutional frames. In the case
of Europe these novel assemblages include those resulting from the formation and ongoing
development of the EU, but also those resulting from a variety of cross-city alliances around
protecting the environment, fighting racism, and other worthy causes. And they result from
sub-national struggles and the desire to make new regulations for self-governance at the
level of the neighbourhood and the city. A final point to elaborate the strategic importance of
the city for shaping new orders is that, as a space, the city can bring together multiple and
diverse struggles and engender a larger,  more encompassing push for  a new normative
order. 
These are among the features that make cities a space of great complexity and diversity. But
today cities confront major conflicts that can reduce that complexity to mere built-up terrain or
cement jungle. The urban way of confronting extreme racisms, governmental wars on terror,
the future crises of climate change, is to make these challenges occasions to further expand
diverse urban capabilities and to expand the meaning of membership. 
Cities and political subjectivity: When powerlessness becomes complex 
Cities are one of the key sites where new norms and new identities are made. They have
been such sites at various times and in various places, and under very diverse conditions.
This role can become strategic in particular times and places – as is the case today in global
cities – a  trend that is counterintuitive but has by now been extensively documented (Sassen
1991/2001; 2012). Today a certain type of city – the global city – has proliferated across the
world  and  emerged  as  a  strategic  site  for  innovations  and  transformations  in  multiple
institutional  domains.  Several  of  the  key  components  of  economic  globalisation  and
digitisation are concentrated in global cities and produce dislocations and destabilisations of
existing  institutional  orders  that  go  well  beyond  cities.7 Further,  some  of  the  key  legal,
6 The emergent landscape I am describing promotes a multiplication of diverse spatio-temporal framings
and diverse normative mini-orders, where once the dominant logic was toward producing grand unitary
national spatial, temporal, and normative framings. See Sassen (2008).
7 Emphasising  this  multiplication  of  partial  assemblage contrasts  with  much  of  the  globalisation
literature that has tended to assume the binary of the global versus the national. In this literature the
national is understood as a unit. I emphasise that the global can also be constituted inside the national,
i.e. the global city. Further, the focus in the globalisation literature tends to be on the powerful global
institutions that have played a critical role in implementing the global corporate economy and have
reduced the power of the state. In contrast, I also emphasise that particular components of the state have
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regulatory  and  normative  frames  for  handling  urban  conditions  are  now part  of  national
framing; much of what is called urban development policy is national economic policy. It is
the concentration of these new dynamics in these cities that forces the need to craft new
types of  responses and innovations on the part  of  both the most  powerful  and the most
disadvantaged, albeit for very different types of survival. 
In contrast, from the 1930s up until the 1970s, when mass manufacturing dominated, cities
had lost  strategic  functions  and were not  sites  for  creative  institutional  innovations.  The
strategic sites were the large factory at the heart of the larger process of mass manufacturing
and mass consumption. The factory and the government were the strategic sites where the
crucial dynamics producing the major institutional innovations of the epoch were located. My
own reading of the Fordist city corresponds in many ways to Weber’s (1921) in the sense
that the strategic scale under Fordism is the national scale: cities lose significance. But I part
company from Weber in that historically the large Fordist factory and the mines emerged as
key sites for the making of a modern working class and as a syndicalist project; it  is not
always the city that is the site for making norms and identities.
With globalisation and digitisation—and all the specific elements they entail—global cities do
emerge as strategic sites for making norms and identities. Some reflect extreme power, such
as the global managerial elites, and others reflect innovation under extreme duress: notably
much of what happens in immigrant neighbourhoods. While the strategic transformations are
sharply concentrated in global cities, many are also enacted (besides being diffused) in cities
at lower orders of national urban hierarchies.
Current conditions in these cities are creating not only new structurations of power but also
operational and rhetorical openings for new types of political actors which may long have
been invisible or without voice. A key element of the argument here is that the localisation of
strategic  components  of  globalisation  in  these  cities  means  that  the  disadvantaged  can
engage new forms of contesting globalised corporate power. Further, the growing numbers
and diversity of the disadvantaged in these cities takes on a distinctive “presence.” 
Critical in this process is to recover some of the differences between being powerless and
being invisible or impotent. The disadvantaged in global cities can gain “presence” in their
engagement with power but also vis-à-vis each other. This is different from the 1950s to the
1970s  in  the  US,  for  instance,  when  white  flight  and  the  significant  departure  of  major
actually gained power because they have to do the work of implementing policies necessary for a
global corporate economy. This is another reason for valuing the more encompassing normative order
that a city can (though does not necessarily) generate.
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corporate  headquarters  left  cities  hollowed  out  and  the  disadvantaged  in  a  condition  of
abandonment.  Today,  the  localisation  of  the  most  powerful  global  actors  in  these  cities
creates  a set  of  objective  conditions of  engagement:   for  example the struggles  against
gentrification which encroaches on minority and disadvantaged neighbourhoods, which led to
growing numbers of homeless in the 1980s and struggles for the rights of the homeless; or
demonstrations against police brutalising minority people. Elsewhere (Sasken, 2008) I have
developed the case that while these struggles are highly localised, they actually represent a
form of global engagement; their globality is a horizontal,  multi-sited recurrence of similar
struggles  in  hundreds  of  cities  worldwide.  These  struggles  are  different  from the ghetto
uprisings  of  the 1960s,  which were short,  intense eruptions confined to the ghettos and
causing most of the damage in the neighbourhoods of the disadvantaged themselves. In
these ghetto uprisings, there was no engagement with power, but rather a protest against
power. 
The  conditions  that  today  make  some  cities  strategic  sites  are  basically  two,  and  both
capture major transformations that are destabilising older systems organising territory and
politics: one of these is the re-scaling of what are the strategic territories that articulate the
new politico-economic system and hence at least some features of power; the other is the
partial unbundling or at least weakening of the national as container of social process due to
the variety of dynamics encompassed by globalisation and digitisation. The consequences
for  cities  of  these two conditions  are  many:  what  matters here is  that  cities  emerge as
strategic sites for major economic processes and for new types of political actors.
What is being engendered today in terms of  political  practices in the global  city is quite
different from what it might have been in the medieval city of Weber. In the medieval city we
see a set of practices that allowed the burghers to set up systems for owning and protecting
property against more powerful actors, such as the king and the church, and to implement
various immunities against despots of all  sorts.  Today’s political  practices, I would argue,
have to do with the production of “presence” by those without power and with a politics that
claims rights to the city rather than protection of property. What the two situations share is
the notion that through these practices new forms of political subjectivity, i.e. citizenship, are
being constituted and that the city is a key site for this type of political work. The city is, in
turn,  partly  constituted  through  these  dynamics.  Far  more  so  than  a  peaceful  and
harmonious suburb, the contested city is where the civic is getting built. 
But what happens to these urban capabilities when war goes asymmetric, and when racisms
fester in cities where growing numbers become poor and have to struggle for survival? Here
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follows a brief discussion of two cases that illustrate how cities can enable powerlessness to
become complex. In this complexity lies the possibility of making the political, making history.
The urbanising of war
Today’s urbanising of war differs from past histories of cities and war in modern times. In the
Second World War, the city entered the war theatre not as a site for war-making but as a
technology for instilling fear: Dresden and Hiroshima are iconic cases of the full destruction
of cities as a way of terrorising a whole nation. Today, when a conventional army goes to war
the enemy is mostly irregular combatants, who lack tanks and aircraft and hence prefer to do
the fighting in cities.  The countries with the most powerful conventional armies today cannot
afford to repeat Dresden with firebombs, or  Hiroshima with an atomic bomb—whether in
Baghdad,  Gaza or  the  Swat  valley.  They can engage in  all  kinds  of  activities,  including
violations of the law: rendition, torture, assassinations of leaders they do not like, excessive
bombing of civilian areas, and so on, in a history of brutality that can no longer be hidden and
seems  to  have  escalated  the  violence  against  civilian  populations  (Cole,  2009  and
Rajagopal, 2008). But superior military powers stop short of pulverising a city, even when
they have the weapons to do so. The US could have pulverised Baghdad and Israel could
have pulverised Gaza. But they did not.  
It seems to me that the reason was not respect for life or the fact that killing of unarmed
civilians is illegal according to international law. It has more to do with a vague constraint that
remains unstated: the notion that the mass killing of people in a city is a different type of
horror from allowing the deaths of massive numbers of people year after year in jungles and
in villages due to a curable disease such as malaria. The mix of people and buildings—in a
way, the civic—has the capacity to temper destruction. Not to stop it, but to temper it. So it is
not the death of human beings as such. It is people in the context of the city. 
Over and over history shows us the limits of power.8 It would seem that unilateral decisions
by the greater power are not the only source of restraint: In an increasingly interdependent
world,  the  most  powerful  countries  find  themselves  restrained  through  multiple
interdependencies. To this I add the city as a weak regime that can obstruct and temper the
destructive  capacity  of  a  superior  military  power.  It  is  one  more  capability  for  systemic
survival in a world where several countries have the capacity to destroy the planet (Sassen,
8 A separate source for unilateral restraint is tactical: Thus theorists of war posit also that the superior
military force should, for tactical reasons, signal to its enemy that it has not used its full power.    
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2008, ch.  8).9 Under these conditions the city becomes both a technology for  containing
conventional military powers and a technology of  resistance for  armed insurgencies.  The
physical and human features of the city are an obstacle for conventional armies—an obstacle
wired into urban space itself. 10
Cities as frontier spaces: the hard work of keeping them open
The preceding section signals that  if  the city is to survive as a space of complexity and
diversity—and not become merely a built-up terrain or cement jungle—it needs capabilities to
transform conflict. It will have to find a way to go beyond the fact of conflicts, whether they
result from racisms, from governmental wars on terror, or from the future crises of climate
change (Marcuse, 2002).
This implies the possibility of making new subjectivities and identities. For instance, often it is
the urbanity of the subject and of the setting that mark a city, rather than ethnicity, religion, or
phenotype. The urbanity of subject and setting often comes out of hard work and painful
trajectories. One question is whether it can also come out of the need for new solidarities in
cities confronted by major challenges, such as violent racisms or environmental crises. The
acuteness and overwhelming character of the major challenges cities confront today can
serve to create conditions where the challenges are bigger and more threatening than a
city’s internal conflicts and hatreds. This might force us into joint responses and from there
onto the emphasis of an urban, rather than individual or group, subject and identity—such as
an ethnic or religious subject and identity. 
One  important  instance  in  the  making  of  norms  concerns  immigration.  What  must  be
emphasised here is the hard work of making open cities and repositioning the immigrant and
the citizen as urban subjects that inevitably, mostly, transcend this difference. In the daily
9 From a larger angle than the one that concerns me here, when great powers fail in this self-restraint we
have what Mearsheimer (2003) has called the tragedy of great powers. 
10 This dual process of urbanisation of war and militarisation of urban life unsettles the meaning of the
urban (Graham 2010). Marcuse (2002) writes that “the War on terrorism is leading to a continued
downgrading of the quality of life in US cities, visible changes in urban form, the loss of public use of
public space, restriction on free movement within and to cities, particularly for members of darker
skinned  groups,  and  the  decline  of  open  popular  participation  in  the  governmental  planning  and
decision-making process.” Second it questions the role of cities as welfare providers. The imperative of
security means a shift in political priorities. It implies a cut or a relative decrease in budgets dedicated
to social  welfare,  education,  health,  infrastructure development,  economic regulation and planning.
These two trends, in turn, challenge the very concept of citizenship (Sassen, 2008, chapter 6, Graham,
2011 and Marcuse, 2002, pp. 596-606).
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routines of a city the key factors that rule are work, family, school, public transport, and so
on, and this holds for both immigrants and citizens. Perhaps the sharpest marking difference
in  a  city  is  between  the  rich  and  the  poor,  and  each  of  these  classes  includes  both
immigrants and citizens (Smith and Favell, 2006). It is when the law and the police enter the
picture that the differences of immigrant status versus citizen status become key factors. But
most of daily life in the city is not ruled by this differentiation.
Here I address this issue from the perspective of the capacity of urban space to make norms
and make subjects that can escape the constraints of dominant power systems such as the
nation-state,  the  War  on  Terror,  the  growing  weight  of  racism.  The  particular  case  of
immigrant integration in Europe over the centuries, the making of the European Open City, is
one window into this complex and historically variable question. 
In my reading, both European and Western hemisphere history shows that the challenges of
incorporating the “outsider” often became the instruments for developing the civic and, at
times,  for  expanding the rights of the already included.  Responding to the claims by the
excluded has had the effect of expanding the rights of citizenship. And very often restricting
the rights of immigrants has been part of a loss of rights for citizens. This was clearly the
case with the Immigration Reform Act passed by the Clinton Administration in the US, which
showed that a Democratic Party legislative victory for an “immigration law” had the effect of
taking away rights from immigrants and from citizens (Sassen, 2008, ch. 4, 5, and 6). 
Anti-immigrant  sentiment  has  long been a  critical  dynamic  in  Europe’s  history,  one  until
recently mostly overlooked in standard European histories (Sassen, 1999 and 2007, ch. 5).
Anti-immigrant sentiment and attacks occurred in each of the major immigration phases in all
major European countries. No labour-receiving country has a clean record; not Switzerland,
with its long admirable history of international neutrality, and not even France, the most open
to immigration, refugees, and exiles. For instance, French workers killed Italian workers in
the 1800s, having accused them of being the wrong types of Catholics. Critical is the fact that
there were always, as is the case today, individuals, groups, organisations, and politicians
who believed in making our societies more inclusive of immigrants. History suggests that
those fighting for incorporation succeeded in the long run, even if only partially. Just to focus
on the recent past, one quarter of the French have a foreign-born ancestor three generations
up, and 34 percent of Viennese are either born abroad or have foreign parents. It took active
making to transform the hatreds towards foreigners into the urban civic. But it  is also the
result of constraints in a large city; for instance, to have a sound public transport system
means it is not feasible to check on the status of all users and also have a reasonably fast
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system. A basic and thin rule needs to be met: pay your ticket and you are on. That is the
making of the civic as a material condition: all those who buy a ticket can use the public bus
or  train,  regardless  of  whether  they are citizens or  tourists,  good people or  not-so-good
people, local residents or visitors from another city.
Europe has a barely recognised history of several centuries of internal labour migrations.
This is a history that hovers in the penumbra of official European history, dominated by the
image of Europe as a continent of emigration, never of immigration.  At any given time there
were multiple significant  flows of  intra-European migration.  All  the workers involved were
seen as outsiders, as undesirables, as threats to the community. The immigrants were mostly
from the same broad cultural and religious group, and phenotype. Yet they were seen as
impossible to assimilate. The French hated the Belgian immigrant workers saying they were
the wrong type of Catholics, and the Dutch saw the German Protestant immigrant workers as
the wrong type of Protestants. This is a telling fact. It suggests that it is simply not correct to
argue, as is so often done, that today it is more difficult to integrate immigrants because of
their  different  religion,  culture  and  phenotype.  When  these  were  similar,  anti-immigrant
sentiment was as strong as today, and it often led to physical violence on the immigrant. Yet
all along, significant numbers of immigrants did become part of the community, even if it took
two or three generations. They often maintained their distinctiveness, yet were still members
of the complex, highly heterogeneous social order of any developed city. 
Today the argument against immigration may be focused on questions of race, religion, and
culture, and this focus might seem rational: that cultural and religious distance is the reason
for the difficulty of incorporation. But in sifting through the historical and current evidence we
find only new contents for an old passion: the racialising of the outsider as Other. Today the
Other  is  stereotyped  by  differences  of  race,  religion,  and  culture.  These  are  equivalent
arguments to those made in the past when migrants were broadly of the same religious,
racial, and cultural group. Migration hinges on a move between two worlds, even if within a
single region or country, such as East Germans moving to West Germany after 1989, where
they were often viewed as a different ethnic group with undesirable traits. What is today’s
equivalent challenge, one that can force us to go beyond our differences and make what it is
that corresponds to that older traditional making of the European civic?
Conclusion: Where we stand now
The major challenges that confront cities (and society in general) have increasingly strong
feedback loops that contribute to a disassembling of the old civic urban order. The so-called
“War on Terrorism” is perhaps one of the most acute versions of this dynamic, that is, the
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dynamic whereby fighting terrorism has a strong impact on diminishing the old civic urban
order. Climate change and its impacts on cities could also be the source of new types of
urban conflicts and divisions. 
But I would argue that these challenges do contain their own specific potential for making
novel kinds of broad front platforms for urban action and joining forces with those who may
be  seen  as  too  different  from  us.  Fighting  climate  change  may  well  force  citizens  and
immigrants from many different religions, cultures and phenotypes to work together. Similarly,
fighting the abuses of power of the state in the name of fighting terrorism can create similar
coalitions bringing together residents who may have thought they could never collaborate
with each other, but now that there is a bigger threat to civil rights that will also affect citizens,
not only immigrants, novel solidarities are emerging. 
The spread of asymmetric war and climate change will affect both the rich and poor, and
addressing  them  will  demand  that  everybody  join  the  effort.  Furthermore,  while  sharp
economic inequalities, racisms, and religious intolerance have long existed, they are now
becoming political mobilisers in a context where the centre no longer holds whether this is an
imperial centre, the national state, or the city’s bourgeoisie. 
These developments signal the emergence of new types of socio-political orderings that can
coexist with older orderings, such as the nation-state, the interstate system, and the older
place of the city in a hierarchy that is dominated by the national state. Among these new
types of  orderings are global  cities that  have partly  exited that  national,  state-dominated
hierarchy  and  become  part  of  multi-scalar,  regional,  and  global  networks.  The  last  two
decades have seen an increasingly urban articulation of global logics and struggles, and an
escalating use of urban space to make political claims not only by the citizens but also by
foreigners. 
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Dealing in Death: the Battle 
Against the UK Arms Trade       
— Barnaby Pace (Freelance)
David  Cameron’s  arms-selling  trip  to  Indonesia  demonstrates  the cynical  realities  of  the
weapons market. It was not long ago that the Indonesian armed forces used UK Hawk jets to
bomb civilians in East Timor. There are continuing human rights abuses in West Papua and
elsewhere. Meanwhile military officers are rumoured to be receiving up to 40% of the value
of arms purchases in bribes. But these sales and the damage they cause can be stopped by
ordinary people who make a stand. The arms trade is the only business in the world that
counts its profits in pounds and its losses in lives.  It  thrives on conflict  and corruption is
routine. Its products are not only intended to maim and kill but to generate profits; profits
taken from state budgets that could otherwise be used on healthcare, education or dealing
with the threats of climate change or resource depletion.
Arms exports from the UK are worth around £5bn every year with the largest customers over
the last ten years being Saudi Arabia, the USA and India. But the statist terms in which the
arms trade is normally explained only voice part of the story. The arms trade is composed of
international companies, operating not to secure a nation but to profit from insecurity. Despite
the corporate status of arms companies, they still receive disproportionate state support. No
other industry receives the same level of ministerial attention, with arms company executives
frequently accompanying the Prime Minister on overseas trips – seemingly regardless of the
local situation as long as there are sales to be made.11 The UK’s export promotion body, UK
Trade and Investment (UKTI), has more staff devoted to arms export promotion than to all
other export sectors put together.12 Yet the economic benefits of the arms trade are vastly
exaggerated. UK arms exports support around 55,000 jobs and make up 1.2% of the UK’s
total exports but depend on a government subsidy conservatively estimated at £700 million
11 For example, David Cameron visited Tahrir Square in 2011 accompanied by Ian King, chief executive
of BAE Systems as well as executives from Thales UK, Qinetiq, Rolls Royce, Cobham Group, Ultra
Electronics, Babcock International Group and Atkins, several of whom were involved in arming the
Egyptian regime.
12 UKTI’s arms export unit employs 160 staff, compared to approximately 130 staff to support its other 34
sectors. CAAT, 8/7/2011 Available at http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/ukti/  Accessed 22 September 2013
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per  year,  which works out  to  £12,700 per  job every year.  In  the words of  the  Financial
Times's Alan Beattie, “You can have as many arms export jobs as you are prepared to waste
public money subsidising.”
The arms trade, including that of the UK, operates in something close to a legal vacuum. A
South American group recently asserted,  with good cause,  that  the international  trade in
bananas is more closely regulated than the trade in arms. The UK does have arms export
regulations which read well on paper – with mentions of the risks to human rights, internal
repression and sustainable development – but these regulations are frequently ignored when
perceived national interests are at stake. This is obvious in the UK’s largest arms customer,
Saudi  Arabia,  a  repressive  and  totalitarian  state,  involved  in  the  violent  repression  of
democratic  protests  both  domestically  and  in  neighbouring  Bahrain,  possibly  using  UK
weaponry. Furthermore UK built Tornado jets were used by the Saudi Arabian military in 2010
to indiscriminately bomb several Yemeni villages in what may amount to war crimes. These
incidents, and many others like them, are brushed off by the UK Government whenever it
suits their  perceived national interests: interests which sometimes overlap disconcertingly
with the profit margins of major arms companies.
Of course the supposed national  interests of  the state are extremely changeable.  In the
recent Libyan conflict British-made arms could be found with the Gaddafi regime, the rebels
and NATO. Indeed, at least one company, MBDA, legally supplied all three sides with bombs
and missiles. Yet weapons are made to be durable and last decades. Many weapons, sold to
so-called stable regimes, such as the 15,000 surface-to-air missiles currently unaccounted
for in Libya, will remain a danger for generations to come.
The  arms  trade  accounts  for  40%  of  corruption  in  all  global  trade  (Roeber,  2005):  a
staggering figure when the international arms trade only amounts to $60bn each year,  a
relatively small sum compared with many industries. The corruption in the trade means that
choices made over what  arms should be purchased can be skewed towards even more
expensive and unnecessary equipment,  subverting any semblance of democracy in such
decision making13 and stealing money from worthier causes. In the UK, political support and
prosecutorial incompetence, best exemplified in the Al Yamamah case, has made the country
a global  hotspot  for  corruption.  Arms companies,  like the German Ferrostaal,  have even
created vehicles in  London for  “outsourcing commission payments”  through which bribes
13 For a more complete insight into the reason why the arms trade is particularly given to corruption, see
Feinstein, A., Holden, P. and Pace, B., ‘Corruption and the arms trade: sins of commission’ in SIPRI
Yearbook 2011. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 13-35
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often flow in order to “insulate themselves from potential tax and prosecutorial investigations”
(Debevoise and Plimpton LLP, 2011).
Dealing death in the Docklands
Perhaps the most visible event in the UK’s support for the global arms trade is the London
arms  fair,  Defence  Systems  &  Equipment  International  (DSEi,  pronounced  ‘Dicey’  by
activists), a government sponsored and subsidised event bringing together arms companies
and their customers in London’s docklands every two years. Substantial protests are often
heavily policed despite their non-violent nature, yet inside the fair, where repressive regimes
are  courted  by  arms  dealers,  it  is  left  to  campaigners,  journalists  and  MPs  to  expose
unethical or illegal activities such as the advertising of torture equipment or landmines.
The last fair  took place in autumn 2011, with over 1,300 arms companies attending from
around  the  world,  displaying  weapons  ranging  from  rifles  to  tanks  to  fighter  jets  to
battleships.  Specially  invited  by  the  UK government  to  browse  through  the  wares  were
fourteen authoritarian regimes, five countries identified by the Foreign Office as having "the
most serious wide-ranging human rights concerns" and eight countries identified as being in
a “major armed conflict”.14 All this takes place in secret behind police lines and the security
fences of the Excel centre. Transparency is not the arms dealer’s friend.
Yet  in  recent  years,  journalists  and  campaigners,  including  Mark  Thomas  and  Caroline
Lucas, have made it into the fair. Every year torture equipment and cluster munitions, both
illegal, are openly advertised; indeed Pakistan Ordnance factories, which were caught selling
cluster munitions in 2009, returned advertising the same weaponry last year. It is incredible
and indicative of the incompatibility of regulation and promotion that it took campaigners, a
comedian and a Member of Parliament to find clearly illegal equipment being marketed at the
UK Government’s own arms fair.
Activists in defence of humanity
Campaigners can help regulate the arms trade,  stopping the most  heinous deals,  either
through alerting the world as in the case of campaigners inside DSEi or attempting to stop
14 The 14 "authoritarian regimes" as identified by the Economist Intelligence Unit were Algeria, Angola,
Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and
Vietnam. The five countries identified by the Foreign Office as having "the most serious wide-ranging
human rights concerns" were Colombia, Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Vietnam.  The eight countries
identified by SIPRI as being in a “major armed conflict” in 2010 were Colombia, India, Iraq, Pakistan,
Peru, Philippines, Turkey and the USA.
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the trade altogether through a range of actions as diverse as the people who want the trade
to end. This can take the form of educating the public about the trade, challenging the clichéd
arguments in favour of arms exports through lobbying the government and with direct action.
Groups such as Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) use a diversity of tactics to constantly
challenge the arms trade and researchers whose names few people will ever hear and work
relentlessly to expose individual deals and companies to scrutiny.
Actions taken by campaigners and public pressure have resulted in real victories. Corruption
has been challenged in moves like CAAT’s legal action against the Government over the Al
Yamamah investigation. The arms export promotion unit inside the UK Ministry of Defence,
DESO, was closed after years of effort. Arms fairs have been shut. An event similar to DSEi
in Australia was successfully shut down on three occasions through a public campaign of
protest. Lobbying and education are organised by a myriad of churches, unions and social
justice organisations.
There has also been a proud history of non-violent direct action against  the arms trade.
Notable  examples  include the Seeds of  Hope group in  1996,  which broke into a  British
Aerospace Engineering (BAE) base and took hammers to a Hawk jet, intended for sale to
Indonesia  and  possibly  used  in  the  conflict  in  East  Timor.  Activists  in  Derry  damaged
Raytheon’s logistical network in 2006 and prevented shipments reaching the war in Lebanon.
The arms company’s office was eventually shut in 2010. These activists, and many others,
have risked their liberty to prevent crimes against humanity.15
Anti-DSEi campaigners have tried to shut the fair. They have attempted to stop delegates
arriving, including through locking themselves to the Docklands Light Railway. They have
targeted the institutions that support the trade, whether financial institutions that fund the
deals or the cultural and political groups that support the fair. Activists have attempted to
remind the public of the consequences of the arms trade and pointed out the absurdities of
the situation,  most  memorably  with the appearance and impromptu auctioning off  to  the
highest bidder of a real tank by the SpaceHijackers group (2007). 
Anti-arms  trade  campaigners,  particularly,  have  been  targeted  in  return  with  a  range  of
landmark policing and legal tactics. Both arms companies and police have sent spies deep
into campaigns and spent millions trying to thwart activists. There have been prohibitions on
15 For an academic look at these cases and what they tell us about Anarchism and agents of security
please see Rossdale, C. (2010) ‘Anarchy is What Anarchists Make of it: Reclaiming the Concept of
Agency in IR and Security Studies’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 39(2), pp.483–501.
[Online]. Available at: http://mil.sagepub.com/content/39/2/483.full.pdf+html, Accessed 17 April 2012
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protests and even an attempted de facto ban on a £500 campaigning film. Luckily these bans
have only drawn greater attention. In the case of the film made by the Brighton campaign,
Smash EDO, On the Verge (2007), designed to highlight the repressive tactics used against
them, made national news and ironically sparked a film tour as “the film the police tried to
ban”. Given the lengths companies and the authorities go to in order to hamper resistance to
the arms trade, it is a reasonable conclusion that this activism is seen as a potent threat.
When working on a book on the arms trade, the author I was working with interviewed an
arms dealer  who  operated  across  the  whole  spectrum of  legality,  supplying  conflicts  all
around the world. Asked about whether an arms deal that broke UN sanctions might be
immoral,  he responded that “I’m in this business for the defence of humanity” (Feinstein,
2012). But it is the people who work towards a world where death is not bought and sold who
are truly defending humanity. They are the real agents of security.
The arms trade is dangerous, corrupting and amoral. It exists in a shadow world at the far
edges of legality, feeding off conflict and corruption. The state has long turned a blind eye to
its damage, defending it in the name of national security or publicly funded jobs. There is a
plethora of effective ways to resist – research, education, lobbying, protest or direct action –
all help to halt the trade of these most lethal of commodities. It is only through the actions of
principled people who want real security for all that the arms trade can be controlled and
eventually ended.
Dealing in Death: the Battle against the UK Arms Trade was published on openDemocracy, 
OurKingdom on 27 April 2012. http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/barnaby-
pace/dealing-in-death-battle-against-uk-arms-trade 
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Section 2
Contending
Histories
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City of Paradox: The 
Refugee Experience    
— Philip Marfleet (UEL)
We have an unusual mix of participants at this conference: academics, researchers, students
and activists. I would like to make some introductory comments which I hope will be useful to
the discussion. Our event headlines the contested character of London, focusing on the city’s
various and different histories and contemporary realities. These are strikingly clear in the
case of migration. Local organisers of the 2012 Games have for years stressed that the
London Games are based on the city’s experience of ‘diversity and inclusion’. Their approach
has been adopted by the official Olympic movement which has endorsed the idea of a great
global city embracing the cultures of the world. The chairman of the International Olympic
Committee’s (IOC) Coordination Commission, Denis Oswald, said that: ‘London is ready to
welcome the world this summer’ (BBC, 2012). The working theme of the Olympics 2012 is in
effect that London, city of inclusion, engages with the world. Yes, London is a great global
city. Yes, it is diverse, ‘super-diverse’ culturally, as some researchers put it. And it can be
highly inclusive; people come to London in part because its diversity gives real options for
inclusion. But London is a city of selective inclusion. 
Entry to Britain has become extraordinarily difficult and will become more so. A new report
from the  National  Audit  Office  has  concluded  that  50,000  people  each  year  ‘abuse’ the
student visa system, coming to Britain in reality to work, and that they should be excluded
(Bowcott, 2012). Some people will get visas for the summer Olympics but the vast majority
will  be  those  able  to  pay  inflated  visa  fees  (the  cost  goes  up  in  April  2012  with  some
categories now doubling in cost). Just to get the visa they will go through elaborate checks,
usually contracted out to private companies, before they are permitted to present a passport.
This will often include examination of a bank statement; only then do they get the chance to
pay extravagant hotel bills, let alone the cost of tickets for events at the Games. This is a
process  of  filtering  those  deemed  appropriate  for  entry.  It  is  not  about  ‘diversity  and
inclusion’; it is about selection and exclusion from a city that is now among the very least
accessible in the Global North. The privileged, the comfortably off, the global elite will get
access: the rest will not get anywhere near the Olympic Park.
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This is the first and rather obvious issue in relation to 2012 and matters of migration. We
might say plus ça change... so it has always been.
Refugees
But issues of migration are dense with paradox and – in a more structured away – with
contradiction.
I want to examine this by looking at the circumstances of people who often most urgently
seek admission – people compelled to become migrants – refugees. Historically, this is not
easy:  refugees  are  among  the  ‘forgotten’  of  mainstream  history.  As  the  historian  Tony
Kushner puts it, they are victims of a form of amnesia among academics with the result that,
although millions of people have travelled to Britain in modern times in search of safety and
security, their circumstances and experiences have seldom been recorded (Kushner, 2006). 
We do know that during the 19th century not one refugee was rejected or expelled from
Britain, that successive governments endorsed their presence. An article in  The Times (28
February 1853, cited in Porter,  1979) declared: ‘Every civilised people on the face of the
earth must be fully aware that this country is the asylum of nations, and that it will defend the
asylum to the last ounce of its treasure, and the last drop of its blood’. Most of the refugees
were political activists associated with movements for national independence in Europe or
with radical currents such as anarchism or communism which opposed governments of some
of Britain’s most important rival states. Almost all lived in London; most in East London. The
city was the ‘refugee capital of Europe’ accommodating a remarkable diversity of people.
The British state itself did not like them, and there were many xenophobic comments from
leading politicians. Bernard Porter, a leading historian of 19th century Britain, notes that the
refugees  were  regarded  as  ‘dirty,  lazy,  immoral,  hirsute,  pipe-smoking,  garlic-smelling
firebrands’ (Porter, 2003). Successive governments nonetheless accepted them on the basis
that accommodating their enemies’ enemies was a wise strategic approach, and one which
also embellished domestic  political  agendas on which the nation-state  was viewed as  a
home of specific ‘British liberties’. This helps to explain the attitudes of some politicians today
when they  want  to  assert  British  credentials  in  this  area.  David  Cameron,  for  example,
asserts that: ‘The British tradition of welcoming genuine refugees to this country is a great
one’ (Refugee Council, 2006). 
While there is some commitment to the idea of inclusion, there’s also contradiction because
these attitudes were double-edged. By the 1880s, with the onset of the ‘Great Depression’,
official attitudes towards refugees became more hostile. In 1905 they changed radically with
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the  Aliens  Act,  the  first  piece  of  modern legislation  which  both  named the refugee  and
provided  for  certain  sorts  of  refugees  to  be excluded.  In  the  early  20th  century,  people
escaping persecution in Russia and Eastern Europe who were on their way to Britain as ‘the
asylum of nations’ found themselves rejected. Encouraged to find sanctuary by an earlier
record of accommodation, they were refused because they were the wrong sort of migrants.
The Aliens Act  was an anti-Semitic  law:  the refugees were rejected because most  were
Jews.
Change
This example reflects a strong tendency in migration law and policy which has had a big
impact in London: the imposition of abrupt, even apparently capricious, changes of policy
upon people on the move. There was earlier evidence as early as the late 17th and early
18th centuries.  We see this  in  the case of  the  very first  people formally  categorised as
refugees: the Huguenots. During the 1680s there was a fascinating episode during which
Parliament – through the king – invited the persecuted Protestants of France (usually known
as the Huguenots) to seek sanctuary in England.  King Charles II of England sent a well-
publicised message to King Louis XIV of France. He wrote:
I conjure you in the name of the great [King] Henry [VIII], whose precious blood 
circulates in both our veins, to respect the Protestants who he looked upon as his 
children. If, as is reported, you wish to compel them to renounce their religion under pain
of banishment from your Kingdom I offer them an Asylum in that of England (Lee, 1936)
When large numbers of Huguenots escaped France and travelled to England – most settling
in London – the English state secured a huge prize. They welcomed migrants who were
among the most dynamic elements in industry and commerce in France, who had played a
key role in the French army and navy, and whose loss to France was viewed as a windfall for
the English state. 
A few years later another group of Calvinists from Europe attempted to follow the Huguenots.
The Palatines of the Rhineland, unlike the French refugees, were not wealthy merchants,
skilled artisans or cadres of a rival  state’s armed forces. Rather,  they were largely poor,
illiterate,  landless  peasants.  Most  were  forced  into  camps  in  South  London  sometimes
described as the first refugee camps of the modern era. Most were shortly expelled from
British territory. A historian of these events explains:
Unlike earlier [Huguenot] refugee groups, who had carefully been kept away from an 
initially fearful people or else displayed at their best, as dressed for church on parade, 
the Palatines were put up in open campsites in the parks so crowds of London strollers 
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could see awesomely large encampments of them on the mundane rounds of daily life, 
eating, washing, disciplining children. English spectators came to stare at them with 
distaste for their slovenly appearance, and fights broke out between English and 
Palatines (Olson, 2001).
The Huguenots have entered the mainstream of British history as ‘definitive refugees’; the
Palatines have largely been forgotten. After an abrupt change of policy they were expelled
and soon removed from history and from memory.
Belgians
There have been other significant examples of this practice. In 1914 the largest-ever short-
term movement  of  migrants  to  Britain  took  place  when some 250,000  Belgians  entered
southern England in efforts to escape the early German military offensives of the First World
War.  The British Government was at  first  unwilling to accept  them but  a mood of  public
enthusiasm for the migrants (despite the impact of the earlier Aliens Act) compelled a change
in policy and Belgian refugees were accommodated across the country. The Government
nonetheless remained determined to intern or to remove all ‘aliens’ and by 1919 almost every
single Belgian had been repatriated; only a handful remained and few were recalled at all in
mainstream history or in popular memory.
Inclusion and exclusion today
I want to draw some conclusions for today. Migration of people in need has for centuries
been a key factor in shaping the character of London: its demography; its culture; and its
daily life. But inclusion can rapidly change to exclusion.
Take the relatively recent example of refugees from Kosovo, encouraged by Tony Blair in
1999 to seek protection in Britain. Large numbers of people in Kosovo started long, risky
journeys to escape the impact of conflict. Many were soon rejected; while some had reached
Britain and others were still en route they were informed that developments in the Balkans
meant that their problems were officially over and that they should return or turn back. One
academic study shows that  the official  picture in Britain of  ‘poor Kosovar refugees’ soon
faded, replaced by images promoted by the media of illegal migrants being smuggled into
Western  Europe,  so  that  Kosovans  became ‘illegal,  scrounging  immigrant[s]’ (Van  Selm,
2006).
It is the state itself which produces these abrupt changes, treating migrants instrumentally,
and selecting and rejecting as circumstances suggest. Here the state itself is an immensely
powerful institution, especially a state structure such as that in Britain, with more than 350
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years of history at the centre of domestic political life. There is a huge disproportion between
the resources of the state and those of vulnerable migrants (especially those who have been
displaced from their places of origin) perhaps more asymmetry here than between any other
institution and informal group in the modern world. For governments, policy making vis-à-vis
such people is perceived as cost-free: refugees have become almost irresistibly attractive as
people  upon  whom  policy  can  be  practised  and  political  agendas  exercised  without  a
collective response.
Paradox
So historically we see inclusion (at least inclusion of sorts) and exclusion. In the case of
forced migrants, the official narrative celebrates ‘genuine’ refugees, rejecting those deemed
unsuitable  or  ‘alien’,  and  today  that  means  that  most  very  vulnerable  people  seeking
sanctuary  cannot  find  safety  and  security  in  London.  Today  unprecedented  numbers  of
people worldwide seek sanctuary in the relatively stable cities of  the Global North.  Their
journeys are long and extraordinarily dangerous. A fraction of them succeed, and a fraction of
these reach London, a city said to be ready ‘to welcome the world’ but in which those with
political  authority  find many reasons for  exclusion.  We know from London’s multiple and
contested histories, and from today’s realities, that it remains less a place of inclusion than a
city of paradox.
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A Snapshot of the Jewish 
Community in London      
— Alex Goldberg (Surrey)
To avoid overlapping with Ben Gidley’s paper, I will start with a few statistics to provide a
snapshot of the present state of the Jewish community in the UK. In the last Census (2011),
two-thirds  of  Jews  lived  in  Greater  London  and  that  does  not  include  those  living  in
contiguous parts of the capital, with a large presence in south Hertfordshire, south Essex and
north  Surrey.  In  2001,  23%  of  the  Jews  in  Britain  lived  in  the  borough  of  Barnet  and
Redbridge;  probably  with  the new Census data  coming in  we will  see the population  in
Redbridge declining whilst Barnet, Stanmore and Hertsmere have become Jewish centres.
Redbridge once boasted the most densely populated Jewish community in Europe (until the
early  1980s).  In  2001  the  village  of  Radlett  had  a  25% Jewish  population.  The  Jewish
community is now a largely suburban phenomenon. This is an interesting phenomenon of
counter-urbanisation where people who came from villages in Eastern Europe and lived in
urban centres less than 20 years ago are now going back to live in a village in Hertfordshire.
However, at the same time, there is still a natural population growth in the inner city areas of
north  Hackney,  Seven  Sisters  and  Haringey,  mainly  due  to  the  strictly  Orthodox  Jewish
community. There has been a massive increase in the size of the strictly Orthodox or Haredi
community:  48% of  Jewish births  in  the  UK,  and probably  over  half  of  Jewish births  in
London,  are  strictly  Orthodox.  The  strictly  Orthodox  community  in  London  probably
numbered only 6-8,000 in 1980. Today this community is nearly 40,000 strong. There has
been a revolution in Jewish schooling. In 1990, 25% of Jewish children attended Jewish state
schools.  Today this figure is 63%. There are around 120 Jewish schools in the UK, of which
about 100 are probably in London. All Haredi children attend Jewish schools and the trend
amongst non-Haredi children is moving towards Jewish schooling (43% of the non-Haredi
community attend Jewish schools).
The Jewish community is diverse in London, coming from different diasporic, denominational
and cultural communities. The community in London is growing for the first time since the
1950s and this is an important new trend. Most demographers now predict it will grow further
following five decades of natural population decline (due to low-birth movements). Jewish
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migration in London traditionally went along tube lines with a slow migration north-west along
the Northern Line and north-east along the Central Line. This still exists and the Thameslink
is now another extension to this route into the Hertfordshire countryside. There also appears
to be some evidence of a counter-counter-urbanisation trend and a return to the inner cities.
In reality this is to do with the fast growth rate in Hackney/Haringey with the strictly Orthodox
community now doubling every 15-20 years. In turn, there appears to be Haredi migration to
centres  such  as  Golders  Green  and  Edgware  (whilst  reportedly  several  hundred  young
families have left London for the other Haredi centre of Salford, Greater Manchester, where
housing is more affordable). The Jewish population worldwide is extremely urban. Most Jews
live in ten cities around the world. London is no longer considered one of those cities as
there  are  only  150–200,000  Jews  living  in  London.  The  only  city  in  Europe  that  has  a
sizeable Jewish population and competes in population terms with the large urban Jewish
populations in the United States and Israel is Paris with about 350,000 Jews.  
Economically, we are looking at a much more diverse, even polarised, community, and we
need  to  tread  carefully  away  from  stereotypes:  in  the  non-Haredi  (strictly  Orthodox)
population the community  is  largely  professional,  university  educated,  with high numbers
having postgraduate qualifications.  This is a community that believes it is well integrated and
has advanced in socio-economic terms in the five generations (now, perhaps six) since the
era of Jewish mass migration, circa 1880-1916. But it is not the only story. Whilst in London
we do have a mobile Jewish population, largely in the suburban areas of Barnet, we also
have the growth of the Jewish population in Hackney and Haringey that I have mentioned
before where many of  the  children are  below the poverty  line  and live  in  large families
averaging five to seven children.  With one in  two Jewish births in  the UK being Haredi
Londoners there is increasingly a socio-economic divide in the London Jewish population.
I also want to pose the question of Jewish culture. Philosophically, how does Jewish culture
become British? In France alone, in the past ten years, some 15 major French feature films
have a Jewish theme in them, including a film called  La vérité si je mens!  (Would I lie to
you?).  The third in  the series of  this popular  comedy feature film,  based on the lives of
Sephardi Jewish families working in the clothing industry in France, was released in 2012.
There is no comparable phenomenon here. 
Comparative surveys show that Jews in Eastern and Western Europe have polarising sets of
concerns. Eastern European Jews today are concerned about their future and as a result of
that tend to value interfaith activity, interactions with other communities being a top priority;
they also freely express concerns about their security situation. The Jewish community in
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Western Europe has concerns about  security but  less so; they are more concerned with
ensuring the continued task of community building: schools and education. The surveys also
reveal that there is greater introspection in Western Europe concerning their relationship with
the  state  of  Israel  and  North  American  Jewish  communities.  The  Eastern  European
communities  (post-Soviet,  declining  populations  and  increasing  levels  of  anti-Semitic
rhetoric) feel they need the support of other Jewish communities around the world. Western
Europe communities feel self-reliant and independent.
There  are  different  schools  of  thoughts  within  Jewish  London:  Minhag  Anglia/Centrists/
Communitarian is one such school. This school probably now represents half the Jews in
London. It belongs nationally to the mainstream Orthodox synagogues which are led by the
chief Rabbi. The Jews belonging to this organisation see their identity as being very British
but  see  their  private  life  as  being  Jewish  at  the  same  time.  As  such  this  group  has
traditionally  portrayed itself  as doing a balancing act  by embracing secular  learning and
modernity whilst maintaining Jewish traditions at home and in the synagogue. This sector of
the community is still the largest but has faced a large decline in numbers. In 1993, three-
quarters of Jews were affiliated to the United Synagogue and other centrist affiliates. Today it
is only 50%.
Progressive  Religious  models  are  similar  to  communitarian  but  with  some  key  religious
differences and like to portray themselves institutionally as more outward looking. Again, as
synagogue  affiliates  there  are  different  denominations  which  claim  to  be  progressive:
reformist  and  liberal.  Whilst  these  movements  and  the  Masorti  (conservative  movement
which is non-Orthodox) have theological differences with the United Synagogue, the outlook
of  their  members  on  society  and  their  identity  tend  to  be  the  same.  This  community
represents about 20-25% of synagogue attendees.
Secular Jewish groups are largely ethnicists:   secular Jews reject the Jewish religion but
identify ethnically or culturally as Jewish. There are some formal structures within this section
of the community around art, music and Yiddish revivalism but unlike the United States and
parts of the Benelux there are no formally established secular Jewish communities. The new
Jewish Community Centre for London tends to attract those from a variety of different groups
mentioned here so does not mirror secular Jewish centres such as the one in Brussels.
The strictly Orthodox/Haredi communities are religious. They are divided into different sects
but have common education and welfare structures. They are conservative and traditionalist
with large population growth.
There is still a kernel of the Jewish socialist tradition but it is nothing like it was in the 1930s;
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Cable St is far away from here. Alternative expressions of Judaism are growing. We have
institutional houses in London where young people live together and form communes made
up of people in mainly arts and drama. There are also alternative Jews who join various
campaigns on the environment, human rights and development. Some of these movements
consist of coalitions with the other models. 
The Haredi community forms practical coalitions in local neighbourhoods to push for better
faith-specific provision for welfare, education, housing and hospital services. In London, a
coalition with the Muslim community, based in Hackney and called the Jewish Muslim Forum
is one such example. It has had successes on welfare services, housing, planning, disability
care and tackling social deprivation. There are also examples of co-operation between these
two communities working together and with the police on security and anti-racism. The issue
of security mirrors some of the mainstream community’s reason for engagement which was
originally the reason that interfaith dialogue was established formally by the Archbishop of
Canterbury and Chief Rabbi in 1942: namely to tackle the root causes of anti-Jewish and
anti-Semitic sentiments at a time when Jews were being persecuted and killed in Europe.
There are many groups which engage in interfaith dialogue: some are elite and academic or
theological (Council of Christians and Jews); some are more intercultural. Some of the newer
groups increasingly look towards common action or social action projects to set up a formal
channel of interaction.  The Three Faiths Forum is one of the leaders in this area.
Coalitions  have  also  been  formed  on  the  basis  of  ideological  social  action,  mainly  by
progressive  movements  such  as  the  Jewish  Action  Social  Forum,  occasionally  London
Citizens  and  other  civic  groups.   To  a  certain  extent  the  central  orthodox  movement,
communitarian movement and alternative Judaism have also got involved. There is a growth
in the number of groups in the Jewish community that have been established to campaign on
issues  relating  to  human rights  (René  Cassin);  development  (Tzedek);  environment  (Big
Green Jewish project; Noah) and anti-racism (JCORE). There is a growing Jewish Social
Hub in West Hampstead that houses and supports many of these groups.
This is a practically based reason for interaction and engagement and is one used by a new
generation of more open orthodox Jewish leaders from the mainstream Orthodox community.
This is looking at ways in which the community can best work with and serve the city and
local neighbourhoods.
In 1950 the Jewish community  was the largest  non-Christian  minority  in  the city,  in  this
country,  probably  in  Europe.  Today  we  are  probably  fourth  or  fifth.  We believe  in  civic
engagement and turn to Jewish values to achieve this. Jewish teaching encourages civic
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engagement, service and a duty to the local community in which you reside.
There  are  some  who  are  looking  at  what  the  Jewish  community  can  do  in  terms  of
developing its collective role in civic life and how best to engage given the new demographic
situation.  Despite  being  'a  smaller  community,  and  no  longer  the  largest  non-Christian
population, we have to find a new role and whilst we are no longer the “other” or the “only
other” we can make a valuable contribution to civic participation, community development
and working with new and newer communities, as well as the more established ones, in
building new civic structures and assisting in building social capital in London, drawing on our
strengths, values and experiences in building communities and developing interaction.
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After the Kettle, the Cordon  
— Dan Hancox (Freelance)
The two million-strong public sector strike on 30 November 2011 was accompanied by a
march of 30,000 through central London against pension reforms, and against government
austerity; along the way many marchers, myself included, were surprised to see a ten-foot
high steel fence erected across Trafalgar Square. ‘Met unveil revolutionary police barrier’
read the Daily Mail (2011) headline; they were the only newspaper to realise its importance.
This  is  what  counts as revolutionary in  2011 Britain:  a revolution  against  free assembly,
against  freedom  of  movement,  against  the  commons,  and  further  towards  a  state  of
exception. The Daily Mail continued: 
The police cordon was erected at the north end of Whitehall near Trafalgar Square 
yesterday afternoon in an attempt to stop anti-cuts protesters heading towards 
Parliament. The Metropolitan Police said the barrier of steel structure is put in place 
when a potential public order situation is likely to develop and they need a physical 
barrier to block cars and people. (2011) 
After  the  TUC march  peacefully  dispersed  on  the  Victoria  Embankment,  I  tracked  back
towards Trafalgar Square. There, at the edge of the steel cordon, two uniformed officers were
acting  like  bouncers,  admitting  tourists  and  office  workers  into  the  square  in  single  file;
admitting  everyone,  in  fact,  except  the  four  women  aged  around  35-55  in  front  of  me,
carrying modest union-issue placards about teachers’ pensions. The cops were clear about
the policy: if you discard your placard at the entrance to the square, you can come in. “That’s
ridiculous”,  the  women  objected.  “We’re  trying  to  prevent  any  potential  protest  from  re-
forming in the square”, the police explained. The women objected a bit more, and eventually,
shaking their heads as tourists filed past us, they dropped their placards at the gate, and
walked in as well.
While all this was going on, one young man who’d walked ahead of us, and had already
passed the cops, reached back and sneakily took a placard off the top of the pile – it was just
a quick, cheeky kick against the cops. One of the cops spotted him out of the corner of his
eye, yelled “Oi!”,  grabbed him aggressively by the shoulder,  dragged him back and, with
great force, yanked the placard out of his hand, then shoved him back into 'the sterile zone'.
Whether there was any suggestion that protest might “re-form in the square” is neither here
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nor there, but I had not heard any rumours to that effect. Heaven forfend someone should
put a sticker on the Olympic clock again: an event which induced riot police to pretty much
truncheon everyone on sight on the evening of 26 March 2012. 
The new ring of steel 
The revolutionary new steel cordon ‘unveiled’ on 30th November in Trafalgar Square is not,
in fact, new. From police blogs and various other sources, this is what I’ve gathered (quotes
are from anonymous police blog comments): 
• The portable steel cordons were designed to be used not for public order situations
like political protests but for dealing with CBRN  incidents, “where they can obviously
very effectively direct the crowd” .* 200 of them were purchased by the Home Office
in 2008 for CBRN preparedness, but they're now available for any police force in the
country to use for any purpose at all. 
• From the small van-capsule, the cordons open out like Transformers. Beyond what
can be seen in the pictures that I have found, they also have “a large screen which
can be raised up above the top of the barrier to provide textual directions/instructions
to people and a (very) powerful PA system with remote management and syncing. A
fantastic  bit  of  kit  all  in  all.  They're  very  robust  and  effective,  even  at  their  full
extension (which is very wide)”. 
• While  they’re  portable,  and  that  seems  particularly  alarming  –  the  prospect  of
something  as  mobile  as  a  group  of  Territorial  Support  Group  (TSG)  officers  but
literally made of steel – they’re not that responsive: “They are extremely heavy and
can just about be towed by a standard 4x4. They are very unforgiving and too much
speed when towing one will destabilise the towing vehicle. I think the maximum speed
for them is 30mph, therefore not easy to deploy in quick developing situations... but
[in]  planned  ones  like  the  student  protest  they  could  have  been  used  more
effectively.” 
• Prior to the Met ‘unveiling’ them on 30th November, they had already been used by
Leicestershire  Police for  separating the EDL and anti-fascist  protesters,  by South
Wales Police to separate Cardiff and Swansea football fans, by Greater Manchester
Police at the Conservative conference and in south Yorkshire at a Sheffield derby.
I  deliberately  avoided spelling  out  what  CBRN means above because I  think  it  is  pretty
astonishing  and  worth  emphasising  here:  CBRN  stands  for  Chemical,  Biological,
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Radiological, and Nuclear. These steel cordons were designed not for protesters, or football
fans, but for the Britain of  28 Days Later. The reason they look so terrifying is they were
designed to be used in genuinely terrifying situations.
Here is your state of exception, already in place: steel cordons which were purchased to deal
with the unthinkable, to deal with a nuclear holocaust or an (erm), zombie apocalypse, are
now  being  used  to  prevent  middle-aged  teachers  from  strolling  into  Trafalgar  Square,
because they're carrying a political placard. 
The (ahem) performativity of the neoliberal balistraria 
I used the word ‘unveiling’ above, and put it in inverted commas: as we have seen, these
cordons are not new at all  but their ostentatious display in Trafalgar Square was, I would
argue,  even  more  important  than  their  stated  practical  function,  “to  prevent  protest  re-
forming” after the dispersal of the TUC march. I was recently sent an excellent geography
paper  (2011)  entitled Rethinking  Enclosure:  Space,  Subjectivity  and  the  Commons about
enclosure  in  the  neoliberal  age,  about  the  way  capitalism  requires  that  “privatised,
secessionary enclaves of infrastructure and services splinter from the city”, and about the
way that inequality and freedom are manifested in a battle for space, a dialectic of enclosure
and the commons. Here’s the key passage about capital’s very physical need to bare its
teeth to the public:
Neoliberal globalisation has undoubtedly prompted a shift in the way in which 
sovereignty is spatialised. The exercise of sovereignty increasingly depends on a more 
complicated geography of transnational assemblages, flows and enclaves. Walling is an 
anxious, sometimes desperate icon of this new predicament… what interests us with 
respect to walling-as-enclosure is its insistent performativity. Walls are often not 
particularly effective. If anything, they can serve as important theatrical devices.
This relates directly to some of the key emerging,  post-Millbank themes I  wrote about in
Kettled  Youth  (2011):  the  physicality  of  protest  is  itself  politically  transformative  and
radicalising, and its tactical antagonist, the kettle,  provokes it  further precisely through its
demonstrative  act  of  oppression.  Kettling  is  designed  to  boil  the  blood,  and  walling  is
designed to make you feel trapped. Walling, of course, is not new but has seen a marked
resurgence across the world since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The new walls have risen in
tandem with their political economic analogue: neoliberalism. Like neoliberalism, which will
soon return British wealth inequalities to those of  the Victorian era,  walls  are erected to
support inequality. The paper (Jeffery et al, 2011) quotes Davis and Monk: 
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…modern wealth and luxury consumption are more enwalled and socially enclaved than 
at any time since the 1890s… the spatial logic of neoliberalism revives the most extreme 
colonial patterns of residential segregation and zoned consumption.
Gated communities  are  little  more than the  geographical  reconstruction  of  medieval  city
states, the paper continues; in fact, the word medieval crops up on numerous occasions to
describe the processes of enclosure now being used. And in quite a profound way, this links
back  to  the  police  cordons.  Responding  sarcastically  to  the  Daily  Mail story  about  the
‘revolutionary new wall’, one cop from a rival police force said: “Excellent, I am pleased that
the Met have finally caught onto the tactical advantages of the medieval balistraria.” Except,
instead of firing arrows through the holes, the cordon serves as a panopticon for surveying
the protesters (as if it was not enough that we are already the most CCTV heavy country in
Europe).
One aspect of the performativity of the 'unveiling' of the 30th November wall stands out: its
timing. It marks the end of a year of unrest, in which the Met have been accused by the right
in slacking in their response to the student and 26 March protests, and accused by the liberal
left  of  slacking in  their  response to the riots.  More importantly,  it  marks an authoritarian
escalation  ahead  of  a  2012  which  promises  more  poverty,  more  inequality,  more
unemployment  and  more  unrest:  and  with  it,  a  state  of  exception  of  truly  Olympian
proportions. 
London 2012, the Olympics 
I took a picture of a kettle line of Wenlocks: Wenlock, the London Olympic mascot, dressed
as a police officer in the Official 2012 Store in Heathrow Airport last month (on my way to a
conference about protest music and freedom of speech). Here, for only £10.25 (not including
shipping), is a FUN! toy version of your instrument of discipline, already equipped with a
single panopticon eye. Water cannon and steel cordon sold separately. Baton rounds may be
unsuitable for small children. A more perfect visual metaphor for 2012, I  cannot imagine.
Think this is hyperbole? Here’s how Westminster is planning to defend your much-lauded
democratic right to protest during the Olympics, from  The Independent:
Ministers are planning legal action to restrict public protests during the Olympics... 
[plan] includes identifying “exclusion zones” around key locations, and fast-tracking the 
removal of protests that do not have the blessing of the authorities... Police have been 
given enhanced powers to act against protests at the Olympics since the Games were 
awarded to London six years ago, including the right to enter private homes and seize 
political posters.
And here’s what the Olympics will bring to London at large, from a  stunning piece in the
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Financial Times by Philip Stephens (2011): 
London is promised an exercise in authoritarian elitism to rival Leonid Brezhnev’s Soviet 
Union. The people’s games have been turned into the apparatchiks’ Olympics. The 
stadiums and arenas will overflow with politicians, bureaucrats and corporate sponsors. 
More than 1m ordinary families have failed to secure a single ticket even to the opening 
stages of the most obscure Olympic sports. 
Civil liberties are to be suspended for the duration of the games. David Cameron’s 
government is promising draconian penalties for anyone who dares jeopardise the 
exclusive rights of commercial partners such as McDonald’s and Coca-Cola. Advertising 
sponsors have been promised what is chillingly called a “clean city”, handing them 
ownership of everything within camera distance of the games. Wear a T-shirt expressing 
a preference for Burger King and Pepsi and you may be thrown into the Tower. The 
crackdown extends to what the Olympic Stasi call “advertising on the human body”.
All this is to one purpose: to make life comfortable for the 40,000 Olympic bigwigs, 
national bureaucrats, commercial sponsors, hangers-on and politicians who are 
preparing to slip into all the best seats at all the best events. These oligarchs of sport will 
whizz from their Park Lane suites to the Olympic venues along 100 miles of dedicated Zil 
lanes carved from an already congested road network. Traffic lights will be programmed 
to turn green as the limousines approach and red again as they pass. Ordinary folk who 
inadvertently stray into the reserved lanes will face draconian fines.
The march of the dead: the wanderkessel
The 9 November student march in 2011 further demonstrates the same pre-2012 escalation.
It was supposed to see a rebirth of the spirit of Millbank (“Another Millbank is Possible” said
one superb placard).  Instead,  it  saw such a  heavy deployment  of  police,  relative  to the
student marches of November and December 2010, that the entire day felt less like a civic
swarm and more like a slow-step trudge to the gallows; with riot cops all around us, literally
herding us to the end location, it felt like we were being marched, not marching. Indeed, 9th
November was essentially what is known in German as a wanderkessel (kettling).
The Olympic State of Exception. 
Let’s go back to the day of the strike, to 30 November, and the shocking story of the 40 odd
people kettled,  "beaten up"  and violently  arrested by riot  cops with dogs,  on a picket  in
Dalston. A full account is here, and well worth reading - but it is this witness statement in the
Daily Mail (2011) from the owner of a nearby cafe, which perfectly articulates the logic of the
Olympic  state  of  exception:  “It  seemed quite  heavy  handed  but  it  contained  them well.
People were upset because they didn't think they had done anything wrong, but it did stop
things escalating.” It stopped things escalating in the immediate short-term, anyway. 
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Originally published here: http://dan-hancox.blogspot.com.es/2011/12/kettling-20-olympic-
state-of-exception.html]
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London, Liberalism, and the 
Chinese Labour Question      
— David Glover (Southampton)
The modern politics of migration in Britain basically begins at the end of the 19th century and
the start of the 20th. It’s then that we see organised campaigns to change the ways in which
governments responded to the movement of people across territorial boundaries, much of it
centred upon London as a point of arrival. That these campaigns had very local roots is
shown by names like the Londoners’ League but even when these groups tried to evoke the
solidarity of male nationals by calling themselves the British Brothers’ League they had no
real impact outside the capital. Similarly, as a state practice, modern immigration control also
dates from the  fin de siècle.  However one evaluates its significance, the 1905 Aliens Act
introduced a new kind of public official – the immigration officer – and a new bureaucratic
machine  for  monitoring  and  controlling  the  majority,  if  not  all,  of  those  non-nationals
attempting to  gain  entry  and settle  within  its  borders.  Largely  neglected and ignored by
historians and social scientists until fresh cohorts of migrants began arriving after the Second
World War, accounts of the 1905 Act can now be numbered among Britain’s cherished island
stories,  with their  characteristic  emphasis upon how the nation changed in spite of  such
exclusionary legislation.
In this talk, I want to argue that the first decade of the 20th century witnessed two moral
panics around the question of immigration, only one of which was concerned with domestic
politics. Or rather, the agitation for restricting the numbers of East European Jews entering
Britain – the target of the 1905 Aliens Act – interacted with, and was re-defined in relation to,
a  controversy  about  the  meaning  and  future  of  Britain’s  empire.  The  Chinese  Labour
Question, as it was then known, is not well-remembered today. But at the time it was hotly
debated within Britain and arguably played a more important role in electoral politics than did
the so-called Alien Question. In his book Human Nature in Politics (1908), the liberal socialist
political  theorist  and activist  Graham Wallas recalled that during the 1906 election period
‘pictures  of  Chinamen  on  the  hoardings  aroused  among  very  many  of  the  voters  an
immediate hatred of the Mongolian racial type’. As further evidence he conjured up another
menacing face and gave it a voice: 
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An hour before the close of the poll I saw, with the unnatural clearness of polling-day fatigue, 
a large white face at the window of the ward committee-room, while a hoarse voice roared: 
“Where’s your bloody pigtail? We cut it off last time: and now we’ll put it round your bloody 
neck and strangle you.” (Wallas, 1920, p. 107) 
Wallas was referring to an election that the Liberals very decisively won, though the story he
tells was obviously  deeply unsettling because the slogan seems to slide quickly  into the
threat of racialised violence. Later studies have tended to confirm the importance of Wallas’s
observation.  According  to  A.K.  Russell’s  detailed  study  (1973)  of  the  1906  election,  the
Chinese Labour Question ‘did as much as any other  single issue to erode the electoral
fortunes of the Tories’; and it did so by providing much of the political glue that held the pact
between the Liberals and their Labour allies together. So what was the issue? What was at
stake here and why did it raise the political temperature on the hustings to fever pitch?
The  nub  of  the  question  belongs  to  the  fallout  from  the  Anglo-Boer  War  and  the
extraordinarily manic mood of jingoism which Britain’s oscillation between defeat and victory
in that conflict produced. Once the roller-coaster had ended in 1901, the building of a new
South Africa was urgently on the agenda and its changing fortunes were closely watched at
home. Given the scale of South Africa’s mineral wealth – the discovery of diamonds there in
1867 had played a major role in intensifying the European scramble for Africa – the output of
the colony’s  mining fields  was always going to be of  central  concern.  Yet  the disruption
caused by the war, and the economic downturn that followed, led to pressure from the mine
owners  to  secure  a  cheap  and  malleable  supply  of  unskilled  labour.  The  two  existing
alternatives before them were seen as deeply problematic.  On the one hand, indigenous
African workers, so-called “native labour” were said to be unreliable, led by fluctuations in the
local  agricultural  economy  and  lacking  the  appropriate  labour  discipline  required  in  the
mines. On the other, unskilled white workers were also regarded with disfavour since they
were relatively scarce and therefore expensive.  Moreover, they too were seen as potentially
posing problems of labour discipline, albeit of a radically different kind. Indeed, the sort of
work that white workers should undertake was a very vexed issue. Should white men be
expected – or even allowed – to do unskilled jobs at all? For some commentators part of the
point of imperial conquest was that it created a world in which the least desirable forms of
labour would be done by other races. Any white man who was prepared to take unskilled
work might be a troublemaker and was not to be trusted: unregenerate, racially dubious, the
scum of the earth. It was in this context that importing workers from China seemed to offer a
solution and in February 1903 the Chamber of Mines in the Transvaal sent a deputation to
California, British Columbia, the East Indies and China to investigate its feasibility. In May
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1904 Chinese workers began to arrive in South Africa where they were received at a former
British concentration camp, examined by a doctor, fingerprinted, and given a brass badge
inscribed with their individual number and the name of their employer.
1904 was therefore a watershed year both in South Africa and in the UK. In the first few
months of that year the Liberals in Britain led a movement against the Labour Importation
Ordinance which had brought Chinese indentured labour to the Cape; and, on 26 March
1904,  they were joined by a large TUC demonstration in  London in which some 80,000
people,  largely  men,  marched on Hyde Park via  the Houses of  Parliament  (Manchester
Guardian, 1904, p. 5). Among the speakers taking part were the sort of heavyweights that
one would expect to front this sort of event – men like the labour leader Ben Tillett and the
fiery  Radical  Liberal  MP  for  Battersea,  John  Burns  –  alongside  representatives  of
organisations  like  the  National  Democratic  League,  the  Liberal  Labour  League,  and  the
Metropolitan Radical  Federation.  This  diversity of  support  was also evidenced by the 14
speakers’ booths in the Park. There one could listen to at least 100 orators including local
non-conformist leaders --  Dr Clifford of the Baptist  Union received the most enthusiastic
ovation  --  and  a  variety  of  speakers  from  the  white  settler  territories,  ranging  from  the
explorer and colonial  administrator Sir Harry Johnston (then in search of a parliamentary
seat) to a member of the New Zealand legislature.
What were the terms in which the issue of Chinese labour was raised by this broad coalition
against the Conservative government’s policy? Marches and demonstrations rely on rousing
speeches rather  than forensic  political  analysis,  but  they are also  placeholders for  more
considered modes of  opinion formation.  Popular  demonstrations  signal  the direction  that
political arguments are taking and here several points stand out. First of all,  there was a
strong sense of payback for the Liberal defeat in the so-called “khaki election” of 1900 when
support for the South African War had been the major vote-winner for Conservatives and
Unionists. In Ben Tillett’s near-doggerel: ‘Once the people of this country were khaki mad,
but now they were khaki sad as they contemplated the results of their madness.’ (The Times,
1904,  p.  7)  Unfortunately,  the  political  return  of  South  Africa  brought  with  it  the  worst
excesses of the 1900 campaign. John Burns had shown no qualms about attacking what he
called ‘Ikey Mo … in Pretoria’ (1900, cited in Schneer, 1999, p.258) in that election and in
Hyde  Park  he  asserted  that  ‘the  British  Government  was  the  handmaid  of  the  Jewish
plutocracy’ and ‘the Mother of  Parliaments had become the mistress of  monopoly’(1999,
p.258). He was not alone. A representative of the London County Council insisted that South
Africa  had ceased to  belong to  the Englishman.  Instead  ‘our  legislators  were permitting
slavery to be introduced to benefit the Jew magnates’ while ‘white men were walking the
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streets  of  Johannesburg  with  nothing  to  do  and  starvation  before  them.’  Against  a
background of relatively high unemployment in the UK, the complaint that ‘Mr Chamberlain
had said that the South African war was a miners’ war, but they now saw plainly how the
British miner was being treated’ carried some clout.  
The second point to note is the use of the defining image of slavery. Not only did some of the
speeches invoke the names of Wilberforce and Lincoln, but the iconography of the rally relied
heavily on visualisations of the figure of the slave. On one banner, for example, ‘the ghosts of
dead soldiers’ watched ‘strings of Chinamen in chains proceeding under armed escort to gold
mines’. But the tableau could easily be reversed. In a leaflet handed out on the march ‘a one-
armed but bemedalled Briton [is] brushing the boots of a supercilious and opium-smoking
Chinee.’ When an MP who was present described the issue of Chinese labour as ‘particularly
a working man’s question’, part of his argument was that the substitution of British miners
would have necessitated a widening of the franchise which the mine owners did not want. To
‘loud cheers’ he concluded that ‘the Chinese whom they proposed to introduce would be
slaves, but “Britishers” never would be.’ Again and again, there’s an uncertainty as to who is
the true object of sympathy: the Chinese labourer or the British miner. Ben Tillett forecast a
race war in which ‘the whites and blacks combined to fight the yellow man and his employer.’
The  secretary  of  the  Amalgamated  Society  of  Engineers,  comparing  South  Africa  with
Australia, reminded his audience that other white settler colonies had steadfastly ‘refused to
import yellow labour.’
What of the arguments that were in play away from the febrile atmosphere of the political
meeting or the hustings? Perhaps the best and most revealing example of the intellectual
case  against  the  importation  of  Chinese  labour  into  South  Africa  from within  the  upper
echelons  of  the  Liberal  Party  is  that  advanced  by  Herbert  Samuel  (1904,  pp.  457-67).
Samuel came from a political family, and would later become the first practising Jew to be a
member of a British cabinet and, later still, he was the first High Commissioner of Palestine
during the British mandate. But at the time he wrote on ‘The Chinese Labour Question’ he
was still a fairly new Liberal MP, who had nevertheless already established a reputation as
an impressively  well-informed and meticulous  parliamentarian  and a  theorist  of  the  New
Liberalism. How did he see the Chinese Labour Question in this period?
Taking a long-term view of the present,  Samuel insisted that a new era had begun. The
militaristic days of ‘conquest, loot and territory’ (1904, p. 457) were over and, in their place,
economic migration was changing the internal composition of countries across the globe,
including the bulk of the British Empire.  ‘India has overflowed into Mauritius,  Natal,  East
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Africa and the West Indies. Many parts of the Malay Peninsula are becoming more Chinese
than Malay.  Polynesians have filled the sugar plantations of Queensland.’ (1904,  p. 457)
Closer  to  home,  Samuel  noted  that  ‘Russia,  Poland  and  Germany  have  annexed  large
districts in East London’ (1904, p. 457). He called these ‘race movements’ and emphasised
that ‘race boundaries’ were no longer ‘fixed’, although I think it’s clear that in this part of the
essay ‘race’ is primarily a synonym for ‘nation.’ On the very first page he refers to ‘a gradual
transformation or mingling of nationality.’ But, as we will see, the emphasis quickly undergoes
a decisive shift, for ultimately he believed that migration raised ‘grave questions of what may
be termed Race Policy’ (1904, p. 457). 
As international travel was becoming safer and cheaper,  managing these population flows
was now among ‘the most difficult problems’ faced by statesmen in the Empire and at home.
He returned to  this  theme the following year  in  an essay for  The Economic  Journal on
‘Immigration’, a piece that should be read in tandem with his paper on Chinese labour. Who
was allowed to go where and what principles were to be invoked in making such decisions
was key; and there’s no suggestion that a  laissez-faire defence of the free movement of
labour would do. This, then, is how Samuel summarises what he calls ‘the leading issue’:
‘The leading issue … is whether the influence of the British State should be used so as to
secure that the temperate regions of the Empire shall be the homes of the white races or be
largely inhabited by Mongolians’ (1904, p. 459). There are really two questions at stake in
this quotation:  that  of  the proper role of  the state,  and that  of  the problem of  race.  The
answer to the first question, regarding the function of the British state, is: yes, it should be the
state and not, say, the mineowners, who decide questions of migration and settlement. As a
New Liberal  and a believer in state intervention,  Samuel had no reservations about  this.
Indeed, the Liberal critique of the state at this time was not that state intervention was a
problem, quite the reverse: under the Tories or Unionists it had been captured by the mine
owners or, rather, that was the claim that Radicals like John Burns were making. And not just
demagogues like John Burns; at a ‘crowded’ Liberal ‘demonstration against Chinese slavery
in South Africa’ held in Sheffield on 30 March 1904, one of the speakers had ‘urged that this
country was not prepared to allow South Africa to be handed over to a company of German
Jews’(Manchester Guardian, 1904, p. 5). At a moment when the Liberals were accusing the
Tories of promoting an anti-Semitic domestic immigration policy this was a very inconvenient,
not to say downright embarrassing, argument to uphold.
The answer to the second question (that is, which race should be permitted to occupy the
more hospitable imperial climes?) was much more complicated. The answer could not be the
Chinese (or Mongolians) for two rather different reasons. Firstly, the Chinese were simply too
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competitive. In Samuel’s words, they were able to ‘flourish’ anywhere (1904, p. 458); for the
‘classes of  Chinese who are accustomed to emigrate’ work tirelessly  and will  endure an
‘excessively low standard of living’ (1904, p. 458). Samuel knew this argument well. For it
was exactly the same argument – though not applied to the Chinese – that featured heavily
in the Immigration Bill that the Conservatives had been trying to push through Parliament
between February and July 1904. Secondly, and more seriously, Samuel accepted the view
of the Chinese as a degraded or uncivilised population that was a staple of anti-Chinese
campaigns  in  the  USA and  Australia  –  that  they  were  unclean,  addicted  to  gambling,
belonged to dangerous secret societies, and ‘where they live in celibate communities, the
peculiarly degrading vices which, unquestionably, they often carry with them, make them …
highly  undesirable  as  immigrants’  (1904,  p.  458).  In  other  words,  they  were  sexually
undesirable too.
There’s a very familiar fear of numbers lurking around this essay: ‘the Chinese number a
fourth of mankind’, Samuel noted and, while the Conservative case is that ‘the importation
into South Africa will be small in volume’ (1904, p. 458) and temporary in duration, Samuel
thought it highly likely that ‘a great Chinese community will be established in permanence in
the midst of the white population’ and will expand across the whole of Africa (1904, p. 459).
Incidentally, this Orientalist racial fantasy of unendingly ‘hyperbolical numbers’, ‘a monstrous
aggregation of human beings’ swelling continuously, goes back at least as far as Thomas De
Quincey’s opium-soaked meditations on ‘Chinese treachery’; those are his phrases that I’ve
just quoted (1841, cited in Barrell, 1991, p.6). In Samuel’s brisk and more sober analysis, the
argument slides into a different fantasy – in some ways the obverse of Ben Tillett’s imagined
race war – in which Chinese labour not only ‘undersell the white population’ but ‘inter-marry
with the black’ (1904, p. 467). This alternative he regarded as ‘intolerable’, as ‘intolerable’ as
the  introduction  of  the  Chinese  under  conditions  of  near-slavery.  Interestingly,  Samuel’s
preferred solution would have been to draw upon white workers but to employ much smaller
numbers than had usually been thought to be possible. His main argument was that the
mine-owners had under-invested in new labour-saving machinery. Samuel tacitly seems to
accept  the  worries  expressed  by  the  owners  that  any  large-scale  importation  of  British
workers into the Transvaal would lead to problems of labour discipline. This anxiety clearly
reflects the growth and militancy of trade unionism at home and particularly in Australia.
There’s a phrase in Samuel’s essay that he uses to paraphrase the mine-owners’ fears: ‘this
dread of a second Australian democracy’ (1904, p. 463) which positions Australia as a sort of
rogue democracy, a dangerously un-deferential culture at the margins of the Empire.
Ironically, after the 1906 election it was Liberals like Herbert Samuel who found themselves
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obliged  to  administer  the  new Aliens  Act  and  to  find  a  remedy  for  the  Chinese  Labour
problem in South Africa.  Wallas argued that  the Chinese face on such anti-Tory posters
‘tended slowly to identify itself, in the minds of the Conservatives, with the Liberals who had
used them.’ In Wallas’s memory it is a Liberal who is being threateningly asked ‘Where’s your
bloody pigtail?’ and it is a Liberal who risks being strangled with the pigtail he has conjured
up.    
Wallas’s anecdote was echoed by his friend H. G. Wells in a novel (1911) from the same
period which charts the rise and fall of a Liberal MP. When the protagonist wins his seat in
Parliament his acceptance speech is interrupted by the cry “Votes for Women!” which is then
quickly drowned out by the shout “Chinese labour … and across the square swept a wildfire
of  hooting  and  bawling.”  Here  too  the  slogan  is  a  kind  of  war  cry,  matched  by  the
iconography of the election, in which “one of the most effective posters on our side displayed
a hideous yellow face, just that and nothing more.” (1911, pp. 221-222)
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Can Real Critique be Faith-based? The 
Role of Religion as Electoral Opposition 
— Sukhwant Dhaliwal (Bedfordshire)
The Newham story
Newham Council has been a Labour-controlled borough for the best part of 40 years. Labour
councillors have enjoyed an easy dominance occupying upwards of 54 of the council's 60
seats since 1982. In 2010 there was an unusually high turnout ushering in a full house of 60
Labour  councillors  as well  as a directly  elected mayor  from the Labour  Party.  Moreover,
Newham has been a safe Labour seat in parliamentary terms with Labour MPs enjoying
large margins over other candidates for almost two decades. 
Unfortunately,  this  strong  mandate  for  the  local  Labour  Group appears  to  have made it
complacent  and  undemocratic.  Several  Newham  interviewees  (Dhaliwal,  2011)  noted
redundant  Labour  Party  branches,  the  lack  of  agency  in  selecting  candidates  and
determining local priorities, a lack of grassroots activism, voter apathy and high levels of
frustration over the absence of an effective Opposition. This lack of local Party democracy
was thought to extend outwards to a lack of autonomy, indeed decimation, of a potentially
plural community and voluntary sector. The borough's directly elected Labour mayor, Robin
Wales,  has  been  criticised  (2010)  for  awarding  himself  a  significant  pay  rise  whilst
simultaneously  announcing  job  cuts  and  reduced  salaries  for  local  authority  employees.
Importantly, within the last decade, the Newham Labour Party's electoral monopoly has only
been interrupted by two political parties – the Christian Peoples Alliance and Respect. Both
relied upon religious identities as vote banks potentially bringing religion to the fore as a
feature of electoral opposition and democratic critique.
The onward march of Christianity?
In 2002, Alan Craig of the Christian Peoples Alliance (CPA) broke through eight years of
Labour Party monopoly by winning one council seat in Canning Town South.  In 2006, they
stood 20 candidates at the local council elections and managed to win  another two seats,
capturing  an entire ward in  the  south  of  the  borough.  By 2010,  however,  all  three CPA
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councillors had lost their seats. The CPA website suggested that the losses were more about
the entrenchment  of  Labour  Party  support  against  a  Conservative  threat  than about  the
unpopularity of CPA's politics amongst the electorate. Interestingly, Alan Craig started out in
electoral politics as a Conservative Party candidate and was predictably unsuccessful in a
borough  where  the  political  landscape  has  been  shaped  by  a  united  stand  against  the
Conservative  Party  (Smith,  2002,  p.162).  So  the  Christian  Peoples  Alliance  possibly
constitutes a small dent for Labour Party dominance in the borough but I think that their story
provides an interesting focus for the question of what constitutes critique or marginality.
The CPA emerged in 1999 out of the Movement for Christian Democracy established in 1991
by three cross-party Christian MPs including David Alton who is best known for his opposition
to abortion and euthanasia. The CPA's ideological framework is set out in its aims which
include the following statements: 
• Recognition of Christ's sovereignty over the nations and in politics.
• Respect of God's law as the basis for constitutional government and a stable society.
• Respect for human life given by God.
• Careful economic stewardship of God's creation.
• Commitment to the fairness of markets and patterns of exchange.
• Open,  transparent  government,  which  subjects  itself  to  debate  and  critique.
(http://www.cpaparty.org.uk/, no date)
It is important to distinguish between religion as a motivating force for political engagement
and the imposition of beliefs that carries parallels with Clara Connolly's distinction between
'Christian in form' and 'Christian in fact' (1990, p.3). The interpretation of some of these CPA
objectives  leaves  little  to  the  imagination  but  their  founding  document,  the  Mayflower
Declaration, offers the following detail: CPA is opposed to the “destruction of the unborn” and
this is given as one example of the ways in which “our nation has failed to live as God
requires”; and science and technology are included in the “mistaken beliefs to which we have
succumbed and idols before which we have bowed”. (http://www.cpaparty.org.uk/, no date)  
Interestingly,  Craig  recognised  the  proximity  between  the  CPA  political  project  and
Cameron's 'compassionate conservatism', a peculiar mix of libertarian and communitarian
conceptions of the state where religion is charged with providing a strong moral framework.
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Newspaper  reports  (Doward,  2010 and Cook,  2010)  about  the influence of  the Christian
Right on the current Conservative Party (through key figures in the Conservative Christian
Fellowship and the Centre for Social Justice) suggest that, like the CPA, they also draw a
great  deal  of  support  from  growing  Evangelical  and  Pentecostal  networks  which  are
expressly concerned to usurp local secular candidates. 
The local chronicler of faith in politics, Greg Smith (2002), noted that Alan Craig’s activism
emerged from his involvement in a local tenants’ and residents’ association and his critique
of  estate  renewal  schemes.  In  my  own  interviews  (Dhaliwal,  2011)  Alan  Craig  guarded
against describing his interventions on local issues as underpinned by a literalist commitment
to Christianity where each political position might be referenced against the Bible. Rather, he
emphasised  the  Party's  commitment  to  generic  principles  such  as  social  justice  and
protecting the poor. Indeed it is this focus that seemed to appeal to Newham activists yet it is
undeniable that CPA do not forego their agenda on reproductive rights. Craig's contribution to
local politics was referenced against four particular issues: opposition to the redevelopment
of the Queen's Market in Upton Park; opposition to proposals to establish a large Casino in
East Ham; a campaign against the construction of a Tablighi Jamaat mosque complex at the
Temple Mills site in West Ham; and attempts to initiate a council debate on sexual orientation
and reproductive rights. The first two issues won the CPA a great deal of recognition amongst
local civil  society actors, placing the CPA at the forefront of a critical  voice opposing the
hegemonic implementation of New Labour policies and the weight of corporations in an area
where local people suffer multiple forms of deprivation. 
Class as a category is important here because the CPA carried the upper hand over the local
(New) Labour Group. At an instinctive level, the CPA were positioned on the side of valuing
local people over the interests of big business. When it came to the vote on the casino, the
Christian Socialists within the Newham Labour Group abstained (on the basis of conscience)
rather than voice their objections, least of all vote against their political party, reinforcing the
undemocratic character of the Labour leadership. On the Queen’s Market issue, a sustained
campaign by the Friends of Queen’s Market highlighted the intersection of multicultural and
working-class  heritage,  and  was  eventually  vindicated  through  the  intervention  of
Conservative mayor, Boris Johnson. Indeed the CPA applauded their own role in the Queen’s
Market  victory  and  brought  this  together  with  a  critique  of  rational  bureaucracy  and
exploitative  capital.  The  following  extract  reflects  Craig’s  reproduction  of  a  widespread
counter-positioning of ‘values free’ secular politics against ‘strong values’ faith-based politics:
The value-free managerialism that Sir Robin offers is selfish, dry-as-dust and takes no 
account of local and vulnerable people - as we have seen at Queen’s market and the 
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Canning Town housing regeneration project. CPA on the other hand stands with the 
marginalised and speaks up for community - and family-oriented values. Unlike the 
Mayor, we would never bulldoze an invaluable diverse community asset like Queen’s 
market in favour of a bog-standard ruthless grasping WalMart Asda. (Christian Peoples 
Alliance, 2006) 
However, the CPA's perspective on the construction of a Tablighi Jamaat mosque and on
sexual freedoms lost them potential allies. Interviewees raised concerns about the CPA's
views on Islam far more frequently than concerns about their stance on sexual orientation
and reproductive rights. Moreover, CPA's dual interests in the Tablighi Jamaat mosque and
sexuality  presented  obvious  contradictions.  Questions  of  women's  rights,  segregation,
dissent and rule of law were central to the CPA's critique of the Tablighi Jamaat and the
council's decision to back Tablighi Jamaat's proposals. Yet CPA simultaneously stood against
sexual  freedoms and invoked a  strong gendered morality  as  part  of  their  own Christian
political  identity.  Interestingly,  their  cutting edge critique of  the impact  of  regeneration on
poverty amongst local people recently collapsed into an assault  on women's reproductive
rights. In November 2011, Alan Craig joined a multifaith picket outside the Newham offices of
the  British  Pregnancy  Advisory  Service  (BPAS)  in  Stratford.  His  statement  levelled  the
following accusations:
BPAS has become a large money spinning business. This centre is commercial 
opportunism to take advantage of Westfield Stratford City and the Olympics. BPAS have 
an interest in doing as many abortions as possible. (Stott, 2011)
The way in which 'race', gender and a critique of regeneration came together to form the
CPA's discursive terrain could be understood as the enfolding of a contemporary nationalist
rhetoric  (Britishness,  civilisational  discourse  and  human  rights)  with  an  emphasis  on
marriage and family and a peculiarly localised variant of communitarian nostalgia. 
Moreover,  although  Alan  Craig  described  the  CPA as  “a  response  to  the  corrosive  and
aggressive secularisation of society and especially of public life” (Dhaliwal, 2011), Christianity
and other religious commitments also live comfortably within the Newham Labour Group. In
2009, my own research (Dhaliwal 2011) found that 17 Newham councillors listed an affiliation
to or membership of a religious organisation in their declaration of interests. By October 2011
this number had fallen significantly to five partly because the Respect Party, Independent
and Christian Peoples Alliance councillors were voted out in May 2010. Still, the interviews
suggested that at least another ten councillors from this list had active links with one religious
organisation or more in the borough. The point is that these affiliations do not manifest in the
manner that Alan Craig would like to see them.
London: City of Paradox — 79
One  important  element  of  Newham's  history  is  the  presence  of  the  Christian  Socialist
Movement (CSM). Both the Newham MPs and three local councillors with Cabinet positions
are involved in the Newham branch of CSM. Interviewees who were involved with the CSM
made clear distinctions between themselves and the Christian Peoples Alliance noting three
particular points of discord: a preference for mainstream rather than religious identity politics;
positions on sexuality and abortion; and racism. In fact it was CSM members of the Newham
Labour Group that  spoke out  against  CPA’s views on sexuality.  Councillor  Revd.  Quintin
Peppiatt, a Cabinet member who holds the portfolio for Children and Young People, but is
also a member of the CSM, Watch (the Campaign for Women Bishops) and the Lesbian and
Gay Christian Movement highlighted shared interests on regeneration and poverty (he and
Craig were equally opposed to the construction of  a casino in Newham) but  significantly
divergent views on same sex relationships and abortion. 
It was more common for Newham interviewees to distance themselves from the CPA on the
grounds of racism. In fact, Alan Craig was very aware that the Muslim Respect Party was
unwilling to associate with the CPA because of their campaign against what they refer to as
the  'Olympic  Mega Mosque'.   There  is  some level  of  irony  here.  Whilst  other  Christian
mobilisations in the borough – the Faith Sector Forum, Faithful Friends, Transform and the
CSM – are white-led, the CPA has had a significant number of black faces at its helm. Its
previous leader was the South Asian millionaire businessman Ram Gidoomal. One of the
elected candidates  for  Canning Town Ward was the  African Simeon Ademolake.  Indeed
several interviewees noted that the CPA base depended upon the particularly conservative
African churches in the borough. The CPA discourse is not about ethnic minorities per se but
rather hones in on Islam. 
The Iraq War and the Respect Party
In spite of this lack of unity amongst the opposition, the 2006 local election did create a
fissure in Labour Party dominance in the area. Both the Respect Party and the CPA made
gains  from  a  significant  anti-war  mobilisation.  There  was  a  sense  that  the  anti-war
mobilisation carried with it the prospect of breaking a local Labour Party monopoly and of
giving rise to a viable Left opposition. In 2006, the Respect Party stood a councillor in every
single ward of Newham as well as a mayoral candidate. A number of people rescinded their
membership of the Labour Party and a few became actively involved in the Newham branch
of the Respect Party (Grzincic, 2003). 
For all intents and purposes the Respect Party in Newham relied on a Muslim vote bank
around the Green Street and Forest Gate area. By the time of the local elections in 2006,
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three Muslim councillors defected from the Labour Group to run for Respect and managed to
capture the Green Street West ward, the heart  of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim
population in the borough. However, a closer look at the political trajectory of one of the
defectors, AK Sheikh, reveals that in the context of contemporary electoral politics, religion
has been welded to existing resentments or has become an important means for articulating
political ambitions. 
AK Sheikh  was  first  elected  as  a  Labour  Party  councillor  alongside  three  other  Muslim
candidates in 1990. It  would be fair to suggest that the timing was no mere coincidence:
ethnic  minority  political  activism was applying pressure on the Labour  Party  through the
Labour Party Black Sections but also as Muslim identity politics, with the latter being shaped
by Islamist mobilisations against Salman Rushdie in 1989 and the first Gulf War in 1991. AK
Sheikh founded the Alliance of Newham Muslim Associations (ANMA), which is affiliated to
the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). Until very recently the MCB was the main platform for
New Labour's engagement with Muslims but then derided for its connections with the Islamic
Right political party, the Jamaat-e-Islami. 
Even after he was voted out as a local councillor, Sheikh continued both inside the state and
also  in  opposition  through  various  consultation  processes  and  networks  that  recognise
religious leaders as a kind of second tier policing in the local area. However, in an interview
before he lost his seat in May 2010, he spoke of a confluence of issues as the steer for his
personal path (Dhaliwal, 2011). He certainly was interested to represent his anti-Iraq war
constituents but this was only part of the reason for his defection. The Iraq invasion shone a
spotlight on the lack of internal Labour Party democracy. At that moment in particular, the
Blairite  leadership  style  and  command structure  at  the  heart  of  the  New Labour  project
became over-determined at the local level.  The New Labour-led faith agenda that distributed
funding for local faith forums enabled a space for developing a critique of the local Newham
Labour Group. As the lifelong General Secretary of the ANMA, Sheikh became very involved
in the Faith Sector Forum during the same period as his defection from Labour to Respect.
However, beyond a pre-election concern with Iraq and a request to support a motion against
the nikab ban in France, the Respect councillors were muted and did little to challenge the
shifting ideological ground of the Labour Party, which should also have given many Labour
Party supporters cause to change their affiliation.
Even Stephen Timms MP for  East  Ham recognised the impact  of  the Iraq war  on local
Muslim voters and suggested that in 2006, around two-thirds of Muslim voters voted Respect
whilst one-third voted for him. As many people have already noted, a number of processes
London: City of Paradox — 81
coalesced around the question of Iraq including: the reconfiguration of Islam in Britain as a
source of political critique; the mainstreaming of Islamist projections of the invasion of Iraq as
a Muslim issue16; and the local impact on politicians who sided with Tony Blair. 
The impact on Stephen Timms's electoral margin, however, was much smaller than expected
given the correlation between the size of Muslim populations and the Respect Party support
base. Part of Timms's ability to surpass this electoral threat was no doubt connected to the
dominant view of him as a politician with integrity. It is also possible that his faith background
and his gender were contributory factors. Timms noted that the Respect Party's mobilisation
in  the mosques  was  not  “universally”  successful'  and his  own political  career  had been
encouraged by some local mosques so his established links with religious groups in the
borough could have served him well during this period. He was also the Labour Party vice
chair on Faith. Moreover, in neighbouring Tower Hamlets, a whispering campaign about the
'loose' and 'immoral' character of the Labour Party MP Oona King was an integral part of the
particularly  dirty  fight  for  the Bethnal  Green and Bow seat.  Timms seems to have been
protected from such tactics also because of  the absence of  a centralised fundamentalist
body in Newham like the Jamaat-e-Islami groupings in Tower Hamlets, a significant element
of the Respect Party campaign. 
Nevertheless,  21-year-old  Roshonara Choudhry,  a  young Bangladeshi  woman from East
Ham, ensured that even after a change of government, the spectre of Iraq and international
Islamist  mobilisations continue to cast  a shadow over local  politics.   In November 2010,
Choudhry was convicted of attempting to murder Stephen Timms. She admitted to carrying
out the attack as her way of avenging the murder of Iraqis. She would have been just 14
years old when Timms cast his vote in support of Tony Blair's decision to invade Iraq. 
Even though Choudhry is  being projected by some as a troubled and vulnerable  young
woman  acting  alone,  the  disquiet  that  her  actions  have  caused  local  politicians  was
16 The situation is rife with contradictions and certainly not as simplistic as that projected within Islamist
claims  about  the  occupation  of  'Muslim  lands'.  Firstly,  the  object  of  Blair's  vilification,  Saddam
Hussein, was a staunch secularist and part of a generation of postcolonial rulers (including the Egyptian
Hosni Mubarak and the Libyan Mu'ammar Gaddafi)  who opposed Islamist  movements.  Moreover,
Hussein perpetuated a violent  confrontational  relationship with the neighbouring Shia theocracy in
Iran.  It  was  the  head  of  the  Iranian  government,  Ayatollah  Khomeini  who  incited  international
mobilisation against Salman Rushdie in  turn fuelling a new wave of Muslim political  identities  in
Britain. Ironically, the British and US invasion of Iraq in 2003 actually increased the space for Islamist
factions to garner power and define the geographical region as a Muslim territory. Importantly, the cost
of  such  political  machinations  is  particularly  borne  by women who were  claimed by Blair  as  his
subjects  of  liberation and yet  whose rights  were traded away in post-invasion negotiations for  the
introduction of religious laws. 
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summarised in the following report:
Choudhry didn't just plunge the knife; she shattered the consensus that existed between 
the MP and his Muslim constituents. For all the rancor evoked by the war, they had 
reached an equilibrium. (Muir, 2010) 
Conclusion
In concluding, I want to draw upon Michael Keith's (2005) assertion that it is necessary to
make a distinction between the conditions of possibility on the one hand and the modalities
of identity on the other. In fact, I think this distinction is missing in the general willingness to
embrace anything and everything that claims itself as 'Opposition' or 'Critique'. In this paper I
have attempted to highlight the reasons why electoral opposition is welcomed in Newham but
then to look more closely at the substance of that critique. 
In  particular,  religion  is  welded  to  a  critique  of  party  structures,  transparency  and
accountability. The issues that were raised became inextricable from questions of democratic
process and participation. At some level this is a continuation of a discourse that positions
religion as the counterweight to formations where 'secular' is added to criticisms about rigid
hierarchal  Party  structures  and  support  for  large  corporations  or  privatisation.  Without
belittling the actual content of the complaints or the religious belief dimension of that content,
it  is  clear that,  in  the current  climate at  least,  some strands of  political  opposition find it
easiest to reach for religion as a source of discontent and as an alternative voice.
In Newham the thrust of the critique was about the centralised command structure and lack
of dissent within a Labour Group modelled on Blair's New Labour. In Newham, a reluctance
to  engage  with  the  local  (centrally  funded)  Faith  Forum,  for  instance,  gave  rise  to  a
metonymic association between the undemocratic practices of the local Labour Group, its
overt secular commitments (including amongst many of its CSM activists) and the Labour
Group's decisions to redevelop the Queen’s Market and give the go ahead to the Newham
Casino. 
The  second  factor  that  comes  into  play  is  the  unfinished  business  of  ethnic  minority
recruitment to the Labour Party.  Conservative (with a small  ‘c’)  ethnic minority politicians
have been sitting comfortably  within local  Labour  Party branches for  a long time. In  the
current moment, religion gives vent to grievances and also provides the form through which
divergent political leanings and views, once sitting comfortably within a 'sovereign Labour
Party', are released and find expression. 
The  third  factor  is  the  viability  of  alternative  political  parties.  The  political  landscape  in
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Newham has been shaped by a united front against the Conservative Party, in turn making
other avenues more viable, namely Christian Right/Democratic politics (especially for African
evangelists) and the (Muslim) Respect Party.
Importantly, these religious critics are united in their social conservatism. Members of the
CPA in  Newham may share  some concerns with the Christians within the Labour  Party,
namely poverty and the impact of regeneration on local people, but are simply not interested
to align with Labour's equality agenda and so have never been inside the Labour camp. 
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‘Cleaning Up’: The Living Wage Campaign 
at the University of East London      
— Ana Lopes and Tim Hall (UEL)
Introduction
What opportunities present themselves, today, for organising migrant workers around issues
of pay and working conditions? What forms should this organisation take and what prospects
of  success  do  such  campaigns  have?  Migrant  workers  represent  some  of  the  most
vulnerable and least protected groups of workers in the UK. According to the report of the
Commission on Vulnerable Employment (2008, p.12) migrant workers are disproportionately
represented in vulnerable employment: more likely to suffer problems at work and summary
dismissal; less likely to be members of trade unions and, therefore, not in a position to have
their  rights  and  conditions  covered  by  collective  bargaining;  less  likely  to  know  their
employment rights;  and more likely to be subject  to routine bullying in  the workplace.  In
addition, recent studies have shown that these problems are compounded by recent cuts in
public  spending  in  the  UK  (Rogers  et  al.,  2009).  All  of  this  would  suggest  that  the
circumstances could hardly be less promising for organising migrant workers. All the more
striking, then, that we should see a proliferation of living wage campaigns led by citizens’
organisations, trade unions and political parties. At present there are living wage campaigns
up and running throughout the UK, led by community organisations like Citizens UK; trade
unions such as Unison and Unite; and movements of political parties like the Movement for
Change in the Labour party.
Our  aim  in  this  paper  is  to  explore  these  questions  by  drawing  on  our  experience  as
participants in the campaign to implement the London living wage at the University of East
London (UEL) and original empirical work carried out subsequently with cleaning workers at
the University. The campaign to introduce the London living wage at UEL commenced in the
April 2010. It was led by London Citizens and formed part of their broader campaign to target
the Higher Education sector in London for living wage campaigns. This campaign achieved
striking gains in a relatively short period of time with Queen Mary, The University of London
(QMUL),  The  School  of  Oriental  and  African  Studies  (SOAS),  The  London  School  of
Economics (LSE), Birkbeck College, the Institute of Education and Goldsmiths College all
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agreeing  to  implement  the  living  wage  between  2006  and  2010.  It  is  estimated  that
£4,692,661  has  been  redistributed  to  externally  contracted  workers  in  these  campaigns
between 2005 and 2011 in the higher education sector alone (Wills et al., 2009a).
While the campaign to introduce the living wage at UEL certainly benefited from being part of
a broader and increasingly high profile campaign, those involved were still surprised by its
speed and success.  We try  to  account  for  this  success by examining the organisational
model adopted.
We also analyse the motivations and experience of the cleaning workers that participated in
the campaign.  As  participants  what  struck  us  during  the campaign  was  how readily  the
cleaning workers were organised. At the time we speculated that we were tapping into a rich
vein of organisational experience acquired through political experience in their countries of
origin. This led us to the view that formed one of the principal hypotheses of our research:
the belief  that  these workers already possessed considerable political  and organisational
capital accumulated in their country of origin. However, our research found little evidence of
this. While leaders from the cleaning staff emerged in the course of the campaign, for the
most part they had no strong backgrounds in union activism – indeed quite the opposite in
some cases. We compare and contrast the campaign in UEL with other campaigns in the
higher  education  sector  and provide  further  support  for  the  adoption  of  broad-based,  or
community-based, approaches to organising migrant workers.
Research context
The living wage campaign at UEL commenced in April  2010 when community organisers
from London Citizens made contact with academic staff at the University. Having ascertained
that  cleaning  staff  17 were  paid  just  above  the  national  minimum  wage,  there  followed
separate meetings with staff (some of whom were trade union branch officers) and students
to try to kick-start a living wage campaign. A key addition to the campaign team was the
involvement of the UEL branch of Unison in the summer of 2010. This afforded cleaning
workers some protection in the actions that they took but also gave them access to branch
17 The cleaning staff at UEL is composed, predominantly, of two groups: a Spanish speaking Colombian
group and a Portuguese speaking group, mostly from African Portuguese speaking countries. Indeed,
46% of  our  questionnaire  respondents  originate  from  the  African  continent  and  30%  from  Latin
America. The majority of workers who responded to our questionnaire are female, although the male
respondents are a significantly large minority (41%). The age of our respondents varies between 18 and
61 with an average of 39. Among the respondents of our questionnaire, the average time spent in the
UK is seven years. Forty nine per cent of the respondents had been in the UK for less than five years
and 27% between 11 and 20 years. 
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officers  that  undertook  casework  on  their  behalf.  In  the  view  of  those  involved  in  the
campaign, if the campaign was to produce lasting benefits beyond an increase in pay it was
vital that cleaning workers had the opportunity to join an established trade union. 
Continued pressure from the campaign team for a meeting led to an announcement by the
Vice Chancellor in November 2010 that UEL would implement the living wage. The campaign
then entered a new phase. After an initial meeting in December 2010 with members of the
Vice Chancellors  Group (VCG),  the campaign team conducted a report  into the existing
contract which found widespread evidence of mismanagement of the contract; of late and
missing  payments  leaving  cleaning  staff  with  insufficient  money  to  live  on.  While  the
campaign was unsuccessful in persuading the VCG to take the cleaning service back in-
house it had succeeded in getting the ethical track record of the company pushed up the
criteria of selection in the tendering process. After the commencement of the new contract in
August 2011, the UEL branch of Unison, supported by the Hidden Workforce Unit at Unison
ran a training course for new members and began the process of identifying and training
representatives to enable cleaning staff to address issues themselves as they arise. While
this development is still in process the signs are positive that the gains of the campaign can
be consolidated in the form of a unionised workforce capable of resolving its own issues and
shaping, to some extent, its working practices.
Existing research on living wage campaigns
Research on living wage campaigns has generally focused on two questions: the first  is
whether living wage campaigns have actually succeeded in lifting low paid workers out of
poverty;  the  second  tries  to  account  for  the  relative  success  of  these  campaigns  with
reference  to  their  organisational  model,  specifically,  the  broad-based  character  of  their
approach. The first question has generated an extensive literature on the economic case for
the living wage (Weldon and Targ, 2004 and Grover, 2008) while the second has tended to
focus on the political and organisational forms of living wage campaigns. Our focus in this
paper will be on the second question. This is not to deny that increased wages form a crucial
part  of  the success of a living wage campaign. However their success cannot simply be
judged  in  these  terms.  There  is  also  the  empowerment  that  follows  from  a  successful
campaign and the formation of a trade union (Nissen, 2000).
UK-based  research  has  tended  to  focus  on  what  is  new and  distinctive  about  them as
political  and  organisational  forms.  Living  wage  campaigns  are  perhaps  the  best  known
examples of broad-based organising in the UK. The latter is not restricted to campaigning for
a living wage but can more or less be applied to any attempt to address an identified social
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problem.  In  the  hands  of  citizens’ organisations,  one  typically  finds  these  organisational
approaches  applied  to  a  range  of  social  issues  like  the  lack  of  affordable  housing;
unemployment; youth violence, personal debt etc.
The fundamental characteristics of broad-based organising are that it  tends to be citizen-
initiated and aimed at realising a general good. It seeks to do this by bringing individuals – as
members of civil institutions – together to organise around what they hold in common rather
than what they disagree about. Solidarity between individuals, within and across institutions,
is engendered through the fostering of public relationships – or political friendships – such
that  individuals  know  sufficient  about  each  other  (their  background  and  motivations)  to
enable effective organising. For this reason broad-based organising is sometimes referred to
as ‘relational’ organising because its principal modus operandi is the one-to-one meeting
between individuals who are also members of associations/ institutions.
Living wage campaigns led by citizens’ organisations tend to be different  in  character  to
those  led  by  trade  unions  or  political  parties.  For  example,  while  both  employ  tactics
designed to increase tension between campaign group and power-holder, for the former this
is always related to a very definite end: typically a meeting with the power-holder. Where
trade union-led campaigns typically  take the form of  a  class  struggle  for  a share of  the
collective  product,  the  focus  of  citizen-led  campaigns  tends  to  be  on  employers  and
contractors coming to recognise the common good and ‘doing the right thing’.
A number of authors including Wills (2008), Holgate (2005) and Heery et al. (2012) have
acknowledged  what  might  be  termed  a  paradigm  shift  in  organising  models.  Where
traditional models of organising centre on the workplace and the ongoing struggle of workers
and management, broad-based organising, it is suggested, centres on a particular space or
locale. For example, the living wage campaign launched by London Citizens in 2002 was
directed at a particular zone – Canary Wharf in the City – rather than any particular sector.
The purpose of this was to strengthen communal relations within the worksite and across
worksites. 
This is not to suggest that broad-based organising represents a complete break with more
orthodox forms of class politics. Jane Wills, for example, views living wage campaigns as
evidence of the rise of a ‘new urban vanguard’ (Wills, 2008, p. 455; also quoted by Hearn
and Bergos, 2011, p.79). In an important article from 2008 Jane Wills has analysed the role
of class in living wage campaigns. Living wage campaigns, she suggests, demand that we
dispense with essentialist conceptions of class. What distinguishes the class politics we find
in living wage campaigns from ‘essentialist’ accounts is an emphasis on contingency and a
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move beyond  the  restricted  site  of  the  workplace  to  broader  considerations  of  how the
surplus is divided in taxation and public spending and the world of investment - property,
pensions, insurance and financial speculation:
[t]he experience of cleaners in London suggests how class interests can be mobilised 
beyond any fixity in the social structure (class is not just about employment relations at 
the point of production or service) and beyond any dependence on shared interests or 
common identities arising from work. As such, London’s cleaners and their supporters 
raise challenging questions for those on the Left who remain stuck with a traditional 
model of class and its potential politicisation. (Wills, 2008, p.26)
According to Warren (2009), Jamoul and Wills (2008) and Wills et al. (2009) this approach
accounts  for  the  success  of  citizens’  groups  like  London  Citizens  in  organising  faith
communities. Jamoul and Wills (2008) contrast the progressive engagement of faith-based
groups  by  London  Citizens  with  the  standard  co-option  of  these  groups  by  the  state.
Whereas the former, they suggest, enables faith communities to retain their radical edge by
campaigning on issues of social justice – such as affordable housing, a living wage and the
regularisation of  migrant  workers – the latter  serves  to de-radicalise and co-opt  them in
community cohesion projects (Jamoul and Wills, 2008, p. 2036 and Defilippis et al.,2010)
This  is  particularly  the case in  the  UK where the government  introduced a  raft  of  such
projects targeted principally at the Muslim community in response to the London  bombings
in 2005. The successful engagement of faith groups, they suggest, also accounts for the
success of the London living wage campaign led by London Citizens. For not only is this
campaign able to draw on the public support and involvement of different faith communities
but it was also able to reach migrant workers that are disproportionately members of such
communities.
As will be seen from the findings of our own research, Jamoul and Wills’ argument is at least
partially  borne  out.  Seventy  per  cent  of  the  cleaning  workers  who  responded  to  our
questionnaire said they regularly attended a place of worship in contrast to just 15% who
said they were previously members of trade unions. It further transpired in the interviews with
key leaders that a number attended the same church in East London that specifically catered
for the Latin American community in the area. While this church itself was not an affiliate of
London Citizens, it became clear that the developments at UEL were widely known amongst
the congregation. It also became apparent that religious values were a key motivation for
some of the leaders amongst the cleaning staff.
Questions of  class,  community  and faith  also arise  in  debates about  the future of  trade
unions. Despite trade union involvement in living wage campaigns in Canary Wharf and the
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City  of  London,  relations  between  community  organisations  and  trade  unions  are  often
strained. Jane Holgate (2009) has argued that trade unions often find it difficult to connect
with broad-based organising groups (especially the religious elements within them) and are
critical  of  their  decision-making  structures.  Additionally  she  points  to  territorial  issues
between trade unionists and citizens’ organisations. Trade union activists and leaders feel
that community groups should not operate in an area that they perceive as their ‘territory’
(such as wages, or the creation of workers’ associations). Conversely, citizens’ organisations
like London Citizens find it difficult to understand and adapt to the democratic processes and
timetables of  unions.  However,  Holgate suggests that  there is  very little in the aims and
objectives  of  these  two  types  of  organisations  that  should  prevent  them  from  working
together  and  that  locally,  the  relationship  between  unions  and  London  Citizens  has
improved.18 
The experience at UEL tends to bear this out. Unison was a crucial addition to the campaign
at UEL.  This was a significant moment in the campaign because the campaign group was
augmented by local Unison activists who were able to convince their membership of the
importance of reaching out to externally contracted staff. It also enabled the campaign team
to go on a recruitment drive resulting in over half of the workforce (approximately 70 across
three sites) joining Unison.   Unionisation also enabled cleaning workers to better resist any
attempt on the part  of  the company or  client  to  offset  the increased cost  of  wages with
reduced contracts and intensified workloads. While some tensions were evident at a central
level, local organisers and activists from Unison and London Citizens worked closely with
one another. The local branch of Unison even went on to affiliate with London Citizens.
The campaign for the introduction of the London living wage at UEL is of interest to current
research on living wage campaigns because it utilised broad-based approaches and was led
by a coalition of community organisers and trade union activists. We turn now to an analysis
of our empirical data.
Findings
Our initial hunch that, as organisers, we were tapping into some significant existing political
and organisational capital was not confirmed by our research. Cleaning workers at UEL who
were involved in the living wage campaign emerged as a group of migrant workers with little
political experience, but with significant associations with faith-based groups. Indeed, religion
18 In this regard see Holgate and Simms (2010) where trade unions are criticised for treating broad-based
organising as a technique and ignoring its implicit political content.
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seems to be a key source of bonding social capital. Religion may also be a source of the
staff’s  pride in  their  work (Snarr,  2007),  as verbalised in  some of  our  interviews despite
stigmatisation and low pay.  
The literature points to tensions between trades unions and community groups (Holgate,
2009).  The  living  wage  campaign  at  UEL,  however,  is  a  good  example  of  community
organisations and trade unions working together effectively. In this case Unison activists and
London Citizens organisers were able to come together and utilise each other’s strengths to
pursue a successful  campaign.  This  confirms Holgate’s  finding that,  locally,  the relations
between these two groups are improving.
Moreover, unionisation of the cleaning force at UEL and the activities that followed (such as
union training course, ESOL) have meant that the cleaning staff are in a better position to
represent  themselves and address other problems they may face in  the workplace.  This
concurs with McBride and Greenwood’s (2009) claim that union involvement is crucial if living
wage campaigns are to lead to lasting benefits.
Lastly,  it  is  apparent  from  our  interviews  that  those  who  took  part  in  the  campaign
acknowledged and valued the impact of the campaign at several levels. Interviewees pointed
to increased visibility in the workplace as one of the positive outcomes of the campaign.
Being more aware of  rights  at  work  and  feeling  connected to  other  communities  at  the
University, such as students and lecturers were other valued outcomes. Thus, even though it
is necessary to take cautiously claims of the success of living wage campaigns, it is also
important to acknowledge that such success is not limited to wage increment.
Conclusion
Our research provides further evidence for a number of claims that have been advanced
about the significance of living wage campaigns in the literature thus far. The first of these is
that broad-based campaigns are particularly good at engaging migrant workers with high
levels  of  social  capital  from  membership  of  faith  groups,  but  limited  levels  of  political
experience narrowly defined. The second is that community and union organisers can and do
work successfully together at grass roots level. Both findings augur well for future living wage
campaigns. The first implies that there are significant sections of the migrant workforce that
can be engaged in living wage campaigns if the right approach is adopted. This may well
differ depending on the composition, background and skills of the workforce as Hearn and
Bergos’s study shows (2011). Overall, however, this implies an increase in the total reach of
living wage campaigns for migrant workers provided the approach is carefully considered.
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The second finding that community and trade union organisers work well at a grass roots
level may come as no surprise given the scarcity of resources each face. But this generates
a range of issues for both organisations which need to be addressed if future campaigns are
to be successful. Trade Unions in the UK have for some time now been experimenting with
community-based organising in the face of declining traditional membership. For example,
Unison, the largest trade union in the UK, have a community organising co-ordinator while
Unite have created a separate branch for community-based campaigns (Unite Community).
This  should  dispose  trade  unions  to  working  more  closely  with  citizens’  organisations.
However a range of  factors impede effective collaboration from disputes over territory to
political infighting. In our experience, however, both citizens’ organisations and trade unions
have a vital role to play: the first in engaging migrant workers and the second in consolidating
the gains accruing from the living wage. It would be a mistake however to ignore substantive
philosophical  differences between community  organising and trade  union organising and
reduce each approach to a difference of  technique as Holgate and Simms have argued
(2010). For this reason there is, in our view, an urgent need to rethink the assumptions –
class-based for the one and communitarian for the other – underlying each practice. 
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The Jewish Community 
in Multicultural London  
— Ben Gidley (Oxford)
This chapter explores the nature of multiculture, and in particular London’s specific form of
urban multiculture, through the perspective of the Jewish presence within it. As captured in
the concept of “the Jewish question”, Jews have figured in modern Europe as exemplars of
otherness,  as  a  non-national  people  in  a  world  of  nation  states.  In  modernity,  although
originally often excluded from the city and dwelling outside the city walls, Jews have been
associated with urbanity, and with the city as a site that is in some sense non-national, even
cosmopolitan, in a world of nations. Nowhere is this truer than London, a city that has been,
to a greater or lesser extent, alien to the English nation, always populated by migrants and
foreigners.  Arguably,  today’s  Jewish  question  is  the  migrant  question,  and  the  historical
experience of London’s Jews can help us think about London as a city of migration. 
I want to start from the idea of Jews having a particular iconic place in the history of London
as a city – and particularly East London as a site – of diversity and tolerance. Les Back’s
term “the metropolitan paradox”  (1996)  captures the simultaneous presence of  the most
brutal forms of exclusion and conflict alongside the most profound forms of conviviality and
co-existence in a city such as London. The metropolitan paradox, the co-existence of conflict
and cohesion, is a structural feature of the modern city, intensified in the age of globalisation
and  austerity.  It  is  in  cities  where  diversity  is  experienced  most  intensely,  to  which  the
majority of migrants move, and where mobilisations against diversity are symbolically rooted.
And it  is  also  at  the local  level  where the possibility  for  new forms of  identification  and
belonging emerge. This tension is embodied in the two sides to London’s migrant narrative
discussed  by  Phil  Marfleet  in  this  volume:  a  narrative  of  London  as  a  place  of  arrival,
welcome, tolerance and integration and another more subterranean story of exclusion and
intolerance. 
No part of London has been the focus of these stories more than the East End. The iconic
image of the Brick Lane mosque – built as a Protestant chapel, used as a synagogue, and
now a mosque – is so often used to illustrate London as a place of arrival. In the mainstream
narrative, successive waves of emigration, from the Huguenots onwards, have shaped the
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area. Migrants assimilate, fit in, move up and move on and other people take their place. My
aim in this chapter is to complicate that story a little, and thus complicate our understanding
of London’s diversity. 
Jewish London
Jewish London history in the modern period begins in Oliver Cromwell's time. In the two
centuries that followed, London saw the slow growth of an ethnically, denominationally and
linguistically diverse Jewish population from Spain and Portugal, via the Netherlands, and
later from the Rhineland and Central  Europe, from the Ottoman Empire and many other
places.  But  a significant  shift  came in the late nineteenth century with a mass arrival  of
mostly Yiddish-speaking East and Central European Jews, mainly settling in the inner East
End of London. They were arriving into an already existing Jewish London with a strong
institutional infrastructure and communal leadership, dominated by a handful of interrelated
families who had been in Britain for some time and who had acculturated very much into
English culture. 
David Feldman (2012) has spoken about a model of “conservative pluralism” which regulated
the state’s relationships with minorities in this period. This conservative pluralist model did
not recognise cultural differences, did not recognise Britain as a place of multiple cultures,
but rather recognised Britain as a place of multiple faiths, Britain as a place where different
denominations could exist side by side. 
The Anglo-Jewish leadership could fit  very well  into this agenda by asserting the Jewish
community as a community of faith and Jews as English people of Jewish faith, and so not
ethnically  but  rather  religiously  different  from  the  English  mainstream.  Jewish  people  in
London, along with Catholics, Methodists and other Protestants, had a very particular kind of
settlement with the British state, which delegated significant authority to communal bodies to
define and regulate  religious  practices  in  the spheres of  marriage,  education,  births and
deaths, and other key life events. In the logic of the communal fostered by conservative
pluralism, communal leadership of the community had the right to speak for and to represent
the community in general (Kahn-Harris and Gidley, 2010).
I would argue that the Yiddish speaking Jews who arrived at the end of the 19th century and
beginning of the 20th century had a very different conception of their identity which would be
better captured by the term 'diasporic belonging', a sense of their kinship with Jews in other
lands. Rather than seeing themselves as Englishmen of Jewish faith, they saw themselves
as Jews who were located in England with a kind of profound kinship with Jews in other
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lands (Gidley, 2013). Such kinship was problematic for the Jewish communal leadership who
wanted to demonstrate that Jews were nothing more or less than loyal British citizens. But at
the same time, the migrant Jews also recognised differences within the Jewish community,
differences and divisions papered over by the communal leadership, in particular, differences
of  class,  especially  in  the  late  19th  and  early  20th  centuries  when  radical  movements
(socialist, communist and anarchist) were very strong within the Jewish community in East
London. 
Trauma and the call to identity
I want to briefly give examples of this sort of diasporic belonging and its tension with the logic
of  the communal  and conservative pluralism of  the Anglo-Jewish leadership.  The first  of
these is the London response to the 1903 Kishinev pogrom, a wave of violence in a town in
the Russian Empire in what is now Moldova, in which 49 Jews were killed. It was not the first
pogrom in  the  Russian  Empire,  but  there  was  a  level  of  violence  which  had  not  been
experienced in the 19th century and it sent shock waves around the Jewish world, and has
been described by historians as a turning point in Jewish history. The trauma became a kind
of iconic moment in modern Jewish history which has over time come to find a place in a
series  of  traumatic  experiences  culminating  in  the  Holocaust,  whose  retrospective  lens
refracts our understanding of past Jewish traumas. 
However, while it would later accumulate this iconic quality, in Britain, as I have described in
more detail elsewhere (Gidley, 2009; Gidley 2013) the initial official Jewish response to the
pogrom  was  very  slow  and  very  quiet.  The  Board  of  Deputies,  which  is  the  official
representative body of  British Jews,  discussed the issue and decided that  there was no
reason for them to take action. In the East End where the immigrants lived there was a wave
of protests culminating in a march of 25,000 people from Mile End to Hyde Park to protest at
the  massacre.  It  was  led  by  trade  unions,  anarchist  organisations,  and  also  hometown
organisations of Jewish immigrants. The Board of Deputies was unhappy with this because
they were worried that people would shout anti-tsarist slogans and they urged quietness and
caution and not making a fuss. When they did finally act, it was to write a letter to The Times
complaining  about  the  Russian  treatment  of  what  they  called  their  ‘co-religionists’.  'Co-
religionists' is a key word here: communal leaders understood the Jews in Russia as people
of the same faith rather than as their kin whereas in the East End marches people spoke
about victims as their  brothers and sisters, mothers and fathers, their flesh and blood: a
different type of identification. 
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Class struggle
However,  the  migrant  Jews  in  the  East  End  were  not  solely  involved  in  movements  of
solidarity with their co-ethnics back home. If class differences were reflected in challenges to
communal  authority  in  providing long-distance  solidarity,  they  were  directly  expressed  in
social struggles within London. Class cut across community: workers could become masters
with a little capital; your boss might also be your cousin or a hometown acquaintance. 
Migrant workers formed unions and went on strike in the garment industry, the furniture trade
and  in  the  bakery  business,  in  battles  that  often  pitted  immigrant  workers  against  both
immigrant  and  non-immigrant  Jewish  bosses.  In  some  of  these  struggles,  they  formed
alliances with non-Jewish workers, most significantly with the mainly Catholic dockers who
lived in  adjacent  neighbourhoods.  Acting both as Jews and,  in  such alliances,  East  End
migrants and their children also resisted ‘anti-alien’ violence in this period, and fascism later. 
Orthodoxy as dissent
There  were  also  theological  disputes  within  the  community,  again  reflecting  class
antagonism. The synagogue was an arena in which the Anglo-Jewish communal leadership
sought to impose their conception of Anglo-Jewry as a community of faith and to mould the
migrant Jews of the East End into English citizens of the Jewish faith. It was therefore an
arena in which this project was actively resisted by a significant portion of the migrants. 
The Victorian and Edwardian communal leadership built “model synagogues” in the style of
theatres which would foster a hushed audience-like congregation with its attention focused
on the rabbi who stood at the front, facing forward, like a Christian priest or an actor on a
stage. In these spaces, migrants were made into English subjects. On the opening of the
New Road Synagogue in 1892, the Jewish Chronicle wrote: 
It was a happy thought to have fixed the consecration of the [Synagogue] on the Queen’s
birthday; a still happier thought to have made reference to that auspicious anniversary… The
members… are all foreigners, mostly Poles, and it was touching to hear ‘God save the Queen’
heartily sung in Hebrew by the Congregation. Fittingly, the Chief Rabbi has made loyalty the
subject of his impressive discourse on the occasion.
This sort of spatiality contrasted sharply to the shtiblekh, the attic congregations that filled the
inner  East  End,  where members of  a  minyan (prayer  quorum) would be positioned in  a
rainbow configuration facing the Ark (where the Torah scroll is kept), around the  bima (the
platform where the Torah scroll is read) to which members of the   would be called one by
one. 
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The Machzikei Hadas synagogue on the corner of Brick Lane and Fournier Street was a
schismatic institution set up in explicit opposition to and rebellion against official Orthodoxy.
The original schism was over who had the right to authorise kosher butchers. This was partly
a theological  issue and also an economic issue – the (East  End migrant)  consumers of
kosher  meat  effectively  subsidised  the  (West  End  English)  authorities.  But  these  issues
opened  up  wider  issues  of  legitimacy,  patronage,  enforced  dependence  and  communal
democracy which were, in turn, entwined with class and cultural antagonisms, and these
antagonisms can be seen in the very shape and substance of the synagogue space. We can
see this also in the rules of the Machzikei Hadas. The rules insisted that the synagogue be
kept open all day as a place of learning and prayer, and not simply be the site of big, formal,
Anglican-style Sabbath services. They insisted that the Torah should be read in the centre of
the space, not at the front, and that the preacher must not dress like a Christian priest. 
At  the time,  a worker  at  the Toynbee Hall  settlement  house perceptively  recognised the
schism as a refusal of assimilation and Anglo-Jewish authority, writing that it “testifies to a
deep-seated spirit of revolt. The same spirit is shown in the constant suspicion and jealousy
of West End interference… The secession of the Mahazike Haddath has important bearings
on the question of assimilation”. These examples from the peak of Jewish London give a
glimpse into the multiple loyalties, belongings and identifications of its migrant Jews. These
stories cut against the grain of celebratory narratives of ethnic succession in which each
group  of  migrants  assimilate  into  British  society  leaving  space  for  the  next  wave  of
newcomers,  and also  challenge the myth  of  Jews as  model  migrants against  which the
integration of later communities is judged. Some migrants, whether subtly or spectacularly,
refuse to assimilate or refuse to move on, and this was no less the case with London’s Jews. 
From multifaith to multicultural and back again
The  conservative  pluralist  settlement  between  the  British  state  and  religious  minorities
persisted  well  into  the  period  of  mass  post-colonial  migration,  and  the  political  strategy
pursued by the Jewish communal leadership shaped in the period of conservative pluralism
persisted  too.  However,  from  the  1960s,  black  Londoners  began  to  challenge  the
assimilationist  assumption that accompanied this settlement.  Anti-racist  social movements
rooted in the black working class communities of the metropolis began to stake a claim to
recognition and inclusion on their own terms. 
These social movements gained a foothold within the municipal state in London, reflected for
example  in  the  explicitly  multiculturalist  funding  streams  of  the  Greater  London  Council
(GLC) under its leader Ken Livingstone in the 1980s. My final example is from this period: the
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Jewish Cultural and Anti-Racist Project (JCARP). JCARP received funding from the GLC to
promote  Jewish  culture  within  the  context  of  multiculturalism:  Yiddish  language  classes,
cultural activities as well as anti-racist activities. The Board of Deputies was again unhappy
with this because they believed that Jews were not an ethnic community within the context of
multiculturalism but rather a faith community. 
More recently,  there has been renewed controversy about  Ken Livingston and London’s
Jews. Significantly, one of the complaints against Ken Livingston within the community has
been that he does not recognise Jews as a people and sees them only as a religion; this
reversal  since  the  1980s  marks  the  belated  acceptance  from  the  Jewish  communal
leadership that Jews are an ethnic group and not just a faith community. But meanwhile the
multicultural  settlement  in  Britain has moved on;  there has been a  striking  return  to the
conservative  pluralism of  the  1900s.  Britain  is  increasingly  seen  by  politicians  as  David
Cameron, Eric Pickles or Sayeeda Warsi not as a multicultural society but as a multifaith
society,  with  considerable  government-supported  work  in  civil  society  and  cohesion
channelled through established faith groups.
This return brings a number of advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, it opens up
possibilities of interfaith alliances: for example, inspiring alliances around Islamophobia and
anti-semitism (such as the support of the Jewish Community Safety Trust for the Tell MAMA
initiative  on  anti-Muslim  hate  crime)  or  grassroots  side-by-side  initiatives  (such  as  the
Muslim-Jewish Forum bringing together  some of  the most  religious  communities  in  East
London) around the practical issues they both face. 
But the multifaith paradigm closes down other possibilities. It reinforces the particular voices
within  communities  which  claim  to  represent  them:  often  the  most  patriarchal  voices.  It
obscures differences within religious communities, and also obscures some of the secular
cultural heritage which runs against the religious identities of Jews. It does not deal well with
multiple identities,  and can encourage a  de facto segregation,  for  instance,  through faith
schooling. It squeezes the secular common ground for dialogue built  by earlier anti-racist
movements. 
In  conclusion,  this  has  wider  implications  for  a  future  urban  politics  of  cohesion  and
cosmopolitanism which must recognise the faith dimension of many of our identities in what
has been termed the “post-secular city”, but also accommodate multiple forms of belonging,
including secular  identities.  This means we need to attend carefully to which histories of
diversity are hidden or celebrated. We need to recall the contentious, schismatic nature of
earlier migrant histories (embodied in the story of the Brick Lane shul or the tailors’ strike).
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The East End exemplifies these subterranean histories as well as reassuring moments of
unity and comfortable narratives of ethnic succession.
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Section 4
Race, Racism
and the City
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The Tropes of ‘Diversity’: a Significant 
Face of Contemporary Racisms       
— Floya Anthias (Roehampton)
My thoughts today are going to be about diversity and the governance of diversity. We hear
continuously  that  diversity  is  everywhere.  Sometimes  it  is  regarded  as  a  bad  thing,  for
example, in the  Daily Mail and some contributions in  Prospect magazine, sometimes it  is
regarded as a good thing, as for example in the framing of the London Olympics. However in
whatever way we use it,  I  think it  is a very problematic notion. It  is highly normative and
differently interpreted. It is, however, a necessary feature of the social world and its use is
clearly socially constructed, as we know. As a boundary maker, it functions as undermining
the very intent it seems to activate. If its intent is to demarcate or to include then it registers
the difference that  can be bridged.  On the other  hand,  if  its  intent  is  to  exclude then it
constructs the demarcation and difference as alien or ‘other’, occupying a terrain that cannot
be crossed. Simmel (1908), to some extent illustrates the conundrum, the contradiction or
paradox that I have been referring to. He refers to the bridge as both connecting spaces but
also demarcating a boundary. So I think diversity functions a bit like the notion of the bridge.
The metaphor of the bridge demarcates boundaries from edge to edge. So in this paper I am
going  to  maintain  that  contemporary  discourses of  diversity  are  boundary  and hierarchy
making, and constitute a significant phase of contemporary racisms. Diversity identifies those
differences that are regarded as salient and ignores others.  Indeed, we cannot use the term
'diversity' without first denoting and marking difference from something or someone. 
Racisms, like diversity, are also boundary and hierarchy making, marking the boundaries in
particularly violent and dehumanising ways. And the tropes underlying racisms can be seen
as those of danger, deviance and deficit. We could, if you like add another D, which we might
call disgust, but I think that functions very much at the individual level, so I have not included
it. The ‘other’ that is racialised can be one or all of these, through discourses and practices of
exclusion – at  times forms of  physical  extermination – but  also assimilation which is  an
extermination or an attempted extermination of difference. The contemporary figuration of the
'diverse' does not appear quite as violent. On the other hand, it also focuses on the “other” as
a social  collective,  marked by ways of life,  alien,  frightening, deficient,  or  in some cases
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exotic. Some of this diversity can be assimilable as long as the diverse jump ship, i.e. they
abandon  some of  the  aspects  that  make them so  but  some are  regarded as  incapable
because the space between the ships is far too wide. Some of the diversity as long as it is
not  too wide and different  becomes a matter  of  praise  and embracement.  However,  the
acceptable  phase  of  diversity  is  that  which  is  regarded  as  a  less  dangerous  and
objectionable expression of cultural difference. So when the term diversity is used in policy
documents – I have in front of me the latest document from the Department of Communities
and Local Government – the form it takes is to construct the diverse in neutral ways and as
not  really  different  apart  from diversity  being used in  a rhetorical  way.  When diversity  is
treated as acceptable it erases difference, it constructs sameness out of difference if you like.
Two elements underpin discussions of diversity: one is a culturalisation of social relations
and the other  is  the  construction of  what  I  call  the 'hierarchical  difference'.   In  terms of
culturalisation,  there  is  a  dominance  of  the  cultural  in  the  construction  of  identity  and
difference.  This  culturalisation  is  also  found  in  the  ways  minorities  themselves  use  the
discursive element of the cultural in order to make claims. Culturalisation is found, therefore,
both in dominant discourse but also in minority discourse. I would argue that where it is found
in the discourse of contestation by minorities, it actually acts as a signifier of other modes
also, i.e. it acts as a vehicle for resource driven and material struggles. Whilst I do not want
to erase completely  the  cultural  intent,  I  would argue that  cultural  difference and claims
around this by minorities act also in claiming resources, space, opportunities and so on. 
Another aspect of diversity talk in the current period is found in that of diversity management.
Many  discussions  of  diversity  management  show  that  it  functions  to  sideline  issues  of
equality. It can be seen as part of a business orientation, being used to foster better business
management.  Hierarchical difference can be found in the current 'diversity agenda' in the
UK.  I  think  we  need  to  see  this  agenda  in  the  context  of  debates  and  policies  about
migration, about policing and strengthening borders. Although social diversity is sometimes
regarded as a social good in many of the relevant documents, it constructs ‘society’ as a kind
of community of shared values. Such a notion of society hails from some mythical age where
purportedly order was possible on the basis of similarities and commonalities around ‘origin’,
‘culture’, ‘identity’ or ‘language’. However, such a view of society is actually quite problematic
in the contemporary and global era but it also constructs the figure of what I call the 'perverse
diverse'.  I would say that there are two ways in which the 'perverse diverse' are constructed
both within migration policy and discourse but also in terms of the discourse of diversity. The
first, denoting the unacceptable face of diversity, I would say is found in the trope of 'unwilling
to integrate'. The concern here is for those who are deviant or deficit in some way and who
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are unwilling to integrate, to be forced to do so, by trying to extract from them a show of
loyalty, a demonstration that in fact they are willing to integrate in a range of ways (including
passing the UK citizenship test). The second trope we find is that of those who are ‘unable to
integrate’ and the impossibility  of some undesirable differences actually being eliminated:
these are seen as a threat to western values. And here the elements of deviance, deficit and
danger which I argued characterise racisms come into play in demarcating the categories of
the 'desirable' versus the 'perverse diverse': the former are constructed as having deficits
that can be corrected whilst the latter become constructed as dangerous and deviant. And
here, debates on the body covering of Muslim women as well as a securitisation discourse
come into focus. 
I want to illustrate this a little bit  more by arguing that integration is seen as requiring a
demonstration  of  a  ‘willingness  to  integrate’,  so  that  citizenship,  for  example,  becomes
conditional on knowledge of life in the UK and of the English language, even before migration
through pre-entry tests. A deficit approach to minorities and newcomers is found in the fact
that there is no validation of their own language; there is a concern to incorporate them but in
assimilationist ways. A lot of the other aspects of who they are, or of their social position, of
their class and their gender, are ruled out of court. The 'unable to integrate', are signposted
also through the securitisation discourse which focuses particularly on Muslims as potential
terrorists. They are the epitome of the perverse diverse, and here we have anxiety about the
dangers they pose eliciting forms of  state violence and control,  from strengthening laws,
changing laws, giving integration and policing roles to religious leaders in policing their own
categories or groups. 
As  well  as  securitization,  we find  a  highly  gendered discourse on the female  body:  the
unwillingness of Muslims to integrate as embodied in the use of the body covering of women.
Although in the UK there is no prohibition, there is a concern with this and how terrorists can
hide behind the chador, and again the danger here of the use of these body coverings. And
there occurs a culturalisation and stigmatisation of the whole group, being personified as the
oppressor of women (forced marriages, violent control  of  women), of the killer of women
(through  debates  on  honour-killings),  sometimes  framed  within  the  agenda  of  equality
discourse  which  again  is  another  paradox  that  we  find  in  here.  More  examples  and  a
development of these points can be found in my article (Anthias, 2013).
Moving on very quickly, I want to try and point to some ways in which we can build on any
positive aspects of the recognition of diversity but at the same time getting rid of the other
underpinnings that make the use of ‘diversity’ very problematic in both analytical and political
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discourse.  I  think  there  are  a  number  of  ways  we  can  do  it.  Firstly,  we  need  a  more
intersectional approach which does not treat people purely in ethnic, migrant or racial terms
but considers the different facets of people's social locations; of their identities. We can do
this at a number of different levels: the structural, the discursive and the identificational. 
Secondly, we also need a more transnational lens because both diversity discourse and the
accompanying  integration  discourse  that  is  current  in  most  European  societies  do  not
actually  take  on  board  the  kind  of  transnational  links  people  have,  the  flows  of
communication between different spaces, including places of residence, countries of origin,
local  and  translocal  links  as  well  as  translocational  positionalities  (noting  not  only  the
crisscrossing connections in peoples’ lives but also some of the contradictions this creates at
a  number  of  different  levels).  This  means  that  people  might  occupy  different  and
contradictory positions globally. For example, someone who works as a cleaner in Britain,
and therefore occupies a subordinate position, might be able improve their social position in
their own homeland through being able to save and display relative wealth on their visits or
return. I remember the woman who used to look after my aunt when she had Alzheimer’s,
who was a Turkish Cypriot, very poorly paid, but she was able to build a house in the north of
Cyprus  and  went  to  live  there  eventually.  I  am  not  saying  that  this  takes  away  the
stratification of inequality and its experience in Britain but using a transnational lens enables
us to see that fixity of positions in terms of stratification is not adequate. A translocational
lens, which attends to the intersectional, the transnational and the recognition of different
localities and spaces can help us to deal with some of the problems of a ‘diversity’ which
assumes and essentialises categories, which defines the boundaries, which asks for bridges.
But those bridges at the same time construct boundaries themselves, construct the 'perverse
diverse'  versus  the 'good diverse'.  A diversity  that  does this  uses the tropes of  danger,
deviance and deficit, and in my view, constitutes a significant face of racism.
London: City of Paradox — 109
References
Simmel, G. (1908) 'The Bridge and the Door', Theory, Culture & Society, 11, pp.5-11.
Anthias, F. (2013) ‘Moving beyond the Janus Face of Integration and Diversity Discourses:
Towards an Intersectional Framing’, Sociological Review, 61(2), pp. 323-343
London: City of Paradox — 110
Migrant London              
— David Feldman (Birkbeck)
Immigration,  as  others  have  said  at  the  conference,  is  a  long-standing  phenomenon  in
London’s  history.  Without  going  back  too  far,  we  can  trace  the  phenomenon  from  the
Germans,  Italians  and  Eastern  Europeans of  the  19th  century,  to  the  lascars  and other
seamen in the 1930s, before the more familiar post-war immigration. However, what this long
view  of  continuity  misses  and  what  I  want  to  underline  is  the  novel  scale  of  recent
immigration to London. And by this I mean what has happened in the last 25 years. The
foreign-born population in London doubled between 1986 and 2006 from one million to two
million. It now comprises, as a modest estimate, one third of the total population in the capital
and this is an immigration which reverses the previous population decline of London. It's not
just  that  there  are  more  people;  the  population  is  also  more  diverse.  In  1986,  50% of
immigrants  came  from  six  countries:  Ireland,  India,  Kenya,  Jamaica,  Cyprus  and
Bangladesh. In 2006 you have to go through 15 countries to reach the same percentage. 
This  presents historians with a challenge because the narrative of  the capital  constantly
being made and re-made by immigrants does not seem adequate to the transformations of
the present. Is there instead a history of rupture and discontinuity that we must tell? I think to
an extent there is but not entirely. In what follows, I want to talk about two things: first of all I
will talk about the relation between immigration and welfare over this long period of time and
secondly I want to talk about the origin of the politics of multiculturalism, and in doing so I
want to present some thoughts about issues of continuity and change.
A number  of  people  who talk  and write  about  the  relationship  between immigration  and
welfare in the present argue that diversity and immigration is bad for welfare. The American
political  scientist,  Garry  Freeman,  (1986)  argued  that  there  was  a  progressive  dilemma
between  diversity  and  welfare,  that  increasing  immigration  in  Europe  would  lead  to  an
Americanisation of European welfare. And this view was reinforced by Dench, Gavron and
Young  (2006)  when  they  argued  that  in  Tower  Hamlets  the  British  welfare  system
marginalised the white working class and fuelled years of racial  conflicts in the borough.
They write that white families were disadvantaged through the priority given to Bangladeshi
housing needs in a preoccupation with the most vulnerable. This occurred as housing was
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allocated on the basis of needs rather than on the basis of a long-standing connection to the
borough. The book was applauded among others by Trevor Philips. So this is an argument
that suggests that welfare chauvinism is inevitable. 
What can history say about this? I think history can say something useful about it  but, in
order to do so,  we have to take account  of  the lower volume of immigration in previous
centuries, when we compare those periods to the present, and look instead at the impact of
local  migration.   Although immigration was important,  it  was not  central  to the history of
London before the late 20th century but internal migration has been absolutely essential to
the growth of London. In 1500, although London was a European capital with some 50,000
inhabitants, it was not in the same league as Paris, Milan, Venice and Naples, which had
more than 100,000 each. A century later, London was a European city with a population of
100,000. By the middle of the 17th century, only Paris was larger than London. Yet the death
rate  in  London exceeded the birth  rate in  this  period.  So London only  grew through its
capacity  to  attract  migrants.  Most  Londoners  were  born  outside  the  capital.  A sample
population drawn from the East End, between 1580 and 1640 found that just 13% had been
born in London. In the 18th century that figure varied between 70 and 80 % born outside
London. As the health conditions improved and the death rate ceased to soar, by the middle
of the 19th century a greater portion of the population had been born in London. But even in
1851, in the age group above 20, a minority, only 46%, had been born in London. 
What is the connection between this internal migration and immigration in the present? First
of all, these internal migrants provoked a torrent of complaints, and a law was introduced in
1593 aimed at restricting building within three miles from the city gates in an attempt to
prevent immigration by restricting the supply of housing. In the late 16th and 17th century, a
number of parishes embarked on campaigns against householders who took in migrants. In
one London parish, the hostility to strangers was so great that in October 1658 the vestry
decided that  no one could be buried in the graveyard without  the consent of  the church
wardens and five parishioners; even in death, the migrant was discriminated against. At the
heart of this antagonism against migrants, I want to suggest, there was a welfare system;
namely the Poor Law. The Poor Law was organised on a parochial basis: people had an
entitlement to  welfare from a particular  parish.  However,  people could move much more
easily than their entitlement to welfare could. It is not that people were not able to get a new
entitlement to welfare, but it was extremely difficult, especially if you were poor. In a society
in which you had so much migration, in a city such as London, probably the majority of the
population lived away from the parish where they had their welfare entitlement. The main
effect of this was the dis-entitlement of the migrant poor. Migrants were less likely to receive
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welfare as a result of this. In a certain way this might support a welfare chauvinist argument.
The circle of solidarity was drawn tightly. As early as 1669, we find parishes trying to shift
poor  migrants  the  length  of  5-6  houses  into  another  parish.  These  practices  were
commonplace  and  continued  for  nearly  200  years.  Patrick  Colquhoun  highlighted  the
problems encountered by migrants in his account of the casual poor in London at the end of
the 18th century: 
Their parochial settlements are either at a great distance, or perhaps they are even without
this  resource.  The expense of  removing,  as the law directs,  is  too serious a charge to  be
incurred  by  the  parish  where  accident  has  fixed  them.  Under  such  circumstances  their
applications are too frequently treated with neglect and contumely by the parochial officers;
and from the disappointment  they thus  experience they are not  seldom driven to  despair.
Willing to labour, but bereft of any channel or medium through which the means of subsistence
might be procured, their distress becomes exceedingly severe. (1799, p.6)
The Irish were often victims of this system of neglect and there is a nice exchange we have
from  1850.  James  Taylor  Ingham,  who  was  a  magistrate  in  the  Thames  police  court,
recounted the following as a regular occurrence in his court:
…many persons come to ask for the advice of the police magistrate, poor Irish people 
among others. They say “we have been to the parish officers to ask for a relief. He would 
not give it”. “Then you must go before the border guardians”, says the police magistrate.
“Oh yes, we have been before the border guardians”. “Would they not give you relief?” 
“Why would the board say they will send us back to Ireland?” “That is to say your case 
maybe being brought to a magistrate and enquired into, whether you come from Ireland 
we will send you back there”. And those poor persons genuinely speaking saying “Oh if 
that is the case we would go without relief”. (1854-5)
In other words, poor migrants from Ireland or from other parts of England subsisted, to a
great extent, without support from the Poor Law. There was systematic discrimination against
migrants under the Poor Law and, as I said, at one level this seems to confirm the existence
of welfare chauvinism. It seems to suggest that there are limits to social solidarity. At the
same time we should see there was no ethnic or racial basis to this. The English, Irish and
Scot poor all suffered.  But I think we need to be careful about this idea of absence of social
solidarity or to ascribe it to a natural reaction, which is what often occurs in the literature,
because  it  actually  had  an  institutional  and  financial  foundation.  Its  basis  was  the  local
foundation of the Poor Law. This meant that the burden of poor relief fell on those areas
where the poor were most heavily concentrated and so least able to bear that burden. In the
face of these intractable circumstances, Poor Law guardians tried to restrict relief as much as
possible, especially through the disentitlement of migrants. Interestingly and importantly, this
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was brought to an end by national legislation. By 1865, paupers only had to be in a Poor Law
district  for  a  year  before  they  became  eligible  for  relief  on  the  spot.  At  that  point  the
discriminatory treatment between migrants and the indigenous poor largely went away. Of
course, the conditions of the workhouse were a scarcely desirable form of welfare provision,
but it is important to stress that for migrants and the Irish it was a safety net of sorts where
beforehand there had been none whatever. 
This suggests that rather than look for some elemental and natural notion of social solidarity
we  need  to  look  at  institutional  and  financial  arrangements  for  the  capacity  to  include
migrants  and  immigrants  from  different  welfare  systems.  Likewise  in  the  present,  local
authorities find it difficult to cope with the demands created by immigration because of the
rigid formulas used for  allocating funds from central  government to local spending.  As a
result,  neither  the  Greater  London  Authority  (GLA)  nor  the  London  boroughs  have  the
financial resources proportionate to the increasing size and diversity of their population. In
this context of underfunding, conflicts between newcomers and the existing population easily
arise. Social solidarity is strained because the benefits of migration accrue nationally and the
costs are concentrated locally, and the funding and legal mechanisms have not caught up
with this. The argument I want to make is that this long history can point to the importance of
institutions and financial mechanisms in shaping entitlements and discrimination in welfare
rather than naturalised conceptions of social solidarity. 
Lastly, I want to talk about what this long view can tell us about the politics of multiculturalism
in London. Multiculturalism is a political term which emerged in the 70s and 80s, driven by
anxieties  and  debates  about  urban  crisis  and  its  connections  with  young  black  men  in
particular.  It  addressed  questions  of  employment  and  economic  disadvantage.  Things
changed  though  from  the  late  1980s.  The  appearance  of  politicised  Muslim  voices
addressing domestic issues such as faith schools, a campaign for a law against religious
discrimination, as well as opposition to wars in overseas lands populated by Muslims, and of
course the publication  of  Satanic  Verses,  are  all  factors  that  have given  religion  a  new
prominence.  In London in 2007, for example, GLA commissioned a report on responding to
the needs of faith communities, something which I think was inconceivable in the 1980s. At
the  beginning  of  the  21st  century,  religion  has  become  central  to  the  politics  of
multiculturalism in  Britain  and we are  likely  to  be said  to live  in  a  multifaith  rather  than
multicultural society. 
Is this new? From one perspective, this is new. It is certainly a long way away from strategies
of assimilation which dominated policy towards migrants in the 1960s and implemented in
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London with ‘bussing’ schoolchildren in Southall  to other areas to keep the proportion of
immigrant children in schools below 30%. But there is a different story to be told where my
first  comments on welfare were saying 'let’s not look at immigration, let’s look at internal
migration'. I think the history of immigration can tell us something about the emergence of
multiculturalism, because there was a sort of politics of diversity that emerged in the 19th
century, particularly to cater for the educational needs of Jews, Irish and Catholics. The first
state grant for education was issued in 1833 by Parliament; within 20 years, state money
was funding not only the Church of England (CoE) but Roman Catholic and Jewish voluntary
schools too. From the 1902 Education Act onwards, Jewish and Catholic schools would be
funded on the rates and,  in  the case of  Jewish schools  in  London,  the majority  of  their
funding came from the rates after 1902. 
Now, extremely briefly,  what  I want to argue here is that this was a double conservative
strategy. The Conservative Government did this in 1902 not because they had any particular
goodwill towards Jewish or Catholic schools but because it was the only way to preserve the
privileged position of the CoE in a plural society in which the majority of people did not attend
church. This 'conservative pluralism', as I call it, was a strategy to a) preserve the privilege of
the CoE and b)  it  gave funds,  authority  and prestige  to  religious  hierarchies  in  minority
communities which boosted their position. We can see a similar dynamic with the emergence
of religious multiculturalism in the early 21st century. For example, Dr Fatma Amer, director
of education and interfaith relations for the London mosque in 2001, stated 'the religious
establishment makes possible a  recognition of a person's right to put into actions what he
most sincerely believes in' (2005, 25). So there is this alliance between a religious hierarchy
within minority communities and the established church that, I think, has its origins in the
Anglican  responses  to  Jewish  and  Catholic  minorities.  British  multiculturalism  reveals  a
practice of collaboration, one that is structured by relations of power and inequality along two
axes. First, the politics of multiculturalism, as it is practiced in Britain, bolsters the position of
an otherwise beleaguered Anglican establishment and, second, at the same time, it shores
up the positions of religious hierarchies within minority communities. 
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Visible and Invisible Migrants  
— Rahila Gupta (SBS)
I want to look at the relationship between visible and invisible migrants, the documented and
the undocumented. I also want to explore how the interests of these two populations have
been posited as antagonistic by the state which complicates matters for activists trying to
open up immigration controls so that migrants have space to live and breathe. As London
remains the main destination for migrants with 40% of the total migrant population, and an
estimated  750,000  undocumented  migrants  in  London  alone,  the  paradoxes  and
contradictions that I will highlight are at their sharpest in London.
I am using the term ‘visible’ not only in its more commonly understood sense of skin colour
but also in terms of being visible to the state i.e. being documented. At the same time, there
is  no  necessary  correlation  between  the  invisible  and  the  undocumented  because
paradoxically the undocumented are both visible and invisible.  Judith Shklar, the American
political theorist, (cited in Grayson, 2012) described the divide as “a symbolic glass floor –
citizens exist above the floor and can look down on those beneath who are excluded from
citizenship and are thus the most deprived in society”. If only it were as clear cut as that: i f
you take a walk on a Sunday in Hyde Park, you will spot many a family with a domestic
worker in tow, someone of a Filipina or South Asian background, poorly dressed and lagging
behind with a sense of  deference.  She may be a domestic  worker  on a work visa with
satisfactory working conditions. But her passport may be in the hands of her employer, her
visa may have run out and she may be an overstayer, technically undocumented and very
vulnerable to exploitation such as working a 14 hour, 7 day week with minimal wages (Gupta,
2007, p.5). However some migrants are truly invisible: African children imprisoned by families
who depend on their domestic labour; Vietnamese children smuggled in to grow hashish;
women kept in flats to service men or brought here as wives who are beaten, raped and
imprisoned. 
Being invisible is paradoxically both safe and dangerous: ‘safe’ from the state, the police, the
UK Border agency and therefore, safe from deportation to the horrors they hoped they had
left behind. But that safety may come at a high price – starvation, violence, slavery and lack
of  access to beneficial  services provided by the state like health (although this  is highly
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circumscribed, often it is only emergency healthcare available to the undocumented) or the
support that could be provided by unions or migrants’ organisations. We really need to set up
alternative neighbourhood watches: not to criminalise non-conformists/outsiders but to sniff
out  those  in  need  of  support.  The  policing  of  ‘illegals’ does  not  stop  at  the  borders;  it
continues at the GP’s reception, the welfare office, the employer and the marriage registrar. 
We  are  faced  with  the  paradox  of  having  to  surmise  the  existence  of  the  ‘invisible’
populations of London from the ‘visible’, those who have crossed over the dividing line and
come to the attention of state and civil society organisations. Denise Marshall of the POPPY
project tells a horrific story of a Chinese woman who had been sold by Chinese men to other
Chinese men and had lived undetected in a flat for some years until her trafficker tried to
murder her and she was found on the pavement below the flat with several broken bones
where she was left for dead. It was only when she ended up in hospital on a life-support
system that the POPPY project found her and was able to help her (Marshall, 2007).
Modern slavery seems to be an inevitable and essential attribute of ‘invisibility’; this makes it
particularly hard to tackle unlike the transatlantic slave trade when slaves were a visible
‘badge’ of the success, pride and prosperity of the slaveowners. The social cohesion and
inclusion debate, what we are doing today, meeting and agonising, does not even begin to
touch the lives of  those who toil  all  hours of  the day working out ways of  pleasing their
employers/ traffickers/  husbands and trying to avoid a beating. It  is  the existence of this
population, more than any other, which exposes the myth of democratic universalism. This
brings me to the central paradox faced by organisations working for the benefit of migrants:
that the advocacy for greater rights for migrants does very little to improve the conditions of
the ‘invisible’ populations. By definition, they are out of reach. It is not possible for benefits to
trickle down to them. And sometimes, the liberalisation of controls can have the unintended
consequence of invisibilising migrants.
In fact, the way in which the immigration system has been constructed by the state leaves
very little  room for  liberalisation,  except  where dictated by the needs of  the economy. A
persuasive ideology has grown up around it that makes it  very difficult to challenge. The
interests of the ‘visible’ population are pitted against the interests of the invisible on the basis
of minimising race, gender and class inequalities. Let me explain.
I will focus on gender and give you a couple of examples from the work of Southall Black
Sisters, an advice and advocacy group for Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) women escaping
violence, of which I am a member. We have been campaigning around the issue of forced
marriage for at least the last decade. We demanded the protection of the state for women in
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this position because it  was certainly  not  a protection available from the community.  We
demanded the provision of adequately resourced specialist  women’s services and refuges.
We demanded better implementation of guidelines on how to deal with forced marriages so
that all the agencies which come into contact with young women, such as schools, health
services, police and social services, are trained to recognise the signs and deal with them
sensitively.
What did we get? BME refuges being shut down at an alarming rate and fine sounding words
from the likes of David Cameron comparing forced marriage to slavery accompanied by a
further turn of the immigration screw. The government raised the age limit for those marrying
overseas spouses from 18 to 21 with the rationale that it will protect women by giving them
time to reach maturity  and independence while  the legal  age for  marriage within Britain
remains 16. This solved nothing and was recently challenged successfully in the Quila and
Bibi case in which two couples fell foul of the age restriction and were not able to sponsor
their non-British spouses to join them in the UK although there was no suggestion of the
marriages being forced. SBS had intervened in the case and argued that the age policy was
a disproportionate and discriminatory way of dealing with forced marriage. Those families
hell-bent on this course would simply have taken their daughters abroad on some pretext,
got them married off, made sure they became pregnant before being brought back to this
country at the right age. They would have become invisibilised. The Home Office has now
backed off and announced a reduction in the age to 18. There were some BME women’s
organisations, however, which supported the new age restriction because it might reduce the
incidence of forced marriage – advancing gender justice through a discriminatory, racist law.
Paradoxically, it is the relaxation of immigration controls which will reduce the likelihood of
forced marriage,  since marriage will  not  be seen as a route to gaining entry  to  the UK.
However,  any  argument  advocating  liberalisation  of  immigration  laws,  no  matter  how
reasonable, is unlikely to succeed. 
Similarly, the story of the one year rule (OYR) demonstrates not just how the interests of the
visible are pitted against the invisible but how the visible are invisibilised. The OYR was the
probationary period for  all  marriages to non-British spouses.  If  the marriage broke down
within  that  period,  the  woman  would  be  deported.  In  1992,  SBS launched  a  campaign
against the OYR because it found that many of the women they were seeing were faced with
a stark choice between domestic violence and deportation. This needed a change to the rule
rather  than  a  case  by  case  fight  which  was  time  consuming.  In  1999,  as  a  result  of
successful campaigning by SBS, the Domestic Violence concession was introduced whereby
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a woman who could provide evidence of violence could apply for leave to remain but would
have no recourse to public funds, that is, no access to benefits or refuges, even if it took
months  for  her  application  to  be  decided.  Women  were  now  faced  with  destitution  or
domestic violence. To balance this ‘concession’, the government increased the probationary
period from one to two years which lengthened the period in which the non-British spouse
would be tied to the British spouse, would have no status in her own right and therefore
become invisible. While the husbands hold their passports, they are able to exert total control
over the women. Those women who become visible by applying under the domestic violence
rule for leave to remain condemn the ‘invisible’, possibly hundreds of other women to violent
marriages for longer periods. They are not to blame. It is the way the system is set up.
Furthermore,  approximately  40,000  marriage  visas  were  issued  in  2010  compared  to
approximately 500 women who escape violent marriages every year. To enable 500 women
to exercise their human right to live free from violence, 40,000 couples have to make sure
that their marriages last for two years before they can make an application to regularise the
status of  the non-British spouse.  How do you square that  circle? What do you do when
winning the battle against one injustice gives rise to another? Which injustice is greater? And
why should we have to deal with a hierarchy of injustices?
Meanwhile, women continue to turn up at the door of SBS, destitute and homeless while they
are waiting for a decision on their future. No refuge can afford to take women who cannot
pay rent. This forces women into further unsavoury and exploitative relationships in order to
find a roof over their heads. Although SBS fundraised successfully for a pot of money to put
women up in B&Bs, this was sticking plaster that did not cover the wound. In such a situation
the responsible thing for  SBS was to continue to campaign against  the No Recourse to
Public Funds.  Since 2007, SBS along with a coalition of 27 women and human rights groups
including Amnesty, Women’s Aid, Eaves Housing and Women’s Resource Centre, have been
fighting this battle.  And happily, I can report to you that just recently, from 1 April 2012, the
Destitute Domestic Violence (DDV) concession came into force. It will allow women to apply
for three months’ leave, giving them access to benefits while they apply for indefinite leave to
remain.  
BUT, and it’s a very big but,  this victory is soured by the current proposal to extend the
probationary  period  for  marriages  to  non-British  spouses  from  two  to  five  years!  The
reasoning behind these extensions is that they are a test of genuine marriages. But are they
really?  When  one  in  seven  genuine  marriages  breakdown  between  two  and  six  years
anyway? The British state has long been concerned with the institution of marriage within its
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migrant communities as the Trojan horse through which further migrants may be smuggled
into the country. 
I  do  not  have  time  to  go  into  detail  about  how documented  migrants  were  drawn  into
antagonism against the undocumented on class and race grounds. The idea that unskilled
migrants will damage the prospects of the local working class has infected all points of the
political spectrum from left to right although there is no conclusive evidence that this is true.
Despite the history of trade union nervousness about migrants and fears for the rights of their
members, a Trades Union Congress (TUC) report (2007) concluded that there was no long
term impact on wages or availability of employment. 
The idea that tough immigration laws are good for race relations is another one that has
been doing the rounds since the mid-70s at least: that the fewer new migrants that ‘darken’
our doorstep, the better it will be for those already here, an argument bought by large chunks
of  the  settled  immigrant  communities  themselves,  the  ‘lifting  the  drawbridge  behind  us’
syndrome. But it  is  a non-sequitur,  probably why we hear much less of it  now. The very
existence of controls, selectively applied, suggests that immigrants are not welcome, the call
for  toughness  suggests  (as  does  the  media  coverage  and  national  conversation)  that
immigrants are slippery, that the controls need to be tougher, none of which can possibly
foster good race relations.
A consensus has grown around the notion of a ‘managed’ migration policy with those on the
left  emphasising  fairness  and  justice  while  the  government’s  emphasis  falls  on  the
‘robustness’ and ‘integrity’ of the system. However, the government’s attempt to maintain its
integrity sets up contradictions and divisions, time and again, as I have attempted to show. A
‘fair  immigration  policy’ is  a  contradiction  in  terms.  The  holy  grail  of  trying  to  tease out
fairness from a system designed to exclude and control entry to this country which has so
engaged our energies is doomed to failure. We claim little victories which smooth out the
sharp edges.  But  the massive,  unyielding block of  injustice cannot  be shifted.  Since the
introduction  of  the  first  immigration  law,  the  Aliens  Act  1905,  what  we  have seen  is  an
ongoing entrenchment of draconian laws which makes it near impossible to enter this country
unless you bring investment or certain skills. 
Campaigners believe that the success of our campaign relies on appearing reasonable in our
demands. This is how we hope to have a monopoly on the government’s ear.  The campaign
against the two year rule, formerly the one year rule, and possibly the five year rule in the not
so distant future, had started off with the demand for the abolition of the rule itself. While we
have succeeded in getting important concessions on domestic violence, what about those
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women whose relationships simply break down and there is no evidence of violence. They
too face the same cultural pressures of having brought shame to their families if they have to
return to them, of being isolated and unsupported by them. What about those women who
are not on spousal visas? Or those who became overstayers because, unknown to them,
their visa ran out? If there was no rule, there would be no artificial divisions between these
women, all of whom face domestic violence. Surely our human rights commitments oblige us
to protect all women from violence. The demand for the abolition of the rule, an eminently
reasonable demand, has fallen off the edge over the years; it was deemed too unlikely to
succeed as a demand. 
For a time, in the middle part of the last decade, there was a head of steam building up under
demands for regularising undocumented workers in Britain. There were the Strangers into
Citizens campaigns; Boris Johnson has famously supported it on the basis that the London
economy will benefit from the increase in taxes. All these calls are conditional on the number
of years that migrants have been here, employment history and so on which is problematic.
Despite London’s position as a global city and its strategic importance to the British economy,
the Mayor’s campaign for regularisation fell on deaf ears in central government. 
Unconditional regularisation of all migrants, allowing the invisible to become visible, is the
only rational way to remove the divide at the heart of the migrant community.  
A version of this paper was published as ‘UK Migration: A Hierarchy of Injustices’ on 
OpenDemocracy 5050
http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/rahila-gupta/uk-migration-hierarchy-of-injustices
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London and Riot             
— Jerry White (Birkbeck)
Riot and London: at first sight, the words sit uneasily together, for traditionally London is a
city known best for its order, civility and tolerance. Yet in a long history there is space for
more than one tradition, and from time to time, rioting in London has challenged the forces of
order and stretched them to breaking point. At times, too, London has seemed on the brink of
a civil war. The summer riots in 2011 left Londoners astonished: if any proof was needed that
this is a city of paradox, it was provided on the evenings of 6th to 9th August. The riots left
commentators groping for  an explanation,  and for  historical  parallels.  Some even looked
back to the Gordon Riots of June 1780 but it seems to me that the most relevant comparison
are the Brixton disorders, some call it the Brixton uprising, of April 1981. I want to focus on
those Brixton events while giving a nod of recognition to the Gordon riots of the 18th century
and the Sunday trading riots of the 19th century. 
First, though, I wanted to reflect on the enduring structural unfairness of London and the
sense  of  injustice  this  unfairness  generates.  The  central  paradox  of  London  is  that  it
promises the world to its citizens while delivering far less. It flaunts daily what the richest
among the Londoners can expect, but what in reality few can obtain, and from which many
are excluded altogether. Just who is excluded has changed to some degree over time. The
experience of social exclusion during an earlier period has not been better described than by
Francis Place (1841) the radical tailor of Charing Cross: 
A great mass of our unskilled… labourers are in poverty, if not in actual misery. A large 
portion of them have been in a state of poverty and great privation all their lives, they are
neither ignorant of their condition nor reconciled to it, they live amongst others who are 
better off than themselves, with whom they compare themselves and they cannot 
understand why there should be so great a difference… To escape from this state is with 
them of paramount importance, among a vast multitude of these people, not a day, 
scarcely an hour can be said to pass without some circumstance, some matter exciting 
reflection occurring to remind them of their condition which notwithstanding they have 
been poor and distressed from their infancy and however much they may at times be 
cheerful they scarcely ever cease … to feel and to acknowledge to themselves with deep 
sensations of anguish their deplorable condition. (cited in Rowe, 1970, pp. 148-9)
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Place's London is very different from ours but I see no reason why this consciousness of
social exclusion should not be as true in 2012 as it was in 1841.  If we replace ‘anguish’ with
anger, we might detect some continuities between Place's London and the riots of summer
2011.  In  2012,  the  Home Office  (HO)  released  figures  which showed that  half  of  those
implicated in the riots were under-21, two-thirds had needed special educational help, one-
third had been excluded from school in the previous year,  and four in ten were claiming
benefits. 
There are other continuities too: this festering inequality is sustained by a system of justice
which always favours those who have over those who have not. Again, because people –
even the socially excluded – are not fools, they are entirely aware ‘of their condition’ and the
inequalities of the justice system. The superstructure of that justice system might change: the
police offices and debtors’ prisons of 18th century London; the 'Crushers' or the still New
Police of the 1850s; the 'pigs' of the 1970s and 1980s. But whatever the manifestation, from
time  to  time,  this  designedly  unfair  system  of  justice  does  indeed  become  repugnant,
occasionally intolerable, to some Londoners who erupt with fury against it. 
We can see this in the Gordon riots of June 1780. They began as an expression of anti-
Catholic  feeling  stoked  up and  let  loose  by  the mad,  bad  and  dangerous  Lord  George
Gordon. But within days, the riots turned into an uprising of the London poor, whose fury
vented itself  against  the institutions of the corrupt  and malicious justice system of  police
offices  and  prisons.   Newgate,  the  Fleet,  the  King’s  Bench,  the  Clink,  the  Houses  of
Correction  in  Clerkenwell  and  Southwark,  the  police  offices  in  Bow Street  and  Worship
Street, scores of private bailiffs’ prisons called sponging houses, were sacked or put to the
torch,  with  hundreds  of  prisoners  set  free.  After  the  burning  of  Newgate,  an  interesting
conversation  took  place  among  the  drinkers  at  the  Bell  public  house  where  Thomas
Haycock, a tavern waiter by calling, boasted how he had been active in the destruction:
I asked him what could induce him to do all this? He said the cause. I said, do you mean 
a religious cause? He said no; for he was of no religion. He said, there should not be a 
prison standing on the morrow in London. (1780)
It was with a jolt of recognition that I read last week in the newspapers of the trial of Laura
Johnson, the so-called millionaire’s daughter caught up in the August riots that at least some
of the rioters also spoke of “the Cause” (2012) when justifying looting to one another.
There are many other possible examples from the 19th century of anger boiling over against
an unfair system of justice: the Sunday Trading Riots of June and July 1855. These were
sparked by another younger son of the peerage who had swallowed too much neat religion
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to be good for him, Lord Robert Grosvenor. He introduced a Bill in Parliament to close shops
and beer houses and to shut down public transport, all in the name of Sabbath observance.
No more naked attack on the living standards of the London poor, already suffering from
unemployment and high prices, could be imagined because Sunday was their main day for
shopping and the only day for pleasure. There were furious demonstrations against the Bill
on successive Sundays in Hyde Park. For Henry Beal, a domestic servant, who was in the
crowd, it was clear why many had come:
There seemed to be a general feeling of abhorrence about the [Bill]; that it was a 
measure to crush the poor; levelled exclusively against the poor, while the rich had their 
privileges unmolested ... Tattersall’s would be open, where horse-racing and betting 
could go on all day – that I heard stated – and the clubs, where a gentleman would have 
any refreshment that he pleased, where he could have his cards or anything he liked, and 
yet that it was a sin for a man to buy a newspaper or get shaved, and that it was a great 
piece of hypocrisy – that was the general observation which I heard applied. (1856)
There was much stone-throwing against the carriage folk taking the air – driven of course by
their servants – that Sunday.  But it was resentment against the Metropolitan Police, trying to
protect  the  silk-hatted  classes,  which  provoked  the  greatest  violence.  'Down  with  the
Crushers!'  was  the  popular  cry,  and  for  six  hours  or  so,  there  were  running  skirmishes
between police and people. Bystanders, promenaders, peaceful demonstrators and ruffians
were all swept indiscriminately into the melee. For a time, some young guardsmen joined the
tumult against ‘the crushers.'  There was much violence on both sides. Forty-nine policemen
were injured. Eventually Grosvenor withdrew his troublesome bill. In both these instances,
the forces of  law and order were seen as the active agents of  injustice and themselves
became the object of the Londoners' fury, even though the site of oppression lay elsewhere:
desperate poverty and hopelessness in 1780s London and class oppression in the 1850s. 
In the 1980s, the police again were the object of wrath. But in these years and for some time
before, the police had themselves become the agent of oppression against Londoners. Not
all  Londoners, of course, but black Londoners, and young black Londoners, in particular.
Police and public relations had been dominated by questions of race almost since the Notting
Hill riots of 1958. There had been incidents of racial abuse and victimisation of black people
by  the  police  before  the  Second  World  War.  But  it  was  the  post-war  Commonwealth
migrations from the late 1940s that put the issue of race and the Metropolitan Police (Met) in
sharp focus. The Notting Hill riots exposed some policemen as sharing the prejudices of anti-
black  rioters:  some  black  men  went  to  prison  for  appearing  merely  to  be  defending
themselves;  and  black  people  complained  that  offensive  weapons  had  been  planted  on
them. The murder of Kelso Cochrane in May 1959, the refusal of the police to accept it as
London: City of Paradox — 126
racially motivated in  case there were reprisals and their  failure to find the assailant  (not
necessarily blameworthy in the case of a random murder by a stranger in the street) fuelled
mistrust of a force which, in the experience of many black Londoners, was by now largely
hostile to them. 
The main elements in the black Londoners' case against the Met were all in place by the
early 1960s. They were articulated by Joe Hunte (1966) from Brixton in a pamphlet which he
titled,  Nigger Hunting in England? after hearing local police officers discussing their night’s
work. He catalogued racial abuse, physical assault, failure to protect blacks against whites,
police suspecting all blacks of being criminals (then pimping or drugs, later street robbery)
and harassment of black social life by raiding drinking clubs. Other details soon emerged,
such as  beatings  in  police  stations,  and  complaints  of  abuse  of  the  laws of  “suspected
persons”. Some of these factors were evident in police-public relations with white working-
class Londoners before black people ever came to London in large numbers and continue to
this day. But racial abuse and the stereotyping which meant that black people were objects of
suspicion just going about their daily business – walking a street, driving a car, carrying a
suitcase – gave a personal edge to relations between police and black Londoners. 
By the late 1960s, in the year or two following Enoch Powell's 'river of blood' speech (1968)
and the East African Asian crises, tensions between black people and the police in London
were running very high. Police raids on the Mangrove restaurant, All Saints Rd in 1969 – to
check contraventions of the licensing laws and search for drugs – and the case of Roland
Ifill, a 14-year-old steward at Queen’s Park Rangers football club, assaulted by whites but
then  arrested  and  charged,  raised  the  temperature  in  Notting  Hill.   In  1972,  the  ‘black
muggers’ moral panic broke. The House of Commons Select Committee on race relations
had been told in 1972 by the West Indian Standing Conference of 'blood on the streets of this
country’ unless police relations with the black community were improved. That this was no
scaremongering was shown sensationally by the Notting Hill Carnival in August 1976. Some
400 police and 200 civilians were hurt in the worst London rioting of the century so far. This
was a ferocious anti-police riot, pure and simple, with some opportunistic looting and street
crime in the confusion. It would set a pattern for collective recrimination in London for the
next 15 years. 
By the late 70s, a campaign against the ‘sus’ laws, sections of the Vagrancy Act of 1824,
designed to deal with persons suspected of being about to commit a crime, focussed on the
way in which they impacted unequally on black youth. The law was most used (and abused)
in London. The Met brought 55% of the nation’s suspected person charges in 1976 when
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London had just 15% of the nation’s population; and 42% of ‘sus’ arrests were made of black
people compared to 12% of all arrests. The campaign was successful and the old law was
repealed in 1981. The scrapping of the sus laws was seen as a defeat for the Met that
rendered the daily policing of black people on the streets of London only more pugnacious.
For the Met’s blue serge was deeply dyed in prejudice.
A remarkable sociological investigation into the force conducted around this time (1983) by a
team led by David Smith, shone a lurid light on the Met canteen culture: irremediably racist
and sexist and cheerfully condoned by every senior officer who came into contact with it.
“There can be few other groups,” the report  concluded, “in which it  is normal,  automatic,
habitual to refer to black people as ‘coons’, ‘niggers’, ‘monkeys’, ‘spooks’, ‘spades’, and so
on”. These attitudes, as Smith and his colleagues rightly stressed, did not always betray
themselves on the streets. But they did so frequently enough, and every unjust act of petty
oppression  was  told  and  retold  in  the  black  community,  making  far  more  enemies  than
victims, and fanning flames the police had long set smouldering. Perhaps the case of Mark
Bravo might stand as one small example of how miserably unjust policing could be to black
Londoners: one black boy in North London whose mother gave him a motorbike for his 16th
birthday. During the first week he was stopped by the police on seven occasions, and this
began  a  pattern  which  continued  for  several  months.  Mr  Bravo  eventually  received  18
summonses  as  a  result  of  countless  stops  between  January  and  the  summer;  he  was
acquitted of ten and those for which he was found guilty included a ‘defective registration
plate’ which contained a crack, (£2 fine) and careless driving, (endorsements). 
Unsurprisingly, things in Brixton had long been tense. The Met’s Special Patrol Group (SPG),
a mobile troubleshooting force which some described as ‘paramilitary’ became operational in
Lambeth from 1978, targeting street crime. The wholesale 'stop and search’ of youth could
only  make matters worse.  A Lambeth  Borough Council  Inquiry  (1981)  into  local  policing
received  275  representations  from  organisations  and  individuals,  except  the  Met,  who
refused to take part. Its report was predictably ‘highly critical’ of the police and unhelpfully
used inflammatory language to say so, but it catalogued a long list of alleged abuses. That
same month saw the dreadful ’Deptford fire’ at a party in the Ruddock family’s home in New
Cross, in which 13 black youngsters died. The cause was almost certainly arson. The motive
was unlikely to have been racism but many black people believed it was and the perpetrators
once more were never caught. David Smith’s team was asked by one of the police officers
(1983): “how many of these niggers actually fried in this barbecue of Deptford then?” Anger
at the Deptford fire culminated in a march on the ‘Black People’s Day of Action’ in March
1981. 
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When the SPG conducted yet another street-crime foray in Lambeth, the following month –
the notorious Swamp 81 – Brixton ignited. The ‘Brixton Disorders’ of 10-12 April 1981 were
the most sustained and serious riots of the 20th century in London. The very beginning of
these terrible events showed how tinder-dry were police and public relations in Brixton. A
police constable (PC) noticed a black man being chased by “two or three other black youths”.
According to the Scarman Report (1981) into the riots the man had been stabbed and badly
wounded and even though police officers tried to render first-aid, an angry crowd gathered
and assumed that the police had set about him. They pushed the policemen aside, ‘rescued’
the youth and took him to hospital. Rumours of the police ‘assault’ spread and brought others
onto the streets. Within 25 minutes, a riot had begun and police came under fierce attack.
Things were quiet by 10.30 but blood had been tasted. 
The following day, the SPG forces returned to Brixton to continue Swamp 81, certainly the
biggest error of judgment the Met were guilty of, in the whole of the 20th century. Three hours
later the most serious rioting on the British mainland had begun. Many police officers were
injured,  some seriously.  One in three of  those arrested was white and all  commentators
noted the large part played by white youths as well as by black in the attacks on police.
Extensive looting was a distinctive feature of the Brixton events. Booze, cigarettes, shoes,
clothes, jewellery and the electrical goods were favourite targets. According to  The Times
(1981), a young black man, calling himself Mr. T, said, “something should have been done
about this place a long time ago. Maybe now it will happen”. 
To read the newspaper reports of April  1981 reveals many similarities with August 2011.
Despite the strides made in the Met since 1981 in adjusting to the realities of a multicultural
London, it  was police action that once more provided the spark. For no matter how well
policing operates – and it is never perfect – it will always seem oppressive to the property-
less and the excluded. However we interpret the events of August 2011, they surely tell us
that this age-old predilection, to riot against property and those institutions established to
protect it, is likely to maintain its vigour in London life for the foreseeable future. 
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England’s Riots of 2011: uprisings or avarice?  
— Rob Berkeley (Runnymede Trust)  
Introduction
The civil  unrest  that  took  place  across  England’s  cities  and  towns  in  August  2011  was
unprecedented;  an experience not  felt  for  at  least  a generation.  Mark Duggan’s death is
widely  seen  to  be  the  spark  that  ignited  those  furious  days  of  destruction  and  the
Independent  Police  Complaints  Commission  (IPCC)  investigation  into  the  circumstances
surrounding  his  death  continues.  Five  people  are  known to  have been  killed  during the
course of the civil disturbance. The impact of the lives lost and the families traumatised as
the civil unrest spread across London and the rest of England will take some time to heal. 
The level of destruction and looting on the streets of England was exceptional. The claims for
loss and damage stand between £200-300 million in London alone. When the cost of police
overtime and the drafting in of officer reinforcements are included, some reports indicate a
total  cost  of  more than £370 million.  The streets that  were so marked by devastation in
August 2011 have largely been refurbished but many shop owners still await their insurance
awards and some local business will sadly not reopen.
In the aftermath of the civil disturbance, there was quite rightly a condemnation of the violent
and destructive activities but there was also a reluctance to understand why it had happened.
The disturbances witnessed in Tottenham following the death of Mark Duggan bore a close
resemblance  to  violent  unrest  that  arose  from  injustices  felt  by  the  African  Caribbean
community in the 1980s. However, as the disturbances spread across London and further,
the events unfolded into something less recognisable. In the absence of a full government
inquiry, the Runnymede Trust was concerned that ethnic inequality and racial injustice, as
potential factors in the civil unrest, were too quickly dismissed and marginalised from public
discussions and brought  together key local decision-makers, professionals,  young people
and members of the community to find out what happened during the riots and what can be
done to prevent similar riots happening again. Most significantly the project aimed to find out
if race played a role in the riots. (Runnymede, 2012)  
Researchers of the Runnymede project went  to four areas where civil  disturbances were
London: City of Paradox — 131
recorded;  Birmingham,  Coventry,  Croydon  (London)  and  Lewisham (London).  The  areas
were selected on the basis of their particular demographic profile and also their particular
history of  community relations and civil  disturbances.  In the course of  our research, we
heard many voices and possible explanations as to why the civil disturbances erupted. The
discussions were, therefore, diverse and wide ranging. The most important issues discussed
are listed below:
Criminal injustices
Since Sir Robert Peel founded the Metropolitan police force in 1829, the UK has operated
with  the recognition  that  the  British  Police  Service  can only  act  with  the consent  of  the
policed. There is a delicate line that the police force must tread to ensure that it receives
cooperation  and  trust  from the  community.  The  relationship  between  black  and  minority
ethnic (BME) communities and the police has been at times troubled and agitated to say the
least. Since the MacPherson Report (1999), participants in our research project recognised
that  there  have  been  positive  developments  in  terms  of  the  recruitment  of  BME police
officers, but felt that stop and search, deaths in custody and injustices in the criminal justice
system continue to undermine the relationship between the police service and BME people. 
Death at the hands of the police
When we asked about the role of race in the civil disturbance in August 2011, participants at
all roundtables referred to the death of Mark Duggan and the miscommunication around his
death as the ‘trigger’ or ‘catalyst’ for the riots. They also made references to Smiley Culture,
Cynthia Jarrett,  Roger Sylvester and Joy Gardner, who were all  members of the African-
Caribbean community who died in suspicious circumstances at the hands of the police. The
death of Mark Duggan appeared to trigger a deep and real memory of historical injustices
and grievances that  BME communities have had with the police and the criminal  justice
system.
Stop and search
The proportion of  stop and searches leading to arrest,  let  alone conviction,  is  incredibly
small. Academics have critiqued the use of stop and search in the Brixton riots 1981, noting
that the police activity only led to increased tensions with the local community (Rollock, 2009;
Sveinsson,  2012;  StopWatch,  2011).  A recent  study,  which  interviewed  people  directly
involved in the riots, found that 73% of those interviewed had been stopped and searched in
the last 12 months (The Guardian, 2012). It is a mistake to draw overly simplistic causal links
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to the riots; however, the research participants repeatedly cited the police’s use of stop and
search as a significant factor in the outbreak of the riots. 
Government data on race and the criminal justice system shows that if you are black you are
seven times more likely to be stopped and searched than if  you are white (MOJ, 2010).
Increases in stop and search are evident for Asian groups, most notably under the Terrorism
Act  legislation employed in  the  wake of  the London bombings (Rollock,  2009).  Counter-
terrorism  legislation  such  as  Schedule  7  has  been  linked  to  widespread  feelings  of
persecution and harassment among Muslims, yet less than 1% of Schedule 7 stops result in
an arrest (StopWatch, 2011) and not one arrest for terrorism-related offences (Sveinsson,
2012). It is important to acknowledge that the feelings of harassment, frustration, and anger
in relation to stop and search are not the domain of young BME men alone. 
In January 2012 the Metropolitan Police Service announced a new approach to stop and
search  to  increase  public  confidence  and  trust  in  the  police  tactic.  As  part  of  the  new
approach, Section 60 of the Public Order and Criminal Justice act 1994 will now be used in a
more intelligence-led and targeted way. The approach aims to reduce the number of Section
60 authorisations whilst ensuring that more arrests arise from searches. The announcement
followed a review of stop and search and was approved by Commissioner Bernard Hogan-
Howe (www.met.police.uk).
In the rush to condemn the riots, political and media elites were quick to conclude that these
riots ‘were not about race’ (Cameron, 2011a) and nor were they ‘race riots’. Although it has
been widely claimed that the 2011 disturbances were not ‘race riots’ dominated by one ethnic
group  (Sveinsson,  2012)  or  clashes  between  ethnic  communities,  it  is  important  to
investigate the role race relations played in the riots of 2011.
The  events  surrounding  the  death  of  Mark  Duggan  clearly  echoed  similarities  to  the
outbreaks of civil unrest in the 1980s. The government inquiries following the riots of the
1980s explored the role race and race inequalities played in those disturbances. There has
been no official  government inquiry into the 2011 riots;  instead the current Government’s
preference  has  been  to  focus  forensically  on  the  criminal  and  acquisitive  nature  of  the
events. When we spoke to participants in the project, many stated that race was a factor in
the disturbances. 
Precarious community relations: Birmingham
Civil disturbances between ethnic communities are not new to Birmingham. Handsworth, an
inner city area of Birmingham, was devastated by two days of violent rioting in September
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1985 and the riots in 2005 were seen to derive from racial tensions between black and Asian
communities.
As evidenced by the participants in the project, there is an element of hypersensitivity around
the relationship between black and Asian communities in Birmingham. Certain members of
the  community  highlighted  how  they  worked  together  to  dampen  down  any  further
disturbances, whereas others were more inclined to discuss the divisions in the community.
There appeared to be an anxiety in stating that there were tensions for fear of driving a
further wedge between the communities.
On 10 August  2011,  in Winson Green,  Birmingham, three men – Haroon Jahan,  21 and
brothers Shahzad Ali, 30, and Abdul Musavir, 31 were killed in a hit-and-run incident while
attempting to protect their neighbourhood. It was widely reported at the time that the driver of
the car was a black man. After pleas from the father of the two brothers who died, no further
violence ensued in retaliation. However, abusive messages and emails did circulate following
their deaths. It is difficult to know from our Birmingham roundtable whether the hit-and-run
incident was racially motivated, but what we can see is that there were very real fears that
the  tensions  between  black  and  Asian  communities  could  have  escalated  into  further
physical  conflict.  This,  to  some  extent,  reveals  the  fragility  of  inter-ethnic  relations  in
Birmingham.
Underlying racial tensions: Lewisham
The  participants  at  the  Lewisham  roundtable  expressed  concerns  that  the  riots  had
unearthed long-term racial tensions that had perhaps been ‘swept under the carpet’ but were
able  to  come  to  the  fore  in  the  aftermath  of  the  riots.  They  were  particularly  fearful  in
Lewisham that the looters and criminals involved were perceived by the wider community to
be  solely  young  black  men.  In  the  days  following  the  disturbances,  the  roundtable
participants reported that  white members of  the community and members of  the English
Defence League attempted to defend businesses from looters. 
Participants at the roundtables were reluctant to apportion blame to any particular community
or ethnic group, but they spoke of how the black community can become a scapegoat for
these disturbances. One participant in Croydon said ‘society likes to find someone to blame
and young black men are the easiest target’. A number of the participants were eager to point
out that a multitude of people from different ethnic backgrounds were involved.
What we do know about previous ‘race riots’ in the 1980s and 2000s is that they too were
ethnically mixed. Lord Scarman wrote of the 1981 Brixton riot: ‘White people, as well as black
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people, helped to make and distribute petrol bombs on Saturday’ (Scarman, 2001, p.126) but
that there were still racial elements to that disorder. The Scarman report went on to stress
the importance of tackling racial  disadvantage and racial discrimination to prevent further
outbursts.
Community cohesion
The government inquiry into the ‘race riots’ of 2001 in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford found
that ethnic communities were essentially living ‘parallel lives’ and the physical and cultural
segregation  engendered  the  conditions  for  the  riots  (Cantle,  2001).  The  concept  of
community cohesion, a term generally used to describe a state of tolerance between people
from different backgrounds, emerged from the official government response.
Coventry  is  home to institutions that  are known for  promoting community  cohesion.  The
roundtable  participants in  Coventry  generally  felt  that  community  relations  were stronger
there than in neighbouring cities such as Birmingham or cities with similar demographics
such as Bradford. Participants discussed the ‘cohesiveness’ of the community and linked
good community relations to the relatively  low level  of  civil  disturbances in  August  2011.
However, some participants in the group, particularly those who worked with minority ethnic
communities, cautioned against complacency.
We can perhaps see from the participants in Coventry that community cohesion can in part
address the issues of inter-racial tensions. However, it may still fail to tackle challenges of
racial inequality when communities are under stress from external forces such as growing
scarcity in resources or greater competition in the job market. It is likely to be more than
coincidental that inter-racial tensions and civil unrest increase during periods of economic
downturn, and where economic inequalities between groups are on the rise (White, 2011).
Precarious lives
Unemployment, particularly for BME groups, was cited during the roundtables as possible
explanation for the civil disturbances. London and the West Midlands, where the majority of
the riot roundtables took place, feature in the top three areas with the highest unemployment
rates in the country (ONS, 2011b). In this economic downturn, unemployment for black and
minority ethnic  people is  at  an all-time high (Wood et  al,  2009).  Roundtable participants
repeatedly  attributed  the  rising  unemployment  rates  to  the  feelings  of  despair  and
hopelessness that potentially led to the riots. 
The ‘precariat’ is  a term that refers to people with little or no job security or prospect of
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employment (Brotherton & Hallsworth, 2011). The composition of this group is often young
urban residents from minority ethnic groups, the working-class and the downwardly mobile. It
is a well established fact that there are ethnic penalties in employment. When subjected to
CV testing,  private sector  employers showed a discrimination rate of  35% in the private
sector compared to 4% for the public sector (Wood et al, 2009). While many commentators
have pointed to the cuts as a potential cause of the riots, participants also spoke of how the
loss of public sector jobs impacts on ethnic minorities as they are overrepresented in that
sector.
Education and employment
We know that only 6.8% of Black Caribbean students achieved the newly-adopted English
Baccalaureate benchmark in their GCSEs in 2010 (Runnymede Trust,  2010) and that for
every African-Caribbean male undergraduate at a Russell Group University, there are three
African-Caribbean males  aged 18-24 in  prison (Sveinsson,  2012).  During the roundtable
discussions, education professionals spoke of institutional racism in the education system
but also the difficulty BME young people may have in finding employment even when they
have all the relevant qualifications. Participants discussed why succeeding generations of
qualified  BME people  have  found  themselves  surplus  to  the  requirements  of  the  labour
market. 
We are in a period where the number of unemployed young people is at a record high (TUC,
2012). Figures show that the number of 16 to 24 year olds not in education, employment or
training (NEET) was at a record high in 2011, and that it is from this group that offenders are
most likely to be drawn (Sveinsson, 2012). The project participants recounted feelings of
anxiety and hopelessness in relation to youth unemployment levels and race discrimination
in employment. There was a real sense that these issues contributed to the frustrations that
erupted into the scenes of destruction that we witnessed across England.
A stake in community
Ministry  of  Justice  figures  show  that  those  involved  in  the  civil  disturbances  came
disproportionately  from  areas  with  high  levels  of  deprivation  (MOJ,  2011).  Roundtable
participants  went  a  step further  and  linked the high proportion  of  BME people  to  those
deprived  neighbourhoods  across  England.  During  the  discussions  around  deprivation,
participants explored how regeneration can often come in the form of exclusive and uneven
development that can lead to certain members of the BME community feeling disconnected
from their own cities. 
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In 2009, Runnymede published the report  Why Do Assets Matter? (Khan, 2009) that briefly
explores various lines of thought on the relationship between owning assets and citizenship.
The report also notes the need for more research and discussion around how having a stake
in a  community  corresponds to the concept  of  community  cohesion.  The riot  roundtable
participants provided examples of a divide between those who had investments in their local
communities and those who did not. The examples provided a possible explanation as to
why  so  many  people  were  willing  to  be  destructive  towards  businesses  in  their  own
community during the riots. There are currently around 360,000 self-employed people from
minority ethnic groups in the UK, representing nine per cent of the self-employed population;
however, there is a wide variation between ethnic groups. Black Caribbean (4%) and black
African  (5%)  people  have  lower  self-employment  rates  than  any  other  ethnic  group
(Runnymede Trust, 2011).
Segregated public spaces
Roundtable participants commented on how the commercialisation of urban cities, combined
with  the  policing  of  those  areas  has  changed  the  nature  of  public  spaces.  Anti-social
Behaviour Orders (ASBOs),  dispersal  zones and gang injunctions were raised as having
some bearing on the sense of  alienation that  some young people may feel  in their  own
neighbourhoods. Furthermore, research has shown that the process of regulation of space
and  social  exclusion  is  often  compounded  by  processes  of  racialisation  (White,  R.  &
Cunneen, C., 2006, pp. 17-29). 
Close to the edge?
It is often easy to forget that over two-thirds of young people are concerned about being a
victim of  crime (Young NCB,  2010).  One young researcher reported how vulnerable she
personally felt during the civil disturbances in London and said that her peers were quite
affected by the riots. Not only were they scared, upset and shocked by the violence during
the riots, but in the aftermath they felt demonised by society.
The civil disturbances in 2011 were seen by the general public through the mediated lens
that  focused on the criminal nature of the disturbances rather than any possible political
motivations. Roundtable participants offered varying opinions on whether the disturbances
could be classed as rioting, protest, demonstration or even uprising. Although the participants
acknowledged the extent of the criminal and acquisitive nature of these civil disturbances,
many also held the view that  these were not  issueless riots.  Participants noted that  the
political motivations were perhaps harder to identify as riots cannot be fully understood by
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the norms of political protest. What we do know is:
…riots do not develop out of thin air. Certain conditions continue to exist in our society 
which must be condemned as vigorously as we condemn riots. But in the final analysis, a 
riot is the language of the unheard. (Martin Luther King Jr, 1968)
Failing political institutions
The roundtable participants stated that the civil  disturbances need to be examined in the
context  of  global,  national  and local  events.  In  the  build-up to  August  2011,  there  were
protests, strikes and public demonstrations of dissatisfaction with changes to public sector
pensions, MPs’ expenses, the banking crisis, public spending cuts and changes to tuition
fees. Participants felt that these ‘quiet riots’ (Solomos, 2011), were signs that we were closer
to the edge than we knew at the time. 
There was a sense from all the riot roundtables and the young people’s research that the civil
disturbances  were a  violent  outburst  of  building  frustrations  that  our  political  and  public
institutions were unable to appropriately respond to in the lead-up to the riots. Young people
under the age of 18 cannot vote and are therefore excluded from that specific democratic
practice but roundtable participants also spoke of a wider political disenfranchisement across
all age groups. 
A recent  study  into  ethnic  minority  voting  behaviour  (Heath  &  Khan,  2012)  found  that
although ethnic minorities were, on the whole, highly supportive of British democracy, there
was worrying evidence that second-generation citizens of Black Caribbean heritage do not
feel that the British political system has treated them fairly and as a group they are most
likely  to  feel  alienated  from  British  political  life.  The  EMBES  study  suggests  that  the
alienation could be attributed to the perceived lack of redress for racial discrimination and
race inequality by political parties. 
Research has shown that,  in  times of  austerity,  there  is  a link between civil  unrest  and
austerity  programmes of  the  kind  that  the  UK government  is  currently  pursuing  (Taylor-
Gooby, 2012). Participants highlighted a disconnect between those bearing the brunt of the
public  spending  cuts  and  those  in  positions  of  power  that  appeared  to  be  unaffected.
Furthermore, some participants felt that government policies were purposefully undermining
communities, and when peaceful demonstration had, in many instances, resulted in little or
no change, the riots provided an opportunity for people to vent their frustration. Participants
across all  roundtables expressed that there had been a breakdown in the social contract
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between individuals and the government. Participants explained this in the context of growing
race inequalities combined with the inability to influence government policies. Legitimacy is
the acceptance of the government’s authority; the civil disturbances of August 2011 appeared
to be a very clear challenge to that authority.
Conclusions
There were a multitude of events that took place during those five days in August 2011 and
there  were  a  multitude  of  reasons  for  people  to  be  involved  in  the  riots.  Our  research
indicates that the police’s slowness to react to the civil disturbances may have contributed to
the spread of the riots and the participants at the roundtables felt  that  the government’s
response displayed a real lack of understanding of the issues but also an unwillingness to
further investigate why these incidents occurred.
One key finding from our research is that strained relationships between the police and the
BME community were a significant factor in the outbreak of the riots. Participants felt that the
death of Mark Duggan and the miscommunication with the Duggan family was a significant
‘trigger’ and this incident awakened memories of minority ethnic experiences of injustices in
the criminal justice system. The profound sense of injustice felt in black communities and,
perhaps to a lesser extent the Asian communities, appears to coalesce around the police
service.  Stop  and  search  and  the  way  it  undermines  trust  between  the  police  and  the
community appeared to be a significant factor in the motivation for many who took part in the
civil disturbances. Minority ethnic people ‘remain over-surveilled and underprotected within
all stages of our criminal justice system’ (Runnymede, 2011, p. 33) and we heard of intense
localised grievance directed at the police in many of the areas we went to.
Unlike previous ‘race riots’, conflict between ethnic groups did not appear to be the reason
for the 2011 riots. However participants at the roundtables expressed concerns that this last
set of disturbances had unearthed racial tensions between communities which were able to
come to  the  fore  during  and  in  the  aftermath  of  the  riots.  It  would  appear  that  all  the
communities we visited were vulnerable to increases in inter-racial tensions and civil unrest
during this period of economic downturn, and where economic inequalities between groups
are  on  the  rise.  Furthermore,  those  groups  that  appeared  to  not  have  a  stake  in  their
communities, most notably African-Caribbean people but also young disenfranchised people,
were perhaps more likely to direct their anger towards their own neighbourhoods.
In August 2011, we witnessed people from all ethnic backgrounds taking part in the riots but
that  does  not  suggest  that  there  was  no  dynamic  of  racial  inequality  at  play.  Building
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frustrations with race discrimination in terms of finding employment and rising unemployment
levels for BME people possibly contributed to the reasons why people were involved in the
civil  disturbances.  Our young researchers found that  youth unemployment  and a lack of
activities for them to do were directly linked to the reasons why young people took part in the
civil disturbances.
The ferocity  of  the  criminal  damage and the extent  of  the  acquisitive  nature  of  the civil
disturbances in 2011 perhaps made it difficult to spot the political motivations behind these
disturbances but many of the research participants felt the civil unrest exposed symptoms of
growing inequalities.
In the lead-up to August 2011 the ‘quiet riots’, protests and demonstrations were indications
of smouldering tensions that would manifest itself on a larger scale. Growing levels of race
inequality  in  conjunction  with  people  living  more  precarious  lives  perhaps  created  those
specific conditions where people felt able to ignore normative social rules.
In the wake of the riots, social researchers and other commentators linked various levels of
social  inequality  across  all  races  and  ethnicities  to  the  disturbances.  As  Danny  Dorling
explains, gross inequalities keep particular races as markers of disadvantage and although
‘greater equality does not cure racism... [what it] does do is reduce the racism endemic within
a society,  and the crime committed and suffered by  those who are part  of  that  society’
(Dorling, 2012, p.20).
At each of the roundtables we heard examples of racial injustices reminiscent of the 1980s
and this was directly linked to building frustrations that exploded into those violent scenes.
Recognising the intensity of those feelings and the pervasive nature of institutional racisms,
race inequalities and political disenfranchisement is intrinsic to understanding why the civil
disturbances broke out in August 2011.
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Section 5
London and
Diasporic
Belongings
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Contested Memories: the Shahid Minar 
and the Struggle for Diasporic Space    
— Claire Alexander (LSE)
Introduction
I want to thank Nira and the conference organisers for inviting me to speak today, and it is a
particular pleasure to be invited to be on a panel with Avtar Brah, whose work has been so
central to my thinking and to shaping our understanding of race and diaspora in Britain. 
It  is  almost  impossible  to  say  something sensible  about  these complex  and paradoxical
formations  and  encounters  in  15–20  minutes  except  to  say  that  they  are  complex  and
paradoxical,  and that  this  itself  is  an important  statement  at  a  time when the dominant
political  and policy narratives are to quash complexity or  erase these difficult  terrains of
difference, sameness, inequality, violence and conviviality in a global city like London. So I
want to draw on Avtar’s very powerful notion of ‘diaspora space’ which it seems to me is very
much a space of paradox, of recognising and naming these paradoxes. Avtar has defined
diaspora space as: 
It is where multiple subject positions are juxtaposed, contested, proclaimed or 
disavowed; where the permitted and the prohibited perpetually interrogate; and where 
the accepted and the transgressive imperceptibly mingle… the point at which boundaries 
of inclusion and exclusion, of belonging and otherness, of “us” and “them” are 
contested (1999). 
Bearing  this  definition  in  mind,  I  want  to  explore  some of  these  tensions  and  positions
through the very intimate lens of one particular diasporic space: the Shahid Minar in Tower
Hamlets, London.  The material I am presenting is drawn from a larger project on ‘the Bengal
diaspora’ which explored migration and settlement from and within the state of Bengal in the
period after 1947 and is concerned in particular with how movement and belonging can and
must be understood empirically and historically, through structures of power and in relation to
a particular place. What I am hoping to do is use this site as a prism through which to view
some ways in  which ideas of  diaspora,  community  and cultural  identity  are created and
performed, and the ways in which this performance is itself contested in the shifting time and
place  of  multicultural  London.  In  particular,  I  want  to  open  up  this  site  as  a  space  of
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encounter, dialogue, conflict and paradox. 
The Shahid Minar
Shahid Minar translates as ‘Tower of the Martyrs’. It was constructed in 1999 and is a replica
of one in Oldham, in northern England (another less well-known but long-established Bengali
community – the second largest in the UK and the site of riots in 2001), which is itself a copy
of the original in Dhaka. The original Shahid Minar stands near the Dhaka Medical College
and was built as a memorial to the Bengali Language Martyrs who were killed by police in
1952 for demonstrating against the attempt to impose Urdu as the main language of East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh); the moment which is usually held to mark the beginning of the
Bengali  nationalist  movement,  and  which  ended  with  the  Liberation  War  and  the
independence of Bangladesh in 1971.
The monument stands in Altab Ali Park across the Whitechapel Road from the entrance to
Brick  Lane,  and  was  formerly  known  as  St  Mary’s  churchyard.   The  Shahid  Minar  has
become a primary site for a version of nationalist/cultural identity work and politics in East
London and elsewhere. At midnight on 21st  February each year, Ekushe, a memorial service
for the language martyrs is held at the Shahid Minar and attended by around 2-300 Bengalis
from East London and further afield. Wreaths are laid around the monument and there are
speeches  by  local  community  leaders  and  representatives  of  political  and  cultural
organisations. This ritual is a lived performance of links to Bangladesh, to its history, the
remembrance of the national struggle and to a set of intertwined values around secularism,
language, culture and nationalism. It is the claiming of a national and cultural identity that
privileges notions of shared origins, of belonging and of ‘roots’. One woman I interviewed,
who runs a local Bengali cultural organisation told me, “it’s my identity, it’s our identity. If I
don’t mark it, I don’t know my roots”.
Ekushe  performs  this  transnational  link,  reflecting  and  calling  into  being  the  sense  of
belonging in the context of displacement in time and space. The performance of Ekushe
conjures elsewheres and also ‘elsewhens’ not only of Bangladesh but of Bengali diaspora
communities. The memorial commemorates not only one event but a series in which the
language  martyrs  are  both  symbol  and  staging  post  for  a  broader  and  longer  national
struggle.  Its  apotheosis  is  reached  nearly  two  decades  later  with  the  foundation  of
Bangladesh and, indeed, the annual ritual points to the unfinished process of nation building
and to its victims, for example, the estimated three million murdered and thousands raped
during the Liberation War. Indeed, Ekushe in East London is co-ordinated by the UK branch
of the Nirmul Committee, a group dedicated to the ongoing prosecution of war criminals, an
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example of what Brubaker might term ‘long distance nationalism’. 
At the same time, the monument itself and the act of memorialisation tells other stories which
speak to an alternate version of diaspora, one which tells of the remaking of home in new
places:  ‘routes’ rather  than  ‘roots’ and  is  ‘present-centred’,  both  in  spatial  and  temporal
terms. I want to explore some of these next. Obviously, given the time constraints, I cannot
do more than gesture at these stories but hope at least to give you a flavour of some of these
dimensions. 
The national-local story
The first level I want to explore is the national and the way in which the Shahid Minar speaks
to the position of the Bangladeshi community within Britain and within Tower Hamlets. I want
to use the two levels  interchangeably here due to lack of  time but  also because Tower
Hamlets is generally considered to be the ‘heartland’ of the Bangladeshi community in the
UK.  Somewhere between a quarter to a third of Britain’s Bangladeshi population lives in
Tower Hamlets: the highest concentration anywhere in the UK, about half of whom are third
generation London-born and bred. The area, and the Bengali community, has been marked
by a rather schizophrenic set of representations: externally, in particular, Tower Hamlets has
been marked through images of poverty, unemployment, poor education, poor health and
bad housing. At the same time, the development of Banglatown, of the Baisakhi Mela or the
Brick Lane Curry Festival from the mid-1990s has seen a cultural claiming and positioning of
this community as an iconic site of multicultural Britain. 
The building of the Shahid Minar illustrates the engagement with wider British society,  in
particular as a way of claiming space within this society.  The Shahid Minar in its current,
permanent  form was  funded  by  the  community  –  50  local  groups  and  business  people
donated £500 each towards the structure – but in conjunction with the local authority, which
provided permissions on the land and the structure. Before this, one local activist told me19:
Bengalis were observing Martyrs’ day by creating a temporary Shahid Minar with wooden
planks and stuff and using community centres. They’ve been doing it for years, since 1952, so
it’s nothing new… [then] the council thought we ought to have a permanent monument. 
There’s another important side-story here too about the ways in which the Labour party and
the local council in Tower Hamlets have been increasingly dominated by Bengali councillors
from  the  1980s  onwards.  It  is  possible  then  to  see  the  establishment  of  a  permanent
monument as a ‘coming of age’ of the Bengali community, a recognition of the permanence
19 All quotes are from interviews conducted by Alexander in 2008 as part of the ‘Bengal Diaspora’ project
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of their presence, an increased confidence and visibility and contribution to the area in a
broader context of a global city and a national context that had not yet pronounced the death
of multiculturalism (which would happen after the riots of 2001 and the start of the War on
Terror). It testifies too to the intricate and long historical linkages binding Bengal to Britain,
from the time of the East India Company through two world wars to the influx of workers from
the 1960s and their families from the 1980s, which challenge the dominant representations of
Bengalis as outsiders, as latecomers to the British nation or Tower Hamlets being dubbed the
‘New East  End’.  Tower  Hamlets council  has recently  developed a  Bengali  Heritage Trail
through the area, in which the Shahid Minar is a key site, and which tells this story. So the
Shahid Minar is part  of  a marking of territory, staking a claim for the Bengali community
within a longer history of migration, settlement and ‘integration’, and a future which is seeing
Bengalis moving eastwards, out of Tower Hamlets. A local councillor placed the Shahid Minar
as part of both a Bengali and a local East End heritage:
The restaurant community on Brick Lane is not secure. It will disappear. I hope not in my 
time….The mosques won’t go, some of the businesses will remain, the landmarks, some of
them will remain – the Shahid Minar, the gate, the naming of some of the streets, some of 
the estates, some of the schools. It will take a long time for the Bangladeshis to be totally 
eradicated from the area, maybe in about 50, 100 years and who cares after that? 
The history
However, as one might expect, this cultural claiming of space is not without its own struggles:
it is significant that the Shahid Minar is located in Altab Ali Park which was renamed in the
late 1990s in memory of a more local martyr, garment worker, Altab Ali who was murdered in
a racist  attack in 1978, and this points to a more UK centred anti-racist struggle. A local
councillor who had been a teenager in the area in the 1970s told me, “People were living with
real fear, fear of being murdered, fear of being beaten up, fear of walking the streets safely”.
Through this period, though, the young men started to band together in self-defence and a
number of youth organisations were set up, who took on the National Front (NF). The chair of
the Brick Lane Mosque committee told me, “Almost every Sunday we had to face attacks by
the skinheads and the racist National Front. In Bethnal Green they used to sell their leaflets
and… we have to fight for it, a long, long fight, and then they moved away…”.
The  murder  of  Altab  Ali  was  a  turning  point.  After  his  murder,  the  Bengali  community
organised a protest march. The councillor told me that ‘For the first time, Bengalis marched
from Whitechapel to Parliament House, on the way round Hyde Park corner and back to
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Whitechapel. It took about eight hours. About 10,000 people. That was the first time Bengalis
came out’. One interviewee, who worked as a youth worker in the area in the 1970s, drew
clear connections between the local anti-racist struggle during the 1970s and the liberation
struggle  and saw both  as central  to  understanding the contemporary  significance of  the
Shahid Minar to the local community:
Altab Ali Park… had importance to the community because of the murder of Altab Ali 
there and the park being a rallying point for lots of demos, meetings and protests, so it 
was always seen as a symbol of protest and of celebration… A lot of people who fought 
the anti-racist struggle were all inspired by Bangladesh’s independence movement, so it’s
all kind of connected. 
The religious divide
However,  within  the  Bengali  community,  the  monument  itself  has  been,  and  remains,  a
source of disagreement: this can be read partly as a struggle between more Islamist inspired
groups and more secular nationalist activists within the community which can partly be read
as a generational divide. This division can also be mapped onto a struggle between the two
most important local mosques: Brick Lane Mosque (BLM) which stands on Brick Lane itself
(with a complex history which reflects the area’s migration history) and sees itself as a very
Bangladeshi mosque, appealing to the more secular nationalist and anti-racist activists of the
60s and 70s and East London Mosque (ELM) which stands about 100 yards away from the
entrance  to  Brick  Lane  and  Altab  Ali  Park,  which  is  seen  as  a  more  ‘global’  Muslim
organisation and is more popular with the younger British-born generation. 
I  interviewed  representatives  of  both  mosques  and  the  differences  in  attitude  were
fascinating. The chair of BLM told me that the Mosque’s imams opposed the shrine but not
the act of memorialisation, whereas he takes a more pragmatic view:
I was involved with the building of the Shahid Minar… but religiously it is two different 
things. I have a role as a community leader and then I have a role in the mosque 
management committee… The mosque cannot oppose anything, the people who are 
religious scholars, they oppose, they make their views clear that this is not good and we 
shouldn’t go there. But people still go there and we as community leaders feel it is our 
obligation as well and we go there… [there is] no tension, no conflict. 
By contrast ELM is seen as more hardline and hostile to the Shahid Minar and there are
stories  of  younger  mosque members  disrupting  the Ekushe memorialisation  ceremonies.
One interviewee said of ELM, ‘they are Muslims first and foremost and nationality, ethnicity or
division should not come into it… So they don’t believe in Bengali nationalism, and if they
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could they would delete Bengal’s history and heritage’
Unsurprisingly, the view from ELM was rather different. I spoke to two representatives of the
London Muslim Centre (LMC), who told me:
You see we as Muslims have a particular way…and this kind of thing which are (sic) just 
copying the West if you like….it has no basis in our religion. We should pray for the ones 
who died in the language movement…. but it’s the process in which you recognise 
them….  I don’t have to do a show of grief for example of how it’s done on the Poppy 
day… I do it in the confines of my personal space…. You won’t find any imams praying in
Altab Ali Park on the 21st of February.
Concluding comments
Through this very small and detailed empirical story, I want finally to gesture towards some of
the wider paradoxes this site captures and the questions it raises for the understanding of
migration and settlement in London.  There are three main points to draw:
• There is  a need to consider the role of  space and place in the understanding of
migration:  this is  not  simply about  the movement from place of  origin to place of
settlement but  to think also of  the intersection of  transnational,  national and local
processes  and  specificities  which  shape  movement  and  continue  to  reshape  the
migration experience over time. 
• There  is  a  need  to  place  these  movements  temporally,  and  here  there  are  two
dimensions: firstly the role of history in explaining settlement and the conditions for
belonging (or not) and the way that histories are narrated as part of opening up the
space for belonging as a process of claims-making; secondly, we need to recognise
that  these  circumstances  are  constantly  open  to  change  and  redefinition,  to
contestation and challenge.  The history of  the Bengali  community in London (and
East London in particular) is a very clear example of this. 
• There  is  a  need  to  recognise  processes  of  power  in  shaping  migration  and
settlement: this can be both external – through the influence of global processes and
politics, as well as national policies, inequalities and exclusions – as well as internal
to the imagined community (and these of course are also shaped by external forces).
This  requires  us  to  engage  in  some  quite  fraught  and  perhaps  unwelcome
discussions. 
These  are  not  particularly  original  insights,  but  they  are  nevertheless  important  ones,
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particularly in the current climate of hostility towards migration and minority groups. I would
say finally that there is a need for detailed and inter-disciplinary work to map these terrains
empirically and historically, and to try and engage with discussions outside of the academy to
shift the terms of the political and policy debates. 
A reworked full version of this paper has been recently published. See Alexander, C., (2013) 
‘Contested Memories: the Shahid Minar and the struggle for diasporic space’, Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, 36 (4), 590-610
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Cyprus and the City: The Negotiated 
Home of Cypriot Refugees in London
— Helen Taylor (UEL)
This paper is based on narrative research with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot refugees
who have lived in London since fleeing the post-independence unrest of the 1960s and the
war of 1974. The title of the conference – City of Paradox – is an apt description of the
relationship  that  Cypriots  have  had  with  the capital,  which has always  been marked by
contradiction and complexity.  Coming here first  in  the 1920s,  Cypriot  migrants arrived in
larger numbers in  the middle of  the century when Britain solicited cheap labour from its
colonies.  When  10,000  fled  to  Britain  in  1974,  as  the  division  of  the  island  led  to  the
displacement  of  up  to  200,000  Greek  Cypriots  and  50,000  Turkish  Cypriots,  they  were
admitted as colonial citizens ‘with special concessions’. But they were never recognised as
refugees,  and  by  1979  most  were  forced to  return  (even  though  their  homes  remained
inaccessible).  Hence the paradox: that when Britain needed Cypriot labour,  the door was
open but when Cypriots needed sanctuary a decade later, it was only slightly ajar.
The second paradox is that at the same time as Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were
being  partitioned  into  separate  states  in  Cyprus,  many  of  those  exiled  in  London  found
themselves living alongside each other just as they had always done in Cyprus. Those who
left Cyprus in the 1950s did not live through the conflict and still maintained the memory of
Cyprus as a bi-communal island.  Home for  Cypriots in London has continued to be one
where the two communities live together in what Brah calls the ‘diaspora space’, alongside
other migrants and indigenous communities (1996, p.208).
London also remains a ‘City of Paradox’ for Cypriot refugees precisely because it became
their home by default. It will always be the home they did not choose but were forced to
accept in difficult circumstances. For many the lost home in Cyprus has been protected by
the rose-tinted glow of nostalgia because, like a prematurely dead relative, it has not been
around to disappoint them. London is forever guilty of not being the lost home and of being,
in many cases, the antithesis of Cypriot life. But London has also been a place of safety for
those who were allowed to stay, and has given many an education and a livelihood as well
as a home.
London: City of Paradox — 151
Cypriots have spent the decades since their arrival setting up businesses, going to school
and university,  having  children,  buying  houses,  working,  campaigning and  socialising,  in
other words, living life. But they have also kept one eye on Cyprus and the homes that they
were forced to leave, maintaining their commitment to their lost homes through rituals of
remembrance. Rather than a pathological response to the catastrophe of exile, however, this
ongoing negotiation between old, new and potential future homes illustrates, I believe, the
development of complex strategies of belonging in the face of life-changing challenges.
Living through such paradoxical circumstances makes the dichotomous choice of belonging
to ‘here’ or ‘there’, to London or Cyprus an irrelevance. Cemal20, who fled a Turkish Cypriot
suburb of Nicosia as a child in 1963, was able to articulate some of the contradictions of
belonging during protracted exile when he said: 
Having spent nearly 50 years of your life in a different place, no matter how much you miss
home – I said the word ‘home’ again with Cyprus, but I suppose it will always be my country.
You can’t deny that, I was born there. But if you spend as long in a foreign country, much
longer than you actually did in your own country then this country becomes your home, no
matter how insulated you might be from the indigenous population. (2009)
Home, then, can be a complicated place, not least for those involved in the process of losing
and making home. Many Cypriots feel ties not only to Cyprus and Britain but also in some
case to Turkey or Greece, or other diasporic homes such as Australia. But in adding this
complexity, it would be misleading to simply read home in spatial terms.
The research I did with Cypriot refugees explored the meaning of home for those living in
protracted exile. From the narrative interviews, four key aspects of home emerged (2009): by
combining an understanding of  the spatial  aspects of  home with temporal,  relational and
material elements, a more complex – although by no means complete – understanding of
home was possible. The spatial home refers not just to physically bounded nation states but
also to the buildings we live in as well as surrounding houses, shops, places of worship,
streets  and  landscape.  The  temporal  home  recognizes  that  homes  exist  in  a  particular
moment when there is a coming together of different elements which change continually as
well as existing in the memories of past homes and dreams of future homes. The temporal
home  also  describes  the  daily  routines,  and  cyclical  events.  The  material  home
encompasses the trees and the soil, the food and the flowers, the scents and tastes of home
that typify the sensory relationship with the land and the daily, embodied experience of home.
20 Pseudonyms have been used for all participants in the study.
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While, the relational home describes the close family bonds as well as the social networks
that exist with friends, neighbours, acquaintances and business contacts and which facilitate
the formation of social and cultural capital. It is the coming together of all these elements
which gives home its unique character at any given time.
To illustrate how some of these elements demonstrate the ongoing negotiation of home, I will
now offer a few snapshots from my research: 
The exiled villagers of Agios Amvrosios have a well-organised village committee in 
London which campaigns for their right to return to their lost homes, as well as engaging
in wider campaigns for the removal of Turkish troops from Cyprus and the reunification 
of the island. The committee is focussed on “keeping traditions going and keeping the 
community together” (2009), while one member told me its purpose was “to help us not 
forget our village… and keep the flame alive”. Its role then could be seen as backward 
looking, concentrating on preserving the memory and culture of the lost home while 
campaigning for the restitution of that home. However, the strategies employed by 
villagers also demonstrate their skill in engendering belonging in the context of their 
London home. One of the key events in the committee’s calendar is the annual dinner 
dance, which continues the tradition of the apricot festival that was held in the village 
square to herald the arrival of the village’s main crop (2009). Central to the event, both 
in Cyprus and here, is the apricot dance performed by young girls from the village. The 
dancers are now third generation, have never lived in the village and, in most case, have 
never seen it.
The continued inclusion of the apricot dance at the festival is a repetition of a long-
established ritual from the village which reminds villagers who they are at the same time 
as reminding them of their lost homes. For second and third generation villagers, it 
instructs them in the cultural identity of the village so that they are able to perform as 
proper children of Agios Amvrosios in the context of exile as well as at some unspecified 
future date, should return ever be possible. The dance has changed from being an 
expression of culture and a site of celebration in Cyprus to a representation of home, 
providing continuity with the temporal home of the past, while staying true to the cycles 
of nature and the material home, celebrating a harvest that no longer takes place. It is 
also possible, however, that villagers enjoy these annual gatherings and the repetition of 
the apricot dance simply because it makes them feel like they belong, engendering the 
sense of being ‘at home’ in London. In his work with Lebanese migrants in Sydney, Hage 
found that the “yearning for homely communality translates into an attempt to build the 
past conditions of its production”, such as surrounding oneself with others speaking the 
same language and reconstructing neighbourhoods (1997, p.105). While the loss of the 
relational home, through the shattering of social networks, has been recognised as one of
the greatest losses of exile, these villagers have demonstrated admirable proficiency at 
rebuilding and extending these networks in a new context.
It is also important to remember that, when the girls who perform the apricot dance take off
their costumes, rather than embodying a distilled version of Cypriot village identity, they will
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be typical of many young people in the world city of London who have always lived with
diverse  cultural  influences.  For  second  and  subsequent  generations  of  Cypriots,  Cypriot
identity is intertwined with notions of Britishness and being a Londoner; the first generation
has  also  been  changed  by  the  daily  encounter  with  London  just  as  London  has  been
changed by its encounter with them.
For villagers from Agios Amvrosios, material aspects of home emerge in the way that the
apricot tree has become a symbol of the village in exile.  In Cyprus, apricots represented
financial  wealth as a crop,  as well  as suggesting the unique character  of  the village,  by
producing – according to villagers – the first and best apricots of the year. Now the trees are
not in orchards but in inner-city gardens in London. Village leader Dimitris told me (2009):
“Every person from our village, you find an apricot tree in his garden. I think it’s a symbol for
everybody that we like to go home one day… It’s a dream. One day we will be able to go
back free.” These trees now perform multiple duties. As a familiar feature of the landscape of
the village, they reproduce the sights, scents and taste of home in a new context, recalling
memories of home as well as making London feel like home. At the same time the tree is
doing political work as a symbol of the lost home, demonstrating the commitment to return,
just like the olive tree has come to symbolise Palestine for its refugees.
Having a garden with recognisably Cypriot elements is important for many and the same
plants can be seen repeatedly, as Eleni explained (2009): “I’ve got jasmine in my garden,
which is one of the Mediterranean types of plants. And if you drive down north London you
would know… a Greek home because of  the… big  white tubular  lilies.”  In  this  way,  the
garden is a vibrant, sensory and material link with the lost home but also makes the home in
London more pleasurable, more homely. These plants have also changed the north London
‘botanoscape’ so that jasmine, lilies and vines are now a part of the scents and sights of the
city for all its inhabitants.
When Cypriot refugees arrived in London, in spite of the Cypriot migrant community already
living here, much about the city initially seemed strange and disorientating. Salih explained
(2009):  “Obviously it  takes time to get  used to a new system. City life  for  me was very
strange and scary  because everything was different.  I  felt  isolated and sometimes I  felt
lonely. Sometimes I felt that I wouldn’t be able to succeed.” However, far from refugees being
unskilled and anonymous people, as they are so often portrayed, it is the unfamiliar context
that is temporarily disempowering. The emplacement strategies used to give place meaning
through daily practices, such as food preparation, prayer, and rituals surrounding birth, death
and marriage,  must  all  be started anew in exile.  But  Cypriots have been very skilled at
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making the spaces of the city their own. Cypriot-run cafes opened in London as early as the
1920s. While the migrants of the 1950s settled first near the West End, Euston and Camden,
before transforming the London borough of Haringey so that Green Lanes, the road running
through its heart, became known as ‘little Cyprus’. Anthias (2006)  describes Haringey as “an
ecological centre” of the Cypriot community where “ethnic concentration and association are
instrumental  in  perpetuating  the  ethnic  category”.  Although  many  Cypriots  now  live
elsewhere,  the area remains a  living map of  Cypriot  emplacement,  from Yashar  Halim’s
bakery to the bi-communal Cypriot Community Centre, men-only cafés named after Cyprus
villages and Greek Orthodox churches like St John the Baptist. This is not and never could
be a recreation of Cyprus but demonstrates the skill of Cypriots in constructing components
necessary to facilitate spatial  belonging while creating a context for the reconstruction of
social  networks.  As  Massey  states,  place  changes  us,  “…not  through  some  visceral
belonging (some barely changing rootedness, as so many would have it) but through the
practising of place… place as an arena where negotiation is forced upon us” (2005, p. 154).
Over the years, practising place in London has changed the meaning of home for Cypriots.
Another of the painful paradoxes of exile has been that, while trips to and from Cyprus have
been frequent and regular, the lost home remained off-limits. When border restrictions were
relaxed in April 2003, it was suddenly possible for visits home to be made 30 years after
access was denied. This momentous opportunity came with its own challenges for those for
whom the lost home had been based on rituals of remembrance. Eleni, a worker for a Greek
Cypriot women’s project, told me of her concern:
…my initial reaction [on hearing that the border had opened] was, ‘Oh my god’ …all 
these people that left the beautiful house or land… would go back to maybe a derelict bit 
of a wall. But they have all these beautiful memories of their home … And that picture is 
in your head. It doesn’t go away and it doesn’t move with the times. So people’s memories
would be like a snapshot of what their house was as they saw it the last time. (2009)
 It  is  perhaps the preservation of  this  snapshot  that  made building a new life in  London
possible. While the lost home was inaccessible, the only option was to make a new home
while staying loyal to the memory of the lost home through the collective perusal of photos,
the keeping of house keys and deeds, the gathering of fellow villagers and the passing on of
memories to the next generation. When it became possible to visit those lost homes once
again, the reality of how they changed became evident.  Emine told me (2009) about her
‘beautiful village’ which she remembered as ‘really, really lovely with birds singing’. But on a
return visit she found her family’s houses had been demolished and their trees cut down. The
experience was temporally and spatially disorientating, and she said, “When I went back I
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was not where I was supposed to be. And then where I was supposed to be is not really
there. I am nowhere.” She regretted the intrusion of reality on her memories of home and did
not  want  to  go back.  Her  experience  points  to  yet  another  central  paradox of  the  exile
experience: even if physical return does become possible, real return is never an option as
the past cannot be regained. As Warner says, return “denies the temporal reality of our lives
and the changes that take place over time” (1994, pp. 170-171).
The Cypriots I spoke to were engaged in a delicate balancing act between maintaining their
commitment to their lost homes and to the right of return, many of them active campaigners
for a political solution, at the same time as taking a pragmatic approach to life in London. The
strongest pull for most was the fact that their children were now deeply emplaced in London
making a permanent return impossible. Those who arrived as children or teenagers have
spent a far greater portion of their life in England than in Cyprus. As a result, this city is the
setting for the life events of three or four decades. The irony is that the more successful
Cypriots have been in remaking home in exile, the harder it will be for them to leave should
return ever become possible.
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Talking about Home: Exploring the 
Particular Communities in Particular Places 
that Create ‘Localities of Belonging’      
— Nicola Samson (UEL)
The East London street where I live provides geographical, historical and social context for
my PhD research on the lives of 14 women and their experiences of belonging. The women
grew up in countries across the world, are from various ethnic backgrounds, range in age
from mid-twenties to mid-seventies, and have been living in the street anywhere between a
few months and 30 years. I have used semi-structured narrative interviews to explore their
lives and encourage the women’s changing sense of belonging to unfold through their life
stories.  This  paper  will  initially  discuss  two  of  the  women’s  memories  of  their  childhood
homes and the sense of belonging they developed in their young lives. In particular, it will
explore my concept of the localities of belonging which some of the women experienced as
children. The second part of the paper will consider the two women’s ethnic belonging as
adults living in East London making connections with their childhood experiences.
Stories of community and belonging
In  discussing my concept  of  ‘localities of  belonging’,  I  am focusing here on two women
migrants: Angelique from Trinidad and Frederica from Malaysia, both of whom experienced a
strong sense of  belonging in  what  they describe as the close communities of  their  early
childhoods. 
Angelique
Brought  up by  her  grandparents  in  a  beautiful,  upper-middle-class  area  of  Trinidad  with
streets named after precious stones and large houses with lawns and verandas, Angelique
describes  a  fairy-tale,  idyllic  childhood in  a  paradise  of  sunshine and flowers where the
children picnicked under coconut, orange and mango trees dripping with fruit, and where “…
there were no strangers […] everybody knew everybody” and where neighbours near and far
were like extended family (Angelique, 2010). 
As the extracts show, Angelique could not imagine having a greater belonging: 
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N: You did mention that you felt it was a real community, erm, where you grew up and the
people you grew up with, how did you feel as a child then in terms of your belonging? 
Did you have a sense of belonging there?
A: [overlapping] Oh yeah. Even now, even now on Facebook we’re part of Emerald 
Avenue group because we’re all in our 40s, 50s and we KNOW that was us, that, the Dale
belonged to us then, it’s not what it is now, we could never be part of what it is now... 
because that sense of community, that sense of belonging, that sense of familiarity… has 
gone. […] I wish I could do the same for my son, I wish he could have that sort of 
childhood, that, that … that feeling of community and that sense of… camaraderie and 
friendship… and love, there was something really embracing about the whole area. 
(Angelique, 2010)
Frederica
In Malaysia Frederica was the fourth of  five children in a Chinese family  who lived in a
traditional “… rambling sort of compound” comprising a long wooden building with an attap (a
kind of palm) reed roof divided into separate homes with three detached houses at one end. 
Not as large as a village but home to about 30 families, it was a happy place providing a
childhood that she says was “quite idyllic”:
… we had that in, in my childhood house, this long house and at the end of it the three 
detached houses, and the rest of it was a communal space...where all the kids played 
together, different ages but we all played together. There was a sort of makeshift 
badminton court, there was a water pump in the middle ... many people from the long 
houses they, they used that as the washing area, the women came out to wash. So there 
was this, you know, communal thing that everybody knew everybody …
(Frederica, 2010)
Localities of belonging
Similar stories of childhood were given by seven of my interviewees and the analysis that
follows is based on all  their experiences. Their musings could be dismissed as opaquely
remembered childhoods, cuddly-blanket wrapped memories of distant past lives holding at
bay adult realities of responsibility, jobs and motherhood in the urban gloom of East London’s
grimy streets and tightly closed doors.  But  I  believe these women’s stories of  childhood
highlight  striking  similarities  in  very  different  situations  that  created  a  real  sense  of
community and belonging for them as children. 
Three common themes arise: firstly, these were places where people knew and engaged
with each other. Frederica’s words speak for most of the women when she says, “So there
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was this,  you know,  communal  thing that  everybody knew everybody …”.  This  notion of
everyone knowing each other was reinforced with depictions of shared living spaces; not
simply that there were communal spaces but that the doors of their separate homes were left
open  for  people  to  come and  go;  where  connection  and  friendship  across  generational
boundaries were shaped. The notion of everyone knowing each other was furthered by a
repeated  perception  of  there  being  no  strangers.  This  apparent  absence  of  strangers
suggests the women experienced a sense of safety and security in their childhood areas.
The second theme that emerges is that of freedom and peer friendships. They experienced
freedom to ‘do their  own thing’,  to go off  with friends expressing ideas of  openness and
space into which they could disappear out of sight for hours at a time, on their bikes, into
countryside,  forest  or  beach.  The  women  portray  both  times  and  places  of  play  and
enjoyment where they felt confident and happy, being themselves. Even where there were no
idyllic landscapes pictured, having friends and spending time with their peers was a dominant
element of these stories. 
The  third  theme  is,  in  some  respects,  a  consolidation  of  the  first  two.  It  concerns  the
familiarity of the people and places in the women’s young lives and the attachments they
formed  as  children  to  those  people  and  places.  It  is  precisely  this  familiarity  and  the
attachments made that created their childhood places as particular communities of people in
particular places, to which they experienced a sense of belonging, and which I will term a
‘locality of belonging’. The actual childhood homes were all very different in terms of country,
environment and size. It is not these broader aspects of their childhood homes that provided
a sense of belonging but the relationships that developed within the localities of people and
place. That is, they found a sense of belonging in an individually defined locality of people
and place which may or may not relate to formally mapped boundaries but are meaningful to
their experience. 
My analysis is, of course, of adults’ stories of childhood. How would it compare to studies
exploring  how children  themselves  experience  a  sense  of  belonging?  Scourfield  et  al.’s
(2006)  study  of  children  aged  between  8  and  11  years  (‘middle  childhood’)  is  primarily
focused on exploring their identification with nation but they devote a chapter to discussing
“… children’s  imagery  of  their  locality  […]  their  emotional  attachment  to  place and their
perception of  quality of  life in their  community”  (2006,  p.  84).  The authors establish that
children predominantly defined where they lived by talking about the immediate localities that
were most vivid to them, particularly where they played, walked and cycled, and found that
“… locality is more significant to children in their everyday lives than other dimensions of
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place and space”, including the larger perspectives of town or district (Scourfield et al., 2006,
pp. 85-86). This clearly resonates with the stories told to me by adults. Perhaps particularly
significant to my research was that they found it was the people in the places that ultimately
rendered the places important. 
Diversity, ruptures and dislocations in childhood belonging
It is not possible here to consider all the aspects of childhood belonging that arise in my
research but there are a couple of points I must mention. It should not be assumed that most
of the women grew up in monocultures where people’s lives were untouched by difference.
The  Trinidad  of  Angelique’s  childhood  and  the  Malaysia  of  Frederica’s,  were  both  very
ethnically diverse but as young children they experienced no division or difficulties. Secondly,
the  localities  of  belonging  that  I  have  identified  relate  specifically  to  young  children.  As
teenagers their particular relationships to people and place often changed and there were
ruptures in their belonging as they grew older. In addition, the locality of belonging related to
half my interviewees, both migrant and non-migrant women. The other half, also migrant and
non-migrant, experienced dislocated childhoods because they frequently moved from place
to place, or they were alienated and seen by others as outsiders, most notably in the realms
of language and/or accent, ethnicity, skin colour and disability.
Ethnic belonging in adulthood
My research explores varying aspects of the women’s adult belonging but this paper only
considers  elements  of  their  adult  ethnic  belonging  which  have  clear  links  with  their
childhoods. As a whole, the research includes both migrant and UK born women but this
paper focuses specifically on Angelique and Frederica both migrants who left their childhood
home countries as young women respectively 18 and 20 years old. Their reasons for coming
were very different. 
Angelique coming to England 
It was Angelique’s mother who decided that Angelique should improve her life chances by
coming to study here. Angelique imagined she would stay for about five years. The extracts
show how alienated and lonely she felt in London.
My mum saw that as … as a step forward […] for me to do something different, not to get
[…] what she would term middle class mediocrity. […] that’s, that’s what my mum didn’t 
want for me.
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I was on my own, it was horrible […] I was let down in a big way coming here ‘cause 
there was no love, there wasn’t just the coldness of the weather but there was a coldness 
to the people.
… my three luxuries in life were to have a phone so that I could always call home, to 
have heating so that I would not feel the cold, and to be able to go home. Those were my 
three luxuries, for 12 years. Those were the ONLY things that mattered to me.
(Angelique, 2010)
Frederica coming to England
Frederica herself chose to leave Malaysia because of the increasingly volatile and repressive
political  situation  there  and  her  own  feelings  of  being  stifled  by  the  very  closed  and
claustrophobic community that she lived in.
That, that was the main thing, to get away… [… living] in a country where you couldn’t 
say anything, all the papers are censored. To this day they are censored.. . It wasn’t 
...satisfactory to ME.
Growing up in Malaya I’ve seen how there is community, you know, there’s extended 
families and there’s neighbours, and the people in a neighbourhood you live in, but that 
kind, it creates a sort, it CAN create er claustrophobia. It can create a LOT of emotional 
unhappiness. I’ve seen it first hand. 
… I would feel… very claustrophobic and I think... that might be why I came as well, a 
second reason apart from the politics. ‘Cause life can be very, very, closed in, in a close 
community. 
(Frederica, 2010)
In the interviews I asked Angelique and Frederica what meaning their ethnicity has for them
now; whether it has any importance in their sense of belonging. Again, their responses were
notably different.
Angelique
This was Angelique’s response:
To be a Trinidadian [sigh] is to...I think being a Trinidadian is, is…or acknowledging 
that you’re a Trinidadian is knowing how rich you are in heritage... To know, to 
know...how many races and cultures that contributed to my being, that’s a wealth, that’s 
something to be proud of. And I am proud. I am proud to carry myself and say, I am a 
Trinidadian.
…it’s not a NATIONAL pride, it goes deeper than that, it’s a pride of being’. 
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(Angelique, 2010)
As can be seen from her quotes, Angelique has a potent sense of her ethnic belonging as a
Trinidadian with her grandparents a mix of Indian, Portuguese, Chinese, Venezuelan and
Carib- Indian and she decries what she feels is the “… stereotyping and compartmentalising”
of her in Britain where she is seen simply as a black woman. In London she continues to
celebrate religious festivals regardless of denomination saying “… it’s all PART of who we
are”  as well  as other  non-religious Trinidadian occasions like Indian Arrival  Day and the
Spanish Christmas tradition of parang. 
But perhaps more than anything, food symbolises home for Angelique and is central not only
to the celebrations but in her day-to-day living and her continuing ethnic belonging. 
Food, good food is about home. We have people coming [laugh], when Louis [husband], 
when the weather is really, really yucky and rainy and horrible, Louis will go out to 
Green Street or to Woodgrange Road and find yam, cassava sweet potatoes, eddoes, 
home, home of root vegetables and he will come home and he will make biggest pot of 
soup...just like we used to make it at home. And you call people up and say, come and get 
your soup... And people will drive through that weather to come and get some of Louis’ 
soup...Because we know a bit of home. And everybody knows it’s a bit of home.
(Angelique, 2010)
Since meeting her Trinidadian husband, Louis, ten years ago, Angelique no longer feels the
need to return to Trinidad so frequently. She tells of how he cooks as their grandmothers did
in Trinidad and anything that Angelique “… used to have to get on a plane and go home to
get”,  Louis makes for  her.  The ingredients may originate from all  over the world but  the
combinations  of  fresh  herbs  and  spices  provide  the  Trinidadian  twist  that  Angelique  so
craves. The food also entices other Trinidadians and while in her mind Trinidad still embodies
home, her locality of belonging is recreated in an East London street.
Frederica
This  was  Frederica’s  response  regarding  the  importance  of  ethnicity  to  her  sense  of
belonging:
N: So what does being Malaysian mean to you now?
F: Er...not a lot. It means a certain way of living, a sort of street, street way, you know, 
lots of… food. Mainly, that’s what it means to me NOW. […]
N: How important are custom and tradition -
F: Not very. 
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N: - if at all?
F: Not very. Erm... I don’t observe the New Years, the Chinese New Years or all the other 
customs, because I don’t even know when they happen. 
(Frederica, 2010)
As the dialogue portrays, she has little enthusiasm to engage with her Chinese Malaysian
upbringing. She does not practise any of the Malaysian traditions and customs and describes
herself as a “… much watered-down, wishy-washy person between all these cultures…”. She
thinks of herself as a member of “this human race community” and feels oppressed by what
she remembers from childhood as claustrophobic ethnic communities. She prioritises having
the freedom to lead her life as she chooses.
However Frederica also reveals that Malaysian food remains very important in her life, not
just the Malaysian flavours, “a particular taste” that she would miss if she could not have it
after a few weeks, but because of the centrality of food in Chinese Malaysian culture. 
For enjoyment we eat. And our greeting in Chinese, when you see someone, is, ‘Have you
eaten?’… That’s the way they say hello […]. If you haven’t, come in, you know, so it’s a 
very hospitable sort of thing, with food. And in Malaya we eat round the clock. … So 
huge efforts go into getting your food. Erm, when we go home to visit, we’re always taken
out, every day. […] It’s something that I think [in] British life... is SO alien from. You 
have certain food at certain times of the day, in, in Malaya you can have any food at ANY
time of the day. 
(Frederica, 2010)
For her husband and children, Frederica will still cook the range of foods she would eat in
Malaysia with ingredients and spices she can buy locally in Forest Gate and, she will still
cook  different  meals  for  each  of  them  keeping  a  Malaysian  tradition  of  people  eating
whatever they choose. 
Translocational positionality
In  briefly  discussing  Angelique  and  Frederica  as  adults  in  East  London,  I  am going  to
consider their ethnic belonging with reference to Anthias’ (2008) concept of translocational
positionality  which  recognises  the  importance  of  context,  meaning  and  time  in  the
intersection of social locations and the construction of belonging in migrant lives. 
There are very obvious differences in Angelique’s and Frederica’s ethnic belonging as adults.
Food is clearly important to both of them but it cannot simply be said that food gives a sense
of ethnic belonging. It is not the acts of buying, cooking or eating food alone that induce a
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sense of  belonging but  the meaning or positionality (Anthias,  2008) that  they give those
actions. For Angelique, who did not herself choose to leave Trinidad and who has always
wanted to retain and maintain her belonging to the country, food provides performative acts
(Fortier, 1999) that to a great degree fulfil the meaning she desires them to have and thereby
give her a sense of ethnic belonging. It is very different for Frederica. Even after nearly 40
years of living in Britain she would miss Malaysian food if she did not eat it, but it does not
give her a sense of ethnic belonging to Malaysia. Her choice to leave Malaysia to escape
both the way of life and the political situation is far more influential on how she feels about
the country than the Malaysian ‘taste’ and attitude to food she so loves. Anthias (2008, p.8)
notes that “Ethnic ties cannot be considered in isolation, as delivering ‘belonging’, given that
they  are  intersected  with  social  relations  of  different  types…”  Relating  this  notion  to
Angelique and Frederica,  it  would appear that  the circumstances in  which they left  their
childhood homes have most significance in their translocational positionalities as adults. 
Understanding  locality  of  belonging  as  the  relationship  with  particular  communities  in
particular places, it is evident that as adults Angelique and Frederica relate entirely differently
to the localities of belonging they experienced as children. For Frederica food is a link to her
childhood  but  she  has  disconnected  herself  from  that  community.  Angelique  however
sustains  her  practice  of  Trinidadian  traditions,  experiences  a  powerfully  Trinidadian
relationship incorporating food, her husband and other Trinidadians, and has recently formed
internet  links  with  childhood  friends,  all  providing  a  vital  continuity  with  the  locality  of
belonging she experienced as a child. 
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The Inside/Outside World of Monica Ali’s Brick 
Lane — Lucinda Newns (London Metropolitan)
Introduction 
This  presentation  forms  part  of  a  larger  PhD  project  about  gender  and  domesticity  in
contemporary  diasporic  fiction.  The  central  aim of  this  research is  to  unpack  the coded
‘passive’  space  of  the  domestic  in  order  to  expose  the  complex  processes  of  cultural
negotiation and identity positioning which occur as migrant and diasporic characters strive for
belonging within the larger spaces of nation and trans-nation.
The title of this conference is ‘City of Paradox’ and I am gesturing at this paradoxical nature
of cities with the title of my presentation. By referring to a world as having an inside and an
outside, I am alluding to the idea that places have multiple faces, which manage to co-exist
even as they complicate and interrogate one another. 
Context of paper
In the thesis chapter from which this presentation is drawn, I trace a parallel between Brick
Lane’s  (2004)  protagonist,  Nazneen  and  its  setting,  Brick  Lane.  I  argue  that  both  the
character and the setting are made up of an ‘outside’, which is made immediately knowable
and accessible through a kind of performance, and an ‘inside’ which the performance intends
to obscure. However, this is not to reduce ‘inside’ to some essential core of meaning or ‘truth’
but rather in the sense that it is less immediately knowable and consumable by outsiders. 
In the case of Nazneen, I look at how the linguistic distance between the narrative voice as a
rendering  of  Nazneen’s  consciousness  and the character  Nazneen who thinks  and acts
creates the feeling that she is performing the role of “the unspoilt girl from the village” which
has been assigned to her by her husband and the diasporic Bangladeshi community at large.
I argue that this performative aspect of Nazneen’s characterisation serves to undermine her
role as the maintainer of tradition and the ‘symbolic bearer of the collectivity’s identity’ (to use
Nira Yuval-Davis’s language) (1997); a role which the (primarily) male characters depend on
in order to sustain their connection to home (in this case, Bangladesh).
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However, in the interest of time and in keeping with the theme of this conference, I will be
focusing on Ali’s setting, Brick Lane itself. The ‘inside’ that I will be talking about in relation to
the novel’s  setting is also about  unpacking those aspects of  city places that  tend to get
marginalized and under-theorized in academic literature, in this case, the domestic and the
everyday (I use the word ‘place’ rather than ‘space’ here because placeness is associated
with the meanings that we ascribe to particular spaces).
Plot summary
On a  basic  level,  Brick  Lane  is  a  migration  narrative.  It  contains  the  conventional  plot
markers  of  departure,  arrival  and  settling,  accompanied  by  periods  of  culture  shock,
adjustment  and  adaptation.  Specifically,  a  young  Bangladeshi  woman called  Nazneen  is
brought to London following her marriage to a much older though ‘educated’ man named
Chanu and they make their home on a council estate near London’s Brick Lane. 
The novel’s plot structure is also complemented by the familiar theme of return or ‘going
home syndrome’ as it is described in the novel. At the end of the novel, this ‘going home
syndrome’ manifests itself as a literal return home for Nazneen’s husband Chanu, though for
most  of  the novel’s  characters,  home is something that  can and must  be created in the
diasporic space of London’s East End. 
The re-branding of Brick Lane
As some of you may be aware, Ali’s novel as well as its film adaptation was met with a
certain amount of resistance from the Bangladeshi community living in and around Brick
Lane. This criticism was largely attributed to Ali’s representation (or misrepresentation as it
was described) of the area and its people. And yet, many literary critics have praised the
novel  for  exactly  the  same reasons,  establishing  it  as  a  document  which  gives  readers
access to some kind of hidden ‘truth’ about Brick Lane’s Bangladeshi community. As one
reviewer puts it, the novel, “opened up a world whose contours I could recognize, but which I
needed Monica Ali to make me understand” (Bedell, 2003). The recognisable “contours”, that
this reviewer speaks of, refer to those aspects of Brick Lane which are easily accessible and
well-known to outsiders. 
In her article about gentrification in Brick Lane, Sarah Brouillette (2009) discusses how this
consumable version of  the area came about.   She cites processes of  gentrification from
outside  led  by  an  influx  of  middle-class  homebuyers  interested  in  the  area’s  Georgian
architecture and proximity to the City. But she also discusses a parallel form of gentrification
from within, involving a campaign to re-brand the area as ‘Banglatown’. This re-branding,
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Brouillette  says,  was  about  redefining  Brick  Lane  as  a  “monocultural  enclave”  with  a
“commercially visible, viable and essentialized image of Bangladeshi identity”. The re-naming
of the area was eventually made official  in 2002, just  one year before the publication of
Monica Ali’s novel.   This re-branding of Brick Lane into an ethnic enclave which is easily
accessible to and consumable by outsiders had positive effects in that it helped to bring in
wealth for local businesses while also challenging notions of ethnic areas as segregationist
or potentially dangerous spaces. 
If we look at how Brick Lane gets represented in cyberspace (2012), we begin to get a feel
for this branding: 
The first hit when doing a Google search of ‘Brick Lane’ appears to be hosted by Tower 
Hamlets Council. Immediately, we see that it is focused on Brick Lane as a space of 
consumption as evidenced by the images of boots and other clothing items. On the 
‘About’ page, we get a strange juxtaposition describing the place as both a destination 
for “trendy bars and clubs” and the “hub of the Bangladeshi community”. 
Further down in the results list is another site: the ownership is unclear but it appears to 
be related to local Bangladeshi businesses, as there is a focus on these and it also 
advertises property in Bangladesh. Again, the wording is interesting. While it 
acknowledges that the owners of the ‘authentic’ curry-houses in Brick Lane are Muslim 
and so do not drink, it emphasises an openness to non-Muslims who wish to bring their 
own alcohol to consume on the premises. 
These  strange  juxtapositions  produce  a  contradictory  image  of  Brick  Lane  as  at  once
‘authentically’ Bangladeshi and trendy, accessible and consumable by non-Bangladeshis. In
this way, the branding functions to present Brick Lane as an emblem of the success of British
multiculturalism, helping to sustain the community’s presence economically,  culturally and
politically.  Despite these positive aspects,  the re-branding project has its drawbacks.  Any
process  that  requires  the  propagation  of  an  essentialised  identity  to  function  can  be
damaging as well as it creates boundaries of belonging which must be continuously policed.
We can see evidence of this policing in Ali’s novel in the form of the ‘leaflet war’ between the
English nationalist Lion Hearts and Islamist Bengal Tigers  as much of the rhetoric used by
both sides is about the proper ‘display’ of women’s bodies. As is often the case, women are
positioned as the boundary-markers of this ‘essential’ identity formation.
Ali’s  characters  call  attention  to  the  paradox  at  the  heart  of  claiming  space  within  a
multicultural  setting.  There  is  a  moment  in  the  novel  in  which  Nazneen  expresses  her
confusion at the sight of Hindu gods in a restaurant window and asks her husband if Hindus
are moving into the area, to which Chanu replies, “Not Hindus, marketing. Biggest god of all.”
“The white people liked to see the gods”, he says “for authenticity”.  “Authenticity” here is
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about presenting a version of Bangladeshi culture that can be easily read by those passing
through,  even  if  this  means  playing  with  history,  mobilising  stereotypes  from  England’s
colonial past in an exoticised or even Orientalist fashion. So ‘authenticity’ in this case gets
exposed as a performance that fulfils  a particular purpose rather than being an accurate
representation of the place or its people. 
We nevertheless see the success of this so-called ‘marketing’ in the novel as Chanu points
out that there is much more wealth in the area than ten years ago while Nazneen describes
the proliferation of so-called ‘smart’ restaurants in the area: 
There were smart places with starched white tablecloths and multitudes of shining silver 
cutlery. In these places the newspaper clippings were framed. The tables were far apart 
and there was an absence of decoration that Nazneen knew to be a style. In the other 
restaurants the greeters and waiters wore white, oil-marked shirts. But in the smart ones 
they wore black. A very large potted fern or blue and white mosaic at the entrance 
indicated ultra-smart. (Ali, 2004, p.252)
Even though Nazneen has such a clear understanding of this hierarchy of restaurants, we
are nevertheless aware that she would never eat in any of these so-called ‘smart’ places.
Instead we are told the customers are ‘young men with sawn-off trousers and sandals and
girls in T-shirts that strained across their chests and exposed their belly-buttons’. (Ali, 2004,
p.253) 
As Nazneen moves through Brick Lane, she notices a tourist taking pictures of the scene and
finds  the  camera  directed  towards  her.  This  reminds  us  that  Nazneen  is  not  the  target
audience of this marketing but an integral part of the performance (or rather the image of her
in a sari and, we are told, walking two steps behind her husband).
Brick Lane’s truth?
As mentioned earlier,  the novel  Brick Lane  is often described by reviewers as containing
some sort  of  documentary ‘truth’ about Brick Lane the place that allows outsiders to see
behind this performance.
One might think that this ‘true’ Brick Lane is characterised by the drug use, gang violence
and rising Islamic fundamentalism that are all portrayed in the novel, reminding us again of
the image of the dangerous ethnic enclave that the Banglatown branding seeks to avoid.
However, we see that these aspects of the area are already made public in other ways,
specifically, in Ali’s account, through a media largely driven by sensationalism. Toward the
end of the novel there is a riot sparked by the ongoing tensions between the Lion Hearts and
Bengal Tigers and camera crews turn up intent  on finding a story on one of  these illicit
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activities and do not rest until they find something incriminating. 
Nazneen also becomes a figure of media and political interest after the riot. A local councillor
comes to her door with a photographer and asks her if she finds it hard to cope, to which she
replies a simple ‘No’. He then switches tactics, asking her how many children she has but
when he hears that she has only two, he is left ‘disappointed’ (in Nazneen’s words). The
councillor’s  ‘disappointment’  stems  from  his  desire  to  uncover  a  scandal  about  a
downtrodden woman burdened with too many children but instead he is only left with the
completely unspectacular image of peeling plaster. 
This documentation of the unspectacular and the everyday runs through the novel and we
often  get  lengthy  descriptions  of  domestic  objects  and  foodstuffs.  The  banality  of  these
descriptions undermines both the exotic, Orientalist ‘branding’ of Banglatown as well as the
sensationalist images of ethnic enclaves as transgressive and potentially dangerous spaces. 
Take, for example, the description given of Nazneen’s flat: 
There were three rugs: red and orange, green and purple, brown and blue. The carpet 
was yellow with a green leaf design. One hundred per cent nylon and, Chanu said, very 
hard-wearing. The sofa and chairs were the colour of dried cow dung, which was a 
practical colour. They had little sheaths of plastic on the headrests to protect them from 
Chanu’s hair oil. There was a lot of furniture, more than Nazneen had seen in one room 
before. Even if you took all the furniture in the compound, from every auntie and uncle’s 
ghar, it would not match up to this one room. There was a low table with a glass centre 
and orange plastic legs, three little wooden tables that stacked together, the big table they
used for the evening meal, a bookcase, a corner cupboard, a rack for newspapers, a 
trolley filled with files and folders, the sofa and armchairs, two footstools, six dining 
chairs and a showcase. The walls were papered in yellow with brown squares and circles 
lining neatly up and down. (Ali, 2004, p.20)
This is not the Orientalist fantasy but rather this sheer accumulation of objects gestures more
at the influence of Western consumerism 
Then, if we look at the detailed description of the contents of the family’s picnic, yet another
picture emerges:
They sat on the grass in St James’s Park and Nazneen laid the picnic out on four tea 
towels. Chicken wings spread in a paste of yoghurt and spices and baked in the oven, 
onions sliced to the thickness of a fingernail, mixed with chillies, dipped in gram flour 
and egg and fried in bubbling oil, a dry concoction of chickpeas and tomatoes stewed 
with cumin and ginger, misshapen chapattis wrapped while still hot in tinfoil and 
sprinkled now with condensation, golden hard-boiled eggs glazed in a curry seal, 
Dairylea triangles in their cardboard box, bright orange packets containing shamelessly 
orange crisps, a cake with a list of ingredients too long to be printed in legible type. She 
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arranged them all on paper plates and stacked up the plastic tubs inside the carrier bags.
(Ali, 2004, p.297)
This is not the ‘authentic curry’ image presented by the Brick Lane marketing campaign but a
mishmash of traditional cooking (blue) and modern convenience (red). 
Just as the photo of peeling plaster is the only ‘truth’ about Nazneen’s daily life that the
politicians can go away with, it could be said that this banality of everyday domesticity is the
only  ‘truth’  about  Brick  Lane  that  Monica  Ali  provides  for  her  readers.  However,  this
apparently banal and unspectacular work of making home needs to be acknowledged as part
of what produces this place called Brick Lane.  Not only is Ali’s novel about undermining the
problematic representations of the exotic or potentially dangerous ethnic enclave but also
offering resources for an alternative view, which is not burdened by essentialisms, of what
this space is about. 
It is worth noting here that some critics found Ali’s tendency to document the unremarkable in
passages such as those above to be tedious. One reviewer describes her style as ‘flatly
compendious  and  pointlessly  accretive’.  However,  when  we  look  at  the  way  Ali  writes
domesticity into her fiction, we cannot simply dismiss it  as pointless. This critic’s reaction
shows the resistance to acknowledging representations of the (female-coded) domestic as
insights into the complex processes involved in ‘making home’ in a new environment.  
Furthermore, returning to the negative reception of the novel by some groups within Brick
Lane’s  Bangladeshi  community,  we  can  find  a  similar  kind  of  resistance.  Both  Sarah
Brouillette in her article and Ali herself, in an interview with the Sunday Times (Craig, 2003)
regard the negative reactions to the novel as largely gendered. Brouillette identifies a link
between the local Bangladeshi organisation which came out strongest against Ali’s novel and
the predominantly male local business leaders who participated in the Banglatown branding
campaign; and Ali emphasises the positive reception she has had from female members of
the community.
 Ali’s novel, which exposes the ‘branding’ of Brick lane as a performance, poses a threat to
the influx of wealth to the area. For example, Brouillette argues that Ali has been demonised
primarily because she is seen to be exploiting the area for her own commercial purposes, i.e.
selling books. More unnerving, however, is that the novel accomplishes this by disrupting the
stable, essentialised boundaries of culture that this brand depends on to be successful. 
In the multicultural logic of the Brick Lane branding project,  the preservation of domestic
norms  and  home-making  practices  becomes  synonymous  with  preserving  the  cultural
essence.  Ali’s  novel,  however,  represents  these  as  complex  processes  of  cultural
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negotiation. This, in turn, poses challenges to the male-centred project of creating a ‘home
away from home’ with clearly defined identities, values and gendered norms by instilling it
with  new meanings  and  new possibilities  for  Bangladeshi  femininity  that  go  beyond  the
archetype of the ‘unspoilt girl from the village’. We could interpret this as the emergence of a
diasporic gender identity, which is neither a triumph of the western liberal/feminist subject nor
an essentialist Bangladeshi one. 
These new possibilities are perhaps best summed up by the clothing business started by
Brick Lane’s female characters at  the novel’s close. In this new venture,  entitled ‘Fusion
Fashions’, a feminised product (clothing) becomes the emblem for women negotiating the
often limited possibilities of the multicultural city, showing that the unspectacular work of the
domestic is more complex and productive of the public space of identity and belonging than
is immediately recognisable. 
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A Child of the Jago: the Reality and the Fiction       
— Sarah Wise (Novelist)
In his review of Arthur Morrison’s novel,  A Child of the Jago, literary critic HD Traill (1897)
wrote that “The original of the Jago has, it is admitted, ceased to exist. But I will make bold to
say that as described by Mr Morrison, it never did exist.” The ‘Jago’ of Morrison’s title was the
scarcely disguised ‘Old Nichol’ slum which stood, until the mid-1890s, just behind Shoreditch
High Street where the Boundary Street Estate is today. A keen eugenicist, Morrison stated
that his intention in writing A Child of the Jago, which was published in November 1896, had
been to show the gradual corruption of a basically decent boy, Dicky Perrott, by the criminal
slum in which he was born and grew up. “It was my fate,” wrote Morrison in his preface to the
novel (1897), “to encounter a place in Shoreditch, where children were born and reared in
circumstances which gave them no reasonable chance of living decent lives: where they
were born foredamned to a criminal or semi-criminal career.” 
A close investigation of dates shows, however, that Morrison’s claim to have more or less
taken up residence in the heart of the Nichol, in order to write the ugly truth about life there,
was itself untrue. Morrison’s own account of how the novel came to be researched places
him in the Nichol between October 1894 and March 1896. But the decision to demolish the
Nichol in its entirety had been taken by the London County Council in 1891, and by January
1893  — that’s  a  whole  20  months  before  Morrison  turned  up  — one  local  newspaper
proclaimed the area “The Land of Desolation”, declaring, “Half the houses are now closed by
the orders of the County Council, and the dark and deserted alleys afford a likely sanctuary
to the burglars and garrotters of who we hear so much lately.” The newspaper is describing
the activities of a small number of ne’er-do-wells who had come from outside the area, in
order to live for free ahead of the demolitions and in order to pursue whatever criminal or
secret  activities  the  condemned  and  empty  buildings  could  give  cover  for.  Mounted
policemen  were  patrolling  the  streets  of  the  Nichol,  now  that  the  6,000-strong  local
population had been evicted or given final notice to quit, in preparation for the demolitions.
Whatever Morrison did or did not see or experience in his 18 months on that spot was not the
behaviour of the community of the Nichol. 
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The Nichol had a reasonably bad reputation before Morrison though many saw it as a tragic
place rather than a wicked one. But the novel damned the spot posthumously, and ‘Arthur
Morrisonitis’, as I call it, has afflicted most, if not all, 20th and 21st century commentators.
Sadly,  in  my  view,  even  some former  residents  came to  view the  place  through  Arthur
Morrison-tinted specs,  and what  today psychologists call  ‘internalisation’ took place on a
grand scale. Morrison’s mythic Jago, “a fairyland of horror”, in critic HD Traill’s (1897, p.66)
lovely phrase, has usurped the historical fact of the Nichol which was for the most part pretty
mundane in its awfulness. When historian Raphael Samuel came to record days’ worth of
cassette tapes with Arthur Harding, who had lived the first ten years of his life in the Nichol’s
final ten years, Harding spoke of his childhood in ‘the Jago’, just as often as he spoke of it in
‘the Nichol’. (The Harding tapes are held by the Bishopsgate Library). This has been one of
the most  impressive literary re-brandings of a district  in London history,  perhaps even in
world history. 
It is a wonderful artistic vision, one that is still read and savoured today; the problem arises
when Morrison  (1897,  pp.  xi-xii)  claims that  it  is  the  literal  truth,  written  in  order  to  stir
lawmakers and others in a position to bring about change to act now to avert social disaster.
He was angry with those who believed “that the sole function of art was to minister to their
personal comfort — as upholstery does.” The wealthy, he said, expected a novel to supply
them with  a  “debauch of  self-delusion”  but  that  he was not  the man “to  coat  truth  with
treacle”.  As a good read, and a page-turner,  I  can not praise  A Child of the Jago  highly
enough; as a source for historians, it is lamentable. The novel’s action spans nine years, and
is told in 37 high-speed, thrilling, heart-in-the-mouth, often sickening, chapters. In the first
section, our hero, Dicky Perrott, is eight years old; in the second he is 13; and in the third and
last, he has reached the age of 17. 
At least some of the excitement in the book arises from the role that the streets of the Jago
themselves  play.  The  maze-like  configuration  of  the  Jago  street  plan  appears  both  to
influence  behaviour  and  to  reflect  emotional  states.  The  slum’s  topography  induces  a
cunning, furtive mentality; the possessor of that mentality, in turn, learns to make use of the
Jago’s intricacies to evade hostile ‘outsiders’ in pursuit. In Morrison’s book, knowledge of
Jago geography is knowledge of evil.  This is one of the clearest examples of what in 70
years’ time would be called ‘psycho-geography’: the interplay between the human mind and
the physical environment in which that mind finds itself. Time and again, in  A Child of the
Jago, characters crash into each other as they burst into the slum or dash round a corner or
erupt into a court. Dicky is shown to have this knowledge and so we also see him negotiating
the  Jago  labyrinth  in  full  flight  whenever  he  has  committed  a  theft.  This  underlines  his
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ambivalent relationship to the place: Dicky’s worse nature knows how to exploit the streets;
his  better  nature  is  routinely  confounded  by  them.  Dicky  travels  along  his  own  private
pathways through the slum to avoid the Dove Lane gang (Dove Lane being a thinly disguised
Columbia Road).
The  real  Old  Nichol  had  been  completed  and  entirely  built  over  by  the  mid-1830s  but
construction had not stopped there. Over the next 50 years or so, the back yards and other
open spaces had sprouted a separate shanty-style development: a parallel world of illegal
courts  and  small  houses,  workshops,  stables,  cowsheds  and  donkey
stalls. Local map-makers and surveyors just gave up trying to keep accurate maps of the
Nichol. But locals knew which houses could be passed right through to bring them out into a
different street and which section of fence could be lifted for an escape from one backyard or
court into another and it is true that the minority of sneak thieves who lived in the Nichol
could use this  secret  knowledge to evade any copper  who had dashed after  them from
Shoreditch High Street or Bethnal Green Road. 
This is something that was also a feature of life in the St Giles slum, where Centrepoint is
today, demolished in the 1840s. The slum had secret pathways through it, all of which added
to the sense that  it  was forbidden territory  to outsiders.  This  is  a  rather  delicious,  eerie
feeling, which Morrison made good use of, but again, it is overplayed. Outsiders may not
have known about these secret ways through the Old Nichol, but they nevertheless did come
into  the  Nichol’s  more  conventional  streets,  even  after  dark,  and  a  scan  of  the  local
newspapers  of  the  1880s  shows  that  middle-class  and  lower-middle-class  people  were
perfectly  happy to  go into the Nichol  for  evening social  occasions,  such as  supper  and
harmonic evenings, and masonic lodge celebrations. These pillars of the community clearly
did not believe that they would be under attack once they entered the maze. But you would
never know that if you took A Child of the Jago to be based on fact. The people of the Jago
are irredeemably awful:  vicious and violent for the sheer joy of it;  incapable of an act of
kindness or honesty; work-shy, ignorant, and proud to be so. According to Morrison, (1897)
they can be nothing other because this is the spot where decades of physical, mental and
moral degeneration have created beings whose biological destiny is fixed. But they keep on
breeding; Morrison himself and characters we are supposed to admire speak of them as
‘rats’ who ‘swarm’ and ‘teem’ and ‘breed’ in their ‘nests’. Morrison writes: “Still the Jago rats
bred and bred their kind unhindered, multiplying apace and infecting the world”. (1897, p.69)
HG Wells,  (1896)  in  reviewing the book,  pointed out  the fallacious heritability  argument.
Morrison, he said, had confused environmental factors and heritable characteristics. Wells
wrote:
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…neither ignorance, wrong moral suggestions, nor parasites are inherited... The Jago 
people are racially indistinguishable from the people who send their children to Oxford, 
and the rate of increase in the Jago population is entirely irrelevant to the problem. The 
Jago is not a ‘black inheritance’, it is a black contagion, which alters the whole problem.
Had  Morrison  turned  up  in  the  Nichol  before  1892,  he  would  have  found  a  population
certainly for the most part mired in chronic poverty. Charles Booth estimated that 80% of the
residents were in extreme poverty against a figure of 35% for the rest of East London. The
Nichol had the cheapest rents to be found anywhere in the capital and it was the place where
you ended up as the last step before the common lodging house and then the workhouse (or
the gutter which many did). 
Over-represented  in  the  demographic  of  the  Nichol  were  the  very  old,  female-headed
households (the male breadwinner being either deceased, absent or in prison), highly skilled
artisans whose fine work was being priced out  of  the market  by mass market,  or  ‘slop’,
products,  men who were out  on  parole  or  discharged prisoners  whose  record  left  them
extremely  unattractive  to  potential  employers.  But  what  was not  over-represented in  the
Nichol was serious criminality. Despite the presence of a highly visible sub-group of young
males lounging around the streets with nowhere else to go, street crime and serious assaults
were no more prevalent in the Old Nichol than in any other part of East London. Just one
murder occurred in the last ten years of the Nichol’s existence, during a family dispute. That
is  not  bad  going  for  a  population  of  over  6,000  living  in  the  most  demoralising  and
grotesquely revolting conditions with very little reason to feel hopeful for any improvement in
their lives. 
So why did Morrison libel the Nichol population? Writing in the late 1960s, Morrison scholar
PJ  Keating  (1969,  p.29)  stated  that  Morrison’s  horror  and  loathing  of  the  Jagoites  was
probably attributable to some personal source. Morrison remains a rather mysterious figure.
Interviewers failed to winkle much background information from him; and, as she had been
instructed, Morrison’s wife, Elizabeth, burnt all his private papers upon his death, in 1945.
But we know that he tried to hide his humble early years as the son of a gas-fitter and a
haberdashery shopkeeper in Poplar. It is tempting to view A Child of the Jago as a record of
a clever, ambitious, young working-class man putting a lot of distance between himself and
those who had fallen into the abyss of chronic poverty.
Morrison had been invited into the slum by charismatic Anglican priest Father Arthur Osborne
Jay whose own three books about his church work in the Nichol contain pretty much all the
incidents and some of the characters that feature in A Child of the Jago. It is not going too far
to say that A Child of the Jago is a novelisation of Jay’s views of his parishioners and the
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best way to confront the ‘social problem’, which is one of the titles of Jay’s own books. One
of the main, and less exciting, thrusts of the novel is the attack on all other forms of help
except that offered by Jay: Church of England pastoral care. The book is apart from anything
an extended advert for Jay’s Holy Trinity church, Old Nichol Street and the assistance that
Jay offered there.  Perhaps this is why the curious name, the Jago, was chosen to re-brand
the Nichol: as Tower Hamlets’ former archivist David Rich put it, the Jago is where Jay goes.
This talk was adapted from a chapter by Sarah Wise in Whitehead, A. and White, J. (eds.) 
(2013) London Fictions, London: Five Leaves Press 
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Value Creation in the Olympic City
— Gavin Poynter (UEL)
 
In the context of London 2012, put quite simply, we have two social processes taking place at
the same time: on the one hand, we have a spectacle, as Michael Rustin has called it in his
book (2009),  a spectacle that  involves one of  the greatest  sporting events to take place
globally in the world; and on the other hand, particularly since the experience of Barcelona in
1992, we have a process associated with that event, which I will briefly call 'city-building'.
Much of the work that we explored in that context here at the UEL has been focussed on this
process of city building, in particular the city-building component that is associated with the
game-delivering,  the  social  transformation  of  East  London  as  promised,  and  the  social
transformation that explicitly seeks to improve and enhance the life opportunities of socially
disadvantaged communities that have long existed within that area. 
The kind of conclusion that we have drawn, I think, and that certainly I would draw from the
research we have undertaken, is that, in a sense, the Olympics as an event and the city
building are two really good things: the Olympics is an event that attracts a global audience
and elite athletes from across the world; on the other hand, in terms of the UK, the thing we
desperately need is good city building, at the present time, particularly given the shortages of
housing,  social  infrastructure  and  other  amenities.  So  these  in  themselves  may  be
considered to be good things. But the problem lies in the way in which these are put together.
It is the bringing together of these good things that give rise to many of the issues that other
papers have referred to. We have heard much about the 'London model', that is, London has
not only delivered the Games on time but it would also deliver an astonishing legacy. The
'London model' is something that we should be interpreting and analysing in some details
because it would be of considerable interest to future host cities.
Now, it seems to me that in this context, one of the other broad points – before going on to
refer to some of the research that we have undertaken – is that throughout the 20th century
politics played with sport, politics engaged with sport, particularly through experiences of the
Cold War era. The Olympics could not escape the ideological debate of the Cold War era and
this was reflected through a number of incidents from 1968 to 1980s with various countries
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refusing to participate in the Games. Since approximately 1992, in a sense, the ideological
Olympics  has been  displaced  by  an  end-of-ideology  Olympics.  There  has  been  a  great
interest  in  the  kind of  model  that  Michael  Rustin  has  already outlined (2009),  a  kind of
technocratic model of Games organisation through which, in effect, sport tends to displace
politics and particularly the politics associated with city building. 
One of the things that we looked at recently and Penny Bernstock, my colleague, has done
much of the hard research on this, has been the ways in which urban regeneration plays in
the context of the mega event and gives rise to a new value, the re-valorisation of the whole
area of the city, in London’s case, the East End of London. How is it that this re-valorisation
takes  place?  And  who  is  it  that  vastly  benefits  from  this  process  of  turning  a  largely
brownfield site into new areas of urban spatial development associated with good transport
and other forms of social and commercial infrastructure?  In a sense, re-valorisation when
linked to this urban regeneration agenda has a certain familiar ring to it, in relation to the
Games as well as other major projects undertaken recently in the UK. It goes something like
this: you have a large pot of public investment, 9.3 billion pounds, the investment takes place
at the lowest point of depreciation of the land and the properties in a particular area, in this
case, East London. Significant public investment improves the rail and road infrastructure,
constructs  new  buildings,  green  spaces  and  areas  of  considerable  potential.  This
subsequently pushes up land values and property prices. In the context of the Olympics, we
suddenly begin to find that the private sector which was interested at the beginning of the
Games becomes rather more interested down the line when public investment begins to
deliver the re-valorisation of certain parts of the area of East London, particularly around the
Olympic Park. 
The private sector engages then with the state in the way that Michael Rustin has already
identified (2009) through negotiation with public authority over the potential of the Olympic
Park, the Olympic Village and the area that surrounds it. In the course of this development,
the obvious concern of the private sector is for viability. We can explore what 'viability' means
in some more detail perhaps in the discussion. That process of re-valorisation is triggered by
the public sector and the private sector in the context of the Olympics gets involved as some
of  the  improvements  begin  to  take  shape.   Who  benefits  from  that  new  value  that  is
generated? Now,  if  we listen to the Mayor  and to  successive  governments,  Labour  and
Conservative, and if we listen to the local authorities, who have very ambitious policies in
relation to the convergence of the life opportunities of these disadvantaged communities with
the rest of London, it would seem clear that the policy that emerges from the political sphere
is  geared  towards  improving  and  enhancing  the  social  condition  of  the  less  well,  less
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privileged communities of East London. 
From the research that we have undertaken so far, however, it appears that what could be
achieved through the development of  the Olympics will  be precisely the opposite of  that
which the policy makers have announced. I think that it is important to know in some ways
how and why this will  take place and it  does require in-depth exploration.  Our work,  for
example,  looked  at  the  agreement  between  the  state  and  the  local  state  agencies,
particularly local authorities but also the London Thames Gateway Development Corporation,
and developers in the area bordering the Olympics Park, in particular, Stratford High Street.
The 'Section 106 Agreement' is one in which a private developer makes a commitment to
provide public and community gain from the developments that are taking place. From the
study conducted by Penny, particularly the 22 schemes in the Stratford High St. area, (we
are following this up with the Olympic Park itself) it is very clear that there is little evidence of
community gain being achieved substantially from these development activities. 
First of all, the scale of the Olympic development reveals in many respects the inadequacy of
all the legal framework mechanisms that the public sector has put in place to secure benefits
from  its  investment.  The  private  developers  tend  to  get  away  with,  to  put  it  simply,  a
'mitigation impact fee' as a result of the development that they have decided to construct.
They  do  not,  in  any  way,  return  to  the  public  or  community  sector,  anything  that  is
commensurate  with the initial public investment made, whether that has been in the form of
social housing, or other public spaces. In the context, for example, of social housing from
2005 to 2012, one can see that the development that has taken place around the Olympic
Park has delivered proportionately less and less social housing.  Other elements of public
and community benefits have also been much diminished as a result of these agreements.
What does it mean in relation to the Olympics coming to East London? I have about four
observations to make. The first is this, that the Olympics does reveal a role performed by the
state and public investment on behalf of the private sector and it does demonstrate, in many
ways,  not  really  some of  the  flows  of  the  public-private  partnership,  but  a  rather  more
important dynamic in relation between the state and the private sector that is one of the
increased  dependency  of  the  private  sector  upon  the  technocratic  state  as  a  source  of
profitability. In other words, the Olympics reveal the fundamental weaknesses existing in the
British economy at the present time and the role that the state has historically played in trying
to support that rather weak economy. Secondly, the claims that are made in relation to the
policy  associated  with  the  socially  disadvantaged  in  East  London  are  all  proven  to  be
ineffective; improvements in the life of the socially disadvantaged will not come through the
London: City of Paradox — 185
Olympics themselves. That balance of benefits will largely accrue to the private sector and
the developers that are working in particular pockets of East London. The nature of that
development opportunity is also changing in the context of London itself: the Olympic Park is
a  good  illustration  of  this.  With  the  Qatari  Sovereign  Wealth  Fund’s  investments  in  the
Olympic Village we can see that international properties investors will begin to find London
properties, in particular of the iconic type, a very lucrative investment. Finally in the context of
the pattern for  London and East  London,  for  the future,  the path that  emerges from the
Games is the path that in a way re-enforces the network of existing business interests and
the networks of  work that  already exist  within London as a whole.  And this,  I  think,  will
ultimately  be to the detriment  sadly  of  the disadvantaged communities that  are currently
living here.
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Is the Army invading British Civil Society?   
— Vron Ware (Open University)
After more than ten years of overstretch in Iraq, Afghanistan and more recently in Libya, the
armed forces – the British Army in particular – find themselves looking for a new role not just
as an adjunct of US military power, or with European partners, but in the domestic sphere as
well (Richard Norton-Taylor, 2012). While the human cost of non-stop wars defies calculation,
the institution has been subjected to significant cuts and restructuring as part of the Coalition
Government’s efforts to slash the public sector. As Londoners assimilate the fact that the city
is under military occupation for the duration of the games, and that a further 3,500 soldiers
will  be employed (Hopkins, 2012) as bargain-basement security guards, it  is clear (Ware,
2010) that the relationship between the armed forces and civil society has changed beyond
recognition over the last decade (Barnett, 2012).
A recent indication is the news that Labour’s latest policy review is looking at how young
people could gain from “the values and expertise” of military institutions.  Stephen Twigg and
Jim Murphy (2012), shadow ministers for education and defence respectively, began with the
now commonplace platitude that the armed forces “are central to our national character, just
as they are to our national security. The ethos and values of the Services can be significant
not just on the battlefield but across our society, including in schools.”  Their vague proposals
for integrating military workers into civilian society include the suggestion that “a cadre of
Armed Services mentors, mainly veterans and reservists …work closely with those in need of
guidance  and  support.  This  gestures  towards  the  vexed  issue  of  resettling  a  militarised
workforce  likely  to  be heavily  scarred  by  combat  experience (Sherwood,  2012).”  One
concrete plan, however, is to increase the cadet force in state secondary schools, a long-
running plan that has been previously backed by Gordon Brown and Michael Gove as a
solution to improving the character and moral standards of the nation’s young people.
Ed Miliband’s attempt to join the military choir is merely the latest proof that the status of the
armed  forces  has  changed  significantly  in  the  last  decade.  From  2003  onwards,  the
outpouring  of  public  sympathy  towards  soldiers  who  were  cast  as  victims  of  futile  and
unpopular  wars has been part  of  a  long drawn-out  process during which British  military
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institutions have been repositioned at the centre of national life. As soldiers prepare to carry
out  security  checks  and  public  order  duties  during  the  London  Olympics  –  the  biggest
mobilisation of military and security forces seen in the UK since the Second World War – the
public is about to witness one dimension of these profound changes.
The games provide a tailor-made experiment to test the public’s reactions to army uniforms
seen up close and,  above all,  worn by soldiers primed to engage with fellow citizens as
opposed to foreign combatants. Despite the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) initial reluctance to
commit the overstretched forces to the operation (Hopkins and Gibson, 2012), the haphazard
co-operation between police, private contractors G4S and military personnel can be seen as
a dry run for Britain’s developing state security arrangements.
While the news of thousands of redundancies and the scrapping of historic regiments has
attracted most  of  the media attention,  the revelation that  the so-called Army 2020 (Army,
2012)  will  involve a greater  proportion of  logistical  and other  work farmed out  to private
contractors has passed without comment. The fact that the future Army 2020 will  rely on
thousands of reserve, or part-time, soldiers, should be understood as another strategy to
integrate military work into the civilian economy, enmeshing employers as well as recruits
into a wider network of  the nation’s  security apparatus.  As Twigg and Murphy point  out,
“Reservists use civilian skills to support the military and the reverse should also be true”.
These developments have had accumulated affects: the changing public view of soldiering
as a particular form of labour; the deployment not just of military hardware (Bond and Drury,
2012)  but  also uniformed soldiers  (Prince,  2012)   in  securitising  the games;  the cuts and
restructuring of the defence sector as an index of the UK’s diminishing global influence; and
the mounting anxiety about the sheer numbers of ex-servicemen and women re-entering the
workforce, a large proportion of whom are suffering mental and physical health issues as a
result of combat experience.
While the armed forces have been engaged in continuous deployment in far away countries,
the  ‘homeland’  has  been  inexorably  subjected  to  new  technologies  of  surveillance  and
control.  With the military otherwise occupied,  the onus on devising policies to cope with
emergencies, from floods to chemical warfare to what are known as ‘Mumbai-style’ attacks,
has fallen largely on police and local authorities.
A recent document (2012) from Mark Phillips, based at the Royal United Services Institute,
indicates that calculating a distinct role for the military in national security and ‘homeland
resilience’ might  be a  fraught  business. He  notes  that  it  not  going  to  be straightforward
integrating the armed forces with police and other security agencies which are not used to
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military modes of operating. Military planners are also aware that the institution’s relationship
with the public is important as well. The King's Centre for Military Health Research (2012)
reports that that although 83 per cent of the public have “a high or very high opinion of the
armed forces, almost 20 per cent of service personnel have faced hostility from members of
the public on their return from Afghanistan and Iraq, and nearly 60 per cent of them felt
people did not understand their experience during deployment.”
For these reasons alone the debates about the future of the armed forces require a politically
engaged  response.  The  official  decision  about  Army  2020  was  announced  shortly  after
Armed Forces Day on 30 June, leaving the government open to the charge that there was a
delay so as to spare embarrassment in the MoD. But, in addition to the controversial cuts
and amalgamations to historic regiments, there are other aspects of the restructuring that
have not been widely discussed. On the same Armed Forces Day – a new calendar event
inaugurated by Brown’s government in  2009 - the Telegraph front  page ran the headline,
‘Battalions with foreign bias face  axe   in army cuts  ’ (Harding and Kirkup, 2012). The following
day,  1  July,  three  more  UK  soldiers  were  killed  in  Afghanistan  (MoD,  2012). One  of
these, Guardsman Apete Tuisovurua of  the 1st  Battalion Welsh Guards,  was a citizen of
Fiji. He represented one of several thousand Commonwealth citizens recruited since 1998,
when New Labour dropped residency requirements for Commonwealth citizens in order to
boost flagging manpower levels. Aged 28, he had only joined in November 2010 and had
served in his regiment for less than a year.
The  suggestion  that  ‘foreign  bias’  was  a  problem  needs  serious  attention.  Without  the
presence of  Commonwealth citizens,  the armed forces – the British Army in particular  –
would not have been able to deploy so widely in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and
more recently Iraq and Afghanistan. The 1998 Strategic Defence Review SDR increased the
size of the logistics section which recruited heavily not just from Fiji, but also from Caribbean
and African countries. In 2009 the Royal Logistics Corps RLC was one of the areas capped
at 15% of non-UK citizens in an attempt to maintain the ‘Britishness’ of the organization.
Today  it  faces  heavy  cuts  and  the  replacement  of  former  in-house  functions  by  private
contractors. The 3rd Battalion the Yorkshire Infantry regiment (3 Yorks), due to be scrapped,
has also recruited heavily from Commonwealth citizens since the turn of the century.
Equally important is the fact that the presence of Commonwealth soldiers throughout the
armed forces has meant that the army, in particular, has been able to reach the requisite
targets for black and minority ethnic (BME) personnel. The decision to axe those parts of the
organisation  that  rely  disproportionately  on  migrant  labour  presents  a  different  kind  of
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headache for  military  recruiters.  As levels  of  UK-born BMEs remain  stubbornly  low,  it  is
important that civilians track the attempts made to sustain a functioning multicultural army
that is not disconnected from the diversity in UK society.
Paying attention to the politics of military work offers important ways of monitoring a country’s
national security policy, as well as interrogating the substance of national identity. There are
many other  aspects  of  the  plan  to  reorganise Britain’s  defence and  security  sector  that
should cause concern. Britain’s foreign policy and its relationship with the rest of the world
are rapidly shifting as a result of the seismic reconfiguration of global power (Norton-Taylor,
2012). The move towards an increasing reliance on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) – what
Tom Englehardt (2010) calls “the perfect American weapon” – must be resisted at all costs.
The weary silence of  a British  public  that  is  tired  of  endless  war  must  not  be taken as
compliance  with  this  latest  development  in  human-killing  technology.  Likewise  the  UK’s
involvement in the global arms trade needs constant resistance and investigation.
But above all, if we are to pay attention to the new meanings of militarisation, it is crucial to
connect the restructuring of the national armed forces to the workings of the security state
within  the  UK.  With  the  police  now  licensed  and  trained  to  use  militarised  control
technologies,  our  cities  are  subject  to  what  Stephen  Graham has  identified  as  the  new
military urbanism (2012): the perfect scenario for the coming Olympics.  We cannot say that
we have not been warned.
Originally published on openDemocracy OurKingdom 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/vron-ware/is-army-invading-british-civil-society
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New Forms of Privatism         
— Mike Raco (King’s College)
In an increasingly complex and uncertain global environment,  Richard Murphy (2011) the
accountant and economist, argues that we are now seeing new forms of privatism or private
politics and new forms of elitism. We are no longer seeing the old-fashioned politics of the
big corporations lobbying the government for laws and taxations that would be favourable to
their interests. Rather, the private companies want to secure new forms of taxation revenues
that they would manage themselves. They claim to perform the task of the state better than
the state itself.   This new private politics is about getting hold of government money, getting
hold of government contracts and trying to convince the government that 'we can do a better
job than you can. If you delegate your responsibility to us we will do it better, cheaper, and
we will do it under a series of contracts’. But actually what is it that private companies want? 
My work, for example, is about how new finance initiatives are being used for new-build in
London. Some people like Murphy argue that the current credit crunch is partly the result of
private investment funds turning away from private business to invest in hospitals, schools,
roads etc where you can get guaranteed returns for 30-40 years through contracts. Why
invest in a small business in Liverpool when you can invest in a new hospital in Liverpool
which will  provide fantastic returns from the tax payers for 30 years? In other words, the
credit  crunch  has  been  partly  caused  by  the  relationships  the state  developed  with  the
private sector. There are huge networks that regulate the sector: the biggest accounting firms
have been deeply involved in projects like the Olympics right from the beginning and one can
easily predict that when it comes to evaluating the Olympics and its legacy these companies
will evaluate themselves and get paid again and again for the same work. These sorts of
companies  act  as the private police  force of  capitalism and regulate the world’s  biggest
corporations,  even  though  they  are  themselves  the  world’s  biggest  corporations.  In  the
Olympic development these networks, I would argue, are very much at the forefront of the
organisation. 
It  is worth looking at the Olympics development in terms of the democratic deficit.  Some
people say to me 'well, the Olympics is an exception'. I think that that is problematic. The
Olympics has provided us with a wonderful model for a particular type of development which
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is hugely appealing for city authorities and governments around the world, not just in relation
to the Olympic Games, but in relation to urban development projects in general. What is so
interesting about the Olympics, however, was the way in which politics, the political debate,
was set aside as a kind of event that finished with the bidding process in 2005. For the
people involved in the preparations for the Olympics, there was a 'two stage process': two
years of talking about what we are going to do, but then after two years, getting rid of, as one
of the people I spoke to called, 'all of that', in other words, the politics and discussions about
the legacy. The whole philosophy underlying the Olympics process seems to be that delivery
of the Games on time should be at the forefront – a fascinating and explicitly technocratic
model for development – that democracy and politics get in the way of delivery, so they need
to  be  replaced  and  moved  somewhere  where  they  are  controllable,  manageable,  and
subordinated to the process of decision making. The argument says, 'well, this is how you
get things done' regardless of the democratic process which is absolutely a fundamental
point. As soon as the delivery agency was set up, they said 'ok, we are the delivery agency
for the government, we are going to get delivery partners from the private sector, who will
deliver  everything  for  us',  which  also  removes  the  private  sector  further  away  from
accountability.  Within  a  month  of  being  established,  they  went  to  tender  and  a  huge
conglomerate Irish company took the contract to deliver the Games on behalf of the Olympic
Delivery Authority (ODA), a public sector body. 
An interesting set of politics surrounds the whole delivery process. We need to look at the
contracts, first of all. This is what I have been doing for my research. We need to look back at
the contract signed in 2006: the 250 page document, which specified just about everything
about the Games, was formulated by the IOC (International Olympics Committee). I  have
been looking, in particular, at the delivery contracts and the relationship between the Olympic
authority and an American company called CLN. They managed 42,000 separate contracts
with  sub-contractors  to  deliver  the  Olympics,  revealing  a  fascinating  series  of  networks
around the Games. 
Some people would argue that there is a logic to this: government decides what it wants,
sets up an agency, that agency goes to the private sector, it gets a transnational corporation
to deliver,  they come in and they manage what  they called a cascade of  contracts.  So,
42,000 contracts were set up with business in different ways, through different levels with
different tiers of contracts. The argument here is that this works, that you deliver, that unlike
any other macro project you run, you get it done, you get it achieved. Certainly there is a
logic to this; a lot of people that I talked to said things like 'it is a sustainable agenda. Things
like employing local people', and 'this is the way to do it because it is only through contracts
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that you can force companies to employ a certain number of people from the local area and
think about sustainability; they would lose their contracts if they don’t deliver. This works.'
There is actually quite an interesting logic at play here and, something which the research
has to engage with it in terms of what that means, but what was interesting for me, is the
scale  of  privatisation  here.  The  levels  of  responsibility  are  enormous;  even  local
consultations to some extent were buried with private companies working on behalf of the
Royal Institute of Architects (RIBA) which was working on behalf of the government. 
What the state of this contract is and where politics fit into this is very problematic because
the lexicon of the discussion is around the delivery of the Games. It is all that they are really
concerned  with.  The  kind  of  terminology  in  the  contracts  –  ‘capital  cost',  'competitive
dialogue', ‘contractor compliance' – has a huge impact on what happens. When you look
through the contracts, you look at the way in which, for example, risk is a proportion of the
shared output. When you look at the details, you realise that everything has effectively been
decided  and  that  not  much  can  really  change  after  the  contract  is  signed;  so  when
community  groups make demands about  certain things,  one of  the problems is  that  the
structure has not  and cannot  change very much.  The delivery of  infrastructure is  a very
expensive process,  but  the contract  rewards them hugely through a series of  dividends,
payments  and  bonuses,  just  for  getting  it  done,  for  doing  their  job.  They  are  fantastic
negotiators because they have got a good deal from their contracts. The conglomerate made
something like £17,018 million just in 2011. I looked at these accounts. In 2011, for example,
a dividend of £43 million was paid, while the average salary of workers was £60,000. They
made a lot out of it, including an army of consultants, lawyers, and companies like Ernst &
Young which made something like £12 million in 2009 alone. You start getting a sense of how
networked  this  is;  organisations  and  companies  come  together  in  a  self-fulfilling,  self-
justifying, self-paying way. A lot of money ultimately comes from the public purse. 
One final anecdote before I finish. Under the Freedom of Information Act I managed to get a
copy of the contract agreed between the Olympic Delivery Authority and one of its companies
in 2006, all 125 pages of it. There are many things I could say about it; one interesting thing
was that any bit of this contract which mentions finance was taken out – that is fair enough
because we know that confidentiality would be a problem for that kind of organisation – but
this has gone beyond that. It says that:
…any prejudice in their commercial interest is likely to resolve in prejudice toward the 
commercial interest because the role of the company is to negotiate the prices of 
contracts for the Olympics authority and any public disclosure of this information is 
likely to provide commercially significant advantage to potential contractual competitors.
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What is fascinating is that they are basically saying that my interests as a citizen are the
same as the interests of the private company. The private company is working for me; it is
not working for itself;  it  has become the state apparatus. It has taken the job of trying to
deliver the Games off the state, and in that way basically what they are saying is 'the public
interest is not to know because in fact the private company is the state per se.’ They become
so intertwined that they are fighting for me as a citizen, not for themselves. I found that more
interesting than the contract, because it ties in with what I have been saying earlier about
these forms of contract. It is much more than a partnership or a basic contract. This is real
change taking place under the radar: the state is saying that it is no longer in charge and that
the privatised companies are acting on behalf of the citizens. I found that very interesting:
public and private interest become so interchangeable that they get turned around. 
Another point I want to make with regard to the contract is that it is fixed in time. Clauses like
'no changes to this contract, unless provided for by the conditions of this contract has effect
unless it has been agreed, confirmed in writing and signed by the parties' suggest that once
the private company has signed the contract, it  does not have to change anything. So if
community groups or politicians talk about sustainability and make changes at a later date,
the  company  has  been  under  absolutely  no  obligation  to  change  anything  since  2006.
Politically, this freezes the entire development project. Basically it says that at that moment,
in  2006  when this  contract  was  in  place,  everything  had  to  be  thought  about,  and  any
subsequent changes must ensure that the company is ‘no better and no worse off'. In other
words, if you are trying to bring in new labour, for example, and the minimum wage has gone
up, the company can write to the government and demand the difference in minimum wage
rates between 2006, when the contract was signed and the current moment. If there is to be
a democratic premium, anything you want to bring in, you have to pay for. This is in the
contract.  This  is  unbelievingly  powerful  in  terms  of  locking  in  a  series  of  development
processes. 
The implications of this go beyond the Olympics.  One of these is about what the state is
becoming in  this  context.  We have been talking about  hybridity  here.  I  want  to  start  by
looking into broader debates into infrastructure, investments, Chinese companies building
new constructions in Britain, all of which will have major implications for what the state is
going to be, what it becomes in the absence of politics.  We need to reverse the argument
that we need to 'take the politics out in order to get it delivered'. We need to re-politicise it.
This is a question we need to discuss more broadly: Look at Italy, for instance, where the
government was handed over to a technocrat in the name of efficiency. At what point then do
you take the power away from the technocrat and give it back to elected politicians? 
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There is also a methodological issue for us as researchers: we lack investigative skills. It is
no coincidence that some of the best research on privatisation comes from journalists or from
those who are accountants, like Richard Murphy who was an accountant before he became
a journalist. People with accountancy skills have an ability to de-construct what is happening
in a way that social scientists lack.
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